THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 OCTOBER 1970
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005977760
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date:
October 26, 1970
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The President's Daily Brief
26 October 1970
46
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
26 October 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
More Communist forces from South Vietnam are being
deployed to southern Laos, apparently to improve
security, along the infiltration corridor. (Page 1)
A recent defector has provided information on the
Communists problems in Cambodia and their uncertain-
ties about capitalizing on a political settlement in
South Vietnam. (Page 2)
In Czechoslovakia, a firm decision appears to have
been made to discontinue political trials. (Page 3)
In Chile, a major effort is under way to apprehend
those responsible for the assassination of General
Schneider. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Communist Troop Deployment Away From South Vietnam
?
Tchepon
2nd N VA talsi
Elements Il
Demilitarized Zone
THAIL
? Stung Treng
C A;t4A D
' PHNOM PENH
550348 10-70 CIA
MILES
50X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM-LAOS
Recent intercepts indicate that one and possibly
two infantry regiments are being sent to southern
Laos from the B-3 Front, the Communist command in the
western highlands of South Vietnam. Part of the 28th
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment was near Attopeu
on 23 October, well outside the B-3 Front's usual
area of operations. Other intercepts suggest that
the 66th Regiment from the same command also is mov-
ing, but its destination is unknown. Another B-3
Front regiment was moved into Cambodia in early sum-
mer in support of the Communist effort around Stung
Treng.
The transfer of regiments from the western
highlands increases further the manpower
buildup in the panhandle. Since early sum-
mer two or possibly three infantry regi-
ments have moved, or are in the process of
moving, into this area from North Vietnam.
Elements of the 2nd NVA Division normally
based in northern South Vietnam have been
stationed in the Tchepone area since mid-
summer. At least 10,000 other men have
been sent to southern Laos through the in-
filtration system.
The movement of regiments from the B-3
Front reduces the immediate military,
threat to South Vietnam's western high-
lands and may have left the B-3 Front
with only two of the five North Vietnamese
regiments it normally has on hand. Hanoi's
willingness to draw off forces from South
Vietnam to help its buildup in southern
Laos underlines again the high priority
the Communists attach to improving security,
for their supply and infiltration system
through the panhandle.
1
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VIETNAM-CAMBODIA
A former COSVN staff officer who defected last?
month says that a tightly-held portion of a new COSVN
directive alleges that it would be "easy" to over-
throw the Lon Nol government by military means but
that ,the Communist movement in Cambodia is not strong
enough to form an effective or lasting government.
Vietnamese Communist units have been forced to help
the Cambodians organize already liberated areas. The
directive, said by the defector to
have been issued in August, indicates that additional
assets will be taken out of South Vietnam for work in
Cambodia and suggests that local commanders in South
Vietnam will have to fend increasingly for themselves.
The claim that local commanders are being
asked to fend for themselves fits neatly
with other evidence that self-sufficiency
is the current watchword for many Commu-
nist forces in South Vietnam. The direc-
tive implies, in effect, that cadre should
wage a holding action even though there
was some rhetoric calling for more and
stronger military attacks.
The official also told of a briefing of high-
level- cadre which stressed the need for the Commu-
nists in South Vietnam to gird for a,political set-
tlement. Briefets said that the withdrawal of US
forces and the setting up of a coalition government
excluding the present South Vietnam Government lead-
ership would not automatically lead to a Communist
takeover. They stressed the strength of anti-Commu-
nist forces and organizations in the South, in par-
ticular the present government apparatus and under-
lined the morale problems cadre would face as they
were exposed to the material comforts of peacetime
after years of military struggle. The US, it:was
said, would use economic aid to "create the impres-
sion of prosperity." This might confuse and demor-
alize cadre, undermining their willingness to persist
in the struggle.
This testimony does not suggest that the
Communists anticipate an early political
settlement or that they are prepared to
modify their tough public demands to get
one. But it does indicate that in their
private councils, Communist Leaders are
sometimes less than confident about their
long-term prospects and about the staying
power of their own forces.
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Our Embassy in Prague reports that a firm deci-
sion appears to have been made to discontinue politi-
cal trials, judging from the "categorical" statement
to that effect by a government official coupled with
the release of the last two de-
fendants. The editor of the party daily Rude Pravo
has been quoted as stating that even the strongly
pro-Dubcek Pachman group will not be brought to
trial, lest martyrs be created.
At the same time, hardliner Josef Groessner has
been removed as Czech state interior minister, ac-
cording to an official announcement. A supporter of
tough measures against the liberal activists of 1968,
Groessner was replaced by a virtually unknown party
functionary.
Rusak probably would not have attempted
such moves unless he felt relatively se-
cure. If he can continue to weaken the
position of his hard-line opponents, pros-
pects for the success of his moderate
course will improve significantly.
3
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-a ?
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Chile: With the election of Salvador Allende
as president Saturday under strict security measures,
a major effort is under way to apprehend those re-
sponsible for the murder of army commander Schneider,
who died yesterday. The plot now appears to have
been of right-wing origin. Several dozen arrests
have been made but the chief investigator believes
the full ramifications of the plot will not be fully
determined until long after Allende's inauguration
next week.
Laos: There was little military activity over
the weekend. In the north, government forces encoun-
tered only light opposition as they captured two more
tactical positions in the territory southwest of the
Plaine des Jarres. Intercepts continue to indicate
that the North Vietnamese are preparing for a coun-
terattack, which will initially be directed at Phou
Seu Mountain on the edge of the Plaine.
4
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Top Secret
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