THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 MAY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976781
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 19, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
19 May 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
Hanoi's first authoritative and substantive response to
President Nixon's Vietnam address was issued Saturday in a
lengthy commentary in Nhan Dan, the party daily. Although
it is predictably negative in tone, the commentary, like Com-
munist statements in Paris, does not reject outright any of
the President's proposals. In fact, it appears to invite
further dialogue by highlighting what Hanoi considers are
the central issues and pointing out which features of the US
package the Communists object to and why.
The statement focuses on the issues of future political
arrangements in South Vietnam and troop withdrawals. As in
the Front's ten points, the burden of Hanoi's argument is
that the US, as the interloper in South Vietnam, must with-
draw completely so that the Vietnamese can organize themselves
free from outside coercion and interference. Once this rit-
ualistic point is made, Hanoi goes on to voice doubts about
the US proposal for eventual movement of American troops into
designated areas, The statement expresses Hanoi's fear that
these troops will continue the "military occupation" of South
Vietnam as part of the American plan for a political solution.
Hanoi clearly finds Washington's formulations on general
elections the most unacceptable of the eight points. The com-
mentary contends that not only did the President ignore the
idea of a coalition government, but, in demanding that any
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CHINA
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93465 1-69
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FOR 'THE PRESIDENT ONLY
future participants in the political process in South Vietnam
renounce the use of force, he in effect called for a unilateral
Communist disarmament while American troops remain in the South
and the South Vietnamese Army continues intact. This, Hanoi
charges is tantamount to a Communist surrender to Saigon. On
the other hand, the North Vietnamese may have attempted to in-
ject a note of moderation into their handling of the President's
declaration that the US has ruled out a military solution in
Vietnam. The President's declaration is pointedly acknowledged
early in the commentary, which thereafter refrains from repeat-
ing the standard propaganda line that the US is intensifying
the war.
The Liberation Front's statement, issued a few hours af-
ter the Nhan Dan article, is by contrast more strident and
polemical. It flatly asserts that the President's initiative
is not a "suitable answer" to the NLF's ten points, that it
contains nothing constructive, and that it demonstrates a lack
of good will. But, like Hanoi, the Front avoids an outright
rejection of the US proposals. The NLF clearly is in the role
of propagandist while Hanoi is the interlocutor, at least in
this first round of Communist responses.
The level of violence increased over much of South Viet-
nam during the weekend. The Communists launched a heavy ground
attack on the capital of Long Kanh Province, and several small
.
but sharp fights flared in I Corps, where Communist regulars
seem to be getting ready to step up the tempo of action even
further.
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MIDDLE EAST
Ex-Premier Karami and President Hilu apparently have
reached an understanding on the fedayeen. This should clear
the way for an attempt by Karami to form a new government.
We assume the understanding is based on the proposals Hilu
was planning to make to Karami late last week, under which
the fedayeen would be allowed to stay in southeastern Leb-
anon but would agree not to mount operations against Israel
from there. Lebanese troops would have secret orders to
take action against any terrorists who get out of line.
This arrangement obviously would be extremely fragile.
It is not even certain that the Lebanese Muslim community
would stick behind Karami once the restraints to be placed
on the fedayeen became widely known. Moreover, even if the
Muslims held firm, Karami's delicate position would be under-
mined if the fedayeen became so recalcitrant as to force the
army to move against them. The agreement thus depends ulti-
mately on the willingness of the fedayeen to keep out of
trouble with the army, and this kind of self-restraint has
always been in short supply among them.
EUROPE
The latest poll by the French Institute of Public Opinion
shows that on the first ballot Pompidou is down 2 percent (to
41 percent) and Poher up 3 percent (to 37 percent). In addi-
tion to indicating a further swing to Poher, this result im-
plies that in the run-off Poher would win by a considerable
margin.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET AFFAIRS
President Kekkonen and Premier Kosygin are scheduled to
meet in Leningrad today. Their primary topic is expected to
be a European Security Conference. The idea for such a con-
ference was first proposed at the Budapest meeting of the Com-
munist parties of Eastern Europe and the USSR in March. Re-
cently Finland took it up (whether at Soviet or Finnish ini-
tiative is not clear) and sent out a memorandum suggesting
Helsinki as the site, participation of the US and both Ger-
manies, with the "German question" a prime subject of dis-
cussion. No date was mentioned and, while Kosygin will un-
doubtedly encourage the Finns. to persist in their efforts on
behalf of the conference, it is unlikely that Moscow desires
to push now for a specific time.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
MALAYSIA
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Although the disturbances in Kuala Lumpur have quieted,
scattered incidents of looting and arson are still occurring.
The government is still not showing much interest in healing
the breach between the communities. It has now set up armed
vigilante groups--most of them Malay--to supplement the police
and the army.
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