THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 NOVEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006146449
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 6, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
6 November 1969
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THE PRESIDENT'S pAlLy BRIEF
6 November 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
A West German official has elaborated on his coun-
try's policy toward the East. (Page 2)
The Soviet leadership is looking to SALT for signs
of US willingness to enter an era of negotiations.
(Page 3)
The Lebanese Government and the fedayeen apparently
reached an agreement only on broad principles in
Cairo. (Page 4) Ambassador Barbour's views on pos-
sible Israeli actions against Lebanon, and our com-
ments thereon, are offered on Page 4.
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NORTH VIETNAM
An article in the North Vietnamese Army news-
paper on 29 October describes a provincial recruit-
ment campaign that may be part of a nationwide ef-
fort. The article is unusually explicit in linking
the drive to the war in the South. It urges men to
"join the army to fight the Americans" and mentions
the duty of party authorities to contribute "human
resources to the front line."
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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY
Egon Bahr, state secretary in the chancellery
and a long-time confidant of Brandt, has told US
officials that the new government will begin its
Eastern policy offensive by attempting to negoti-
ate agreements renouncing the use of force with
the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany in that
order. He said that West Germany would require?
completion of such agreements before it would par-
ticipate in a European security conference. He
thinks the Soviets have publicly engaged their
prestige in convening a conference soon, thus giv-
ing Western countries an opportunity to put forth
preconditions.
In pursuing a dialogue with East Germany, Bonn
hopes ultimately to negotiate an "all-German treaty,"
according to Bahr. The treaty would provide for a
modus vivendi on the basis of the existence of two
German states. Bonn would not formally recognize
East Germany, nor would Allied rights in Berlin be
affected.
In return for East German guarantees of West
German access to Berlin, Bonn would give up its op-
position to recognition of East Germany by third
countries. Bahr said the measures in Bonn's pro-
gram would have to be taken rapidly--perhaps within
a year--lest a flood of third country recognitions
undermine Bonn's negotiating position.
In outlining Bonn's plans, Bahr was very
careful to assure the Allies that their
interests will be protected. As with
previous West German governments, the
leaders of the new one apparently recog-
nize that Washington, Paris, and London
expect to be kept fully informed on East-
West German developments.
Bahr seems to be saying in effect that
the West Germans recognize once and for
all that the burden of moving toward
closer ties with East Germany is pretty
much theirs alone. He senses that Bonn
has some leverage with East Germany, but
will have to act rapidly in order to ex-
ploit its advantage.
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USSR-US
Valentin Berezhkov, the acting editor of a
Soviet newsweekly, told a US Embassy official on 3
November that successful strategic arms limitations
talks could lead to US-USSR cooperation in other
areas. The Soviet leadership; he said, is looking
to the talks for signs of US willingness to enter
an era of negotiations.
Soviet diplomats at the UN have been taking
this line recently in discussing the resolution on
international security which Gromyko introduced in
the General Assembly in September. They emphasize
that Moscow expects the US attitude toward this
resolution to be reflected at the arms talks'.
This is an oft-tried gambit when the So-
viets want the US to be more forthcoming.
It often is backed up with the claim that
the US will thereby strengthen the more
Western-minded faction in the Kremlin.
Nevertheless, these statements do mark
Moscow's.private acknowledgment that SALT
cannot be dissociated from other matters--
an acknowledgment the Soviets have been
reluctant to make. Moscow in the past
has often showed its annoyance at public
US statements linking disarmament progress
to other problems, probably in part be-
cause the Soviets are nervous about con-
veying the impression they are colluding
with the US on matters outside the dis-
armament sphere. The Soviets may also
believe that Washington is trying to make
them appear responsible for any Zack of
progress on SALT.
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MIDDLE EAST
The Lebanese Government and the fedayeen ap-
parently reached an agreement only on broad prin-
ciples in Cairo, press reports to the contrary.
Following a meeting with President Hilu on Tuesday,
caretaker Prime Minister Karami announced that both
parties will soon meet in Beirut to work out the
details of the Cairo agreement. There may be even
further delays in arriving at a comprehensive agree-
ment.
Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv states his be-
lief that:
--Israel will exercise "maximum restraint"
toward the fedayeen in Lebanon in order not to com-
plicate Lebanese problems in controlling them.
--If the Lebanese Government loses control of
the fedayeen, Israel would be opposed to anything
more than retaliation in kind.
--Even "if direct Syrian military intervention
results in the disappearance of Lebanon as a state,"
the odds are strongly against the seizure of Leba-
nese territory by the Israelis.
From our admittedly long-distance view-
point, we find it difficult to concur in
this prediction of Israeli restraint.
Tel Aviv does have an interest in preserv-
ing and encouraging the Christians in Leb-
anon and might hesitate for this reason
before retaliating. The most telling fac-
tors in Israeli calculations, however,
are the incident and casualty rates along
the frontier. The Israelis certainly
view with great disfavor what amounts to
an extension of their fighting fronts to
include Lebanon, and we find it hard in-
deed to believe that they will treat this
front any differently from the others
when the going gets heavy.
(continued)
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SimilarZy, we do not think an Israeli
seizure of Lebanese territory is as re-
mote a possibility as Ambassador Barbour
suggests. It would certainly take a ma-
jor incident on the other side to trigger
such a seizure, and we do not think the
fedayeen by themselves could provoke it.
A Syrian takeover, however, could very
easily do so.
Moreover, it would not be beyond the ca-
pacity of the Lebanese Christians, if
they thought their position in the coun-
try were deteriorating seriously, to try
to stimulate an Israeli intervention by
various direct and indirect means.
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CHILE
General Rene Schneider, who was named commander
of the Chilean Army after last month's uprising,
on Sunday that he thinks
Senator Salvador Allende will win next year's pres-
idential election. He says he would accept an Al-
lende government. Schneider termed 73-year-o1d
Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the conserva-
tives, a "'has-been" and said there would be another
military rebellion if he were elected. Nor, he
asserted, would the army,accept Jacques Chonchol,
a radical leftist who is vying with Allende for
leftist and Communist support. (Most:observers
agree that the main contenders will be Radomiro
Tomic of President Frei's Christian Democrats and
Alessandri, along with the candidate of the left.)
Allende belongs to the Socialist Party,
the most extreme of Chile's major left-
ist groups. Among his Socialist col-
leagues he seems relatively respectable,
but he is still a fervent admirer of
Fidel Castro and a good friend of the
Chilean Communist Party. He also is
highly popular with the Chilean elector-
ate; in 1958, in one of his three presi-
dential campaigns, he came in a close
second to Alessandri.
GeneraZ Schneider's professed willingness
to accept Allende is the first indication
we have seen of the way political senti-
ment is running in the upper ranks of the
Chilean military?and the military is
taking a more active interest in politics
in the wake of the uprising last month.
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