THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992563
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 2, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
2 April 1971
48
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
2 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in the Pakistani situation are reported
on Page 1.
Egypt. (Page 2)
At Annex, we comment on the municipal council elec-
tions in Chile this weekend.
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PAKISTAN
Government, reinforcements mostly in civilian
clothes, are continuing to fly into East Pakistan
via Ceylon. Although-the governmentremains in con,-
trol of Dacca and Chittagong, the situation else-
where:is unclear.
the Indian Army believes
that much of the central region out-
side of Dacca is in East Pakistani hands .and that
the. situation in army-held towns nearer the Indian
border is "touch and go." Recent press. reports
claim that the East Pakistanis have gained control
in oneof these-,Jessore, some 80-miles,west_of
Dacca-,-although West Pakistani troops are still
nearby. In Dacca, evacuation.by-air Of some Brit-
ish and other foreign civilians is under way, while
the departure of US citizens has been awaiting final
Pakistani clearance.
The evacuees may well become the source
of further press stories about West Pak-
istani atrocities, creating additional
strains in relations between Washington
and Islamabad. Earlier stories by US
reporters, who were not even aware of
the extent of the army's brutality,
brought a strong reaction in the Pak-
istani press. One West Pakistani news-
man claims that the Foreign Ministry re-
cently asked him to prepare a release
attacking the Anglo-American press while
praising coverage of the situation by
Pakistan's "socialist friends."
West
Pakistani officials have
has moved three additional army
divisions to the area bordering East Pakistan. De-
fenses are reported being tightened at Dacca airport
against the possibility of Indian air raids.'
The information about Indian Army movements
is unconfirmed and may have been passed to
encourage the US and other countries to
caution India against intervention. There
is no firm evidence that India plans any
overt intervention(
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USSR-EGYPT
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NOTES
SALT: Soviet delegate Timerbaev, standing in
for Minister Semenov, emphasized at yesterday's
plenary session that the USSR has already chosen in
favor of the US proposal for NCA-level ABM and thus
rejects the other two US Al3M proposals. This marks
the first time the Soviets have clearly turned down
zero-level ABM. Ambassador Smith again pressed the
Soviets to discuss offensive limitations, and called
upon them to respond to US-proposed limits on an
aggregate ceiling, and sub-ceilings on total missiles
and modern, large missiles.
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CHILE
On Sunday, 1,653 municipal council seats and Presi-
dent Allende's former senate seat will be contested
in Chile's first election since Allende's inaugura-
tion last November. The contest is looked on ?by
both the government and the opposition as a plebi-
scite on the first five months of the Allende admin-
istration. About 3 million votes will probably be
cast?approximately the same number as in the pres-
idential election last September.
Below the president and congress, municipal council-
men are the country's only popularly elected offi-
cials. Councilmen get no salary and their authority
is greatly restricted by law, but their election is
considered ,a stepping stone to a political career.
Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition is running
candidates in the municipal election under the la-
bels of four of its six member parties--the Commu-
nist, Socialist, Radical, and Social Democratic.
The reason for this is that coalitions are prohib-
ited by law from offering candidates on their own.
The opposition candidates are from the Christian
Democratic, National, and Democratic Radical parties.
The UP coalition gained only 36 percent of the votes
in last September's presidential election, thus ac-
quiring the stigma of being a minority government.
It therefore is going all out to gain a majority of
council seats in hopes of shedding this image. By
election day Allende will have campaigned on behalf
of UP candidates in all of Chile's major population
centers.
Allende and his spokesmen have relied heavily on
economic issues to attract votes. For exampie, the
introduction of strict price controls since the in-
auguration has sharply reduced the rate of increase
in the cost of living, despite highly inflationary
budget and monetary policies. The business commu-
nity is being tightly squeezed between rising wage
costs and frozen prices, but the real income of
workers has increased, and this is an important po-
litical asset for the UP parties. In addition, the
government's permissive attitude toward illegal land
seizures by peasants and its intervention in or na-
tionalization of a number of mining and manufacturing
operations seem likely to improve the UP's electoral
showing.
(continued)
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There is also keen competition within the UP itself
for the greater share of the coalition's vote. The
Communist Party is promoting itself as the pillar of
the coalition and has been extremely active. The
Socialists are centering their campaign on the fact
that Allende is a Socialist and are urging voters
to "build Socialism with Socialists." The Radical
Party, the only major non-Marxist force in the UP,
is promoting itseZf as the guarantor of democracy
within the government and is counting on attracting
the votes of those Allende supporters who could not
otherwise bring themselves to vote for a Marxist
ticket.
The opposition?chiefly the National Party and the
Christian Democratic Party--is trying to capitalize
on the high level of unemployment and the Marxist
strong-arm tactics that have prevailed under the
Allende administration. The effort has been weak-
ened, however, by the traditional rivalry between
the two parties and by divided leadership within
the Christian Democratic Party.
Most political observers in Chile believe that the
UP parties will receive somewhere between 45 and 54
percent of the vote, and that, if Allende achieves
or even closely approaches an absolute majority,
he will be able to speed Chile's evolution toward
a Marxist society. With an absolute majority, Al-
lende would have a popular mandate with which to
blunt congressional and scattered military opposi-
tion. Such a mandate would also be a powerfuZ tool
for restructuring Chilean institutions and for en-
couraging defections from the anti-Allende forces.
Allende has already indicated that if the UP par-
ties win more than 50 percent of the vote he will
call for a national plebiscite to replace the pres-
ent congress with a unicameral "people's assembly."
Whether or not the coalition wins a majority, the
basic programs of the Allende government will be
unchanged. What will be affected by the size of
the UP vote are rather the pace and style with
which Allende pursues these programs.
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