THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014990
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 29, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
December 29, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B(I ).(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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December 29, 1975
Table: Of Contents
China-USSR: Amicable Chinese handling of the re-
lease on Saturday of three Soviet helicopter
crewmen is startling in view of the sour state
of Sino-Soviet relations. (Page 1)
OAU-Angola-South Africa-Zaire: The summit of the
Organization of African Unity that opens in
Addis Ababa on January 10 to consider Angola
increases South Africa's dilemma as to its in-
volvement there. (Page 3)
Notes: USSR-Angola; Lebanon; Thailand-Laos (Pages
5 and 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CHINA-USSR
Amicable Chinese handling of the
release on Saturday of three Soviet heli-
copter crewmen is startling, given the
hitherto sour state of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions and the bitterness the helicopter
incident initially caused on both sides.
The Chinese gesture is the most con-
ciliatory move Peking has made toward
Moscow since Premier Kosygin was briefly
invited to China in 1969.
The Soviet crewmen had been held incommunicado
since the helicopter went down in northwestern
China in March 1974. The announcement of the re-
lease Saturday stated that Chinese public security
forces had concluded, following an investigation,
that the border intrusion had been unintentional.
Peking had initially charged that the Soviet
crew was engaged in an espionage mission. Despite
Soviet efforts to gain the crew's release through
diplomatic pressure, propaganda, and threats to re-
taliate, the Chinese maintained a stony silence in
public from the beginning while inspiring diplomatic
rumors that the crewmen would be brought to trial.
The description in the announcement of the heli-
copter as an "armed reconnaissance" model may have
been designed to justify the lengthy detention of
the crew.
In an especially telling gesture, a senior
Chinese Foreign Ministry official gave a dinner for
the Soviet airmen before their release. Peking had
never before accorded such treatment to foreign na-
tionals who had been detained for any reason.
The release appears to be an important symbolic
act, but the reasons for its timing are not yet
clear. The long Chinese public silence on the heli-
copter affair suggests that handling of the matter
may have been a contentious issue in Peking which
has only now been resolved.
There have been muffled indications for nearly
two years that some fairly important people in China
may have been arguing in favor of a less abrasive
policy toward Moscow, presumably on the grounds that
(continued)
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1 \J .1 1 1.1, 1 .1%.1.-J0 I 1.-/ 1- 41 1 \_ .11 L.,
China's current approach is too dangerous. There
have been no recent signs, however, that such a de-
bate has come to a head, and in fact exchanges be-
tween Peking and Moscow in the past six or eight
months have been particularly sharp.
The Chinese have also indicated concern in the
past several months that the US has not been prop-
erly standing up to the Soviets. The implication
is that putative US passivity leaves the Chinese in-
creasingly exposed. Recent action on Angola by the
US Senate undoubtedly has further heightened Chinese
concern on this matter.
In addition, Peking's move may be intended as a
signal to the US that Sino-US rapprochement does not
indefinitely preclude some improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations. The Chinese may be particularly anxious
?to make this point at a time when their attacks on
detente and SALT seem to be having little or no ef-
fect on Washington.
At a minimum the Chinese probably also hope to
complicate Moscow's attempts to use the anti-China
theme in connection with its efforts to convene an
international communist conference in 1976; they
may also hope to complicate Secretary Kissinger's
dialogue with Moscow.
The release of the helicopter crew removes an
important irritant in Sino-Soviet relations, but a
host of others remain. A senior Soviet Foreign Min-
istry official publicly revealed two weeks ago, for
example, that the Chinese hold three other citizens
who, he claimed, had strayed across the border.
Chinese propaganda, moreover, immediately be-
fore and after the announcement of the release, has
continued to attack the USSR's "archcriminal" activ-
ities in Angola and "expansionist" foreign policy.
Moscow, which from the beginning has maintained
that the March 1974 border violation was uninten-
tional, has merely issued a Tass announcement report-
ing the release of the "illegally detained" crewmen.
According to a press report, the Soviet ambassador
in China described the Chinese action as a "complete
mystery."
The Soviets undoubtedly calculate that as long
as he lives, Chairman Mao is unlikely to acquiesce
for long in any Chinese move significantly to lower
tensions with Moscow.
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I Ain. IIiIi F IN,12011./E.IN N L., 1
OAU - ANGOLA - SOUTH AFRICA - ZAIRE
The summit of the Organization of
African Unity that opens in Addis Ababa
on January 10 to consider Angola in-
creases South Africa's dilemma as to
its involvement there.
Pretoria has decided "in principle" to with-
draw South African forces soon, preferably before
the summit The de-
cision presuma y is intended to permit the Nation-
al Front for the Liberation of Angola and the Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola
to deny at the summit that South African troops
are assisting them.
South Africa set no specific date for with-
drawal. Pretoria is aware that its aid is a politi-
cal liability to the two groups but also recognizes
that a precipitous withdrawal would seriously re-
duce their military capabilities.
Pretoria hopes that military gains can be made
before the summit that will give the National Front
and the National Union a political advantage over
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
South Africa's hesitation on setting a date for
withdrawal suggests that the decision to leave may
be reviewed and could be reversed.
Zambian President Kaunda shares Pretoria's pre-
dicament over assisting the Front and the Union.
With Angola's two rival regimes both trying to
line up support before the summit convenes, it is
not clear how OAU members would react to a South
African announcement of withdrawal. Two more gov-
ernments--Ghana and Burundi--last week recognized
the Luanda-based Popular Movement under Agostinho
Neto. This raises to 17 the number supporting the
Movement within the 46-member OAU. Both Ghana and
Burundi oppose Soviet involvement in Angola but,
like Nigeria and others, they recognized the Popu-
lar Movement because of South African support for
the National Front and the National Union.
(continued)
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Kaunda says he has reached agreement with Tan-
zanian President Nyerere and Mozambican President
Machel--both of whom recognize the Popular Movement--
on proposals that would avoid a serious split within
the OAU and enable it to work for a political settle-
ment in Angola.
Kaunda claims the three governments will propose
that the OAU:
--condemn the presence of
troops in Angola;
--demand the withdrawal of
military personnel;
--stop further supplies to
involved in the fighting;
--call for a cease-fire;
--call for a government of
South African
all foreign
the parties
national unity.
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AFRICA
. .Azores
Iporl
CANARY
ISLANOSISA:
Ceo
Sp. Sa
Gambia
Guine7
BISSZU
Conakr
Siert'
Leone
ia
Eq. Guinea.,
500 1000 Miles
0 500 1000 Kilometers
`013 ;2-75
Pointe Noire
Comoro Is.
.1Fr t
Mauritius
ascar o
tiOunt011
tFyi
Walvis Bay
(s. at4
ambigua
the
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NOTES
The Soviet Kotlin-class destroyer approaching
Conakry, Guinea, could enter that port todau.
The destroyer and the tanker accompanying it
were detected Saturday off the coast of Senegal.
The Soviet landing ship that has been in the vicin-
ity of Pointe Noire, Congo, remains on station. It
was located yesterday about 300 miles off the coast
of northern Angola. The tanker that refueled it on
Friday is returning to Conakry.
The holiday lull in fighting in Lebanon con-
tinued over the weekend, partly because of freezing
rains and high winds.
Sniping and occasional heavy exchanges of fire
in parts of Beirut continued to make the streets
unsafe in the capital, but Tripoli and Zahlah were
quiet. Radio Beirut announced Saturday that Prime
Minister Karami's coordination committee--which
includes representatives of the warring factions
as well as Lebanese security officials--had agreed
on a timetable for enforcing the cease-fire over
the next few days. There is no indication that
the latest agreement will be any more effective
than other truces worked out over the past eight
months.
(continued)
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Thailand may be preparing to reopen its border
with Laos.
An official of the Thai Foreign Ministry an-
nounced late last week that the border would be
"temporarily" opened today to facilitate transpor-
tation of essential goods to foreign embassies in
Vientiane. The official said he expected Thai
Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot to order the en-
tire border reopened shortly. An "informed source"
in Vientiane, however, today told the French Press
Agency that the temporary opening will be delayed
a week.
The Thai announcement could be a trial balloon.
Khukrit may well decide to withhold a final decision
on reopening the entire border until he has strong
public support for such a move.
The Vietnamese communists have increased their
propaganda attacks against Bangkok's "unilateral"
closing of the border and its "economic blockade"
of Laos. A statement by the North Vietnamese For-
eign Ministry charged on December 24 that the Thai
administration has "continuously colluded with US
imperialists" against the Lao people.
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Top Secret
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