THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 DECEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993691
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 22, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
22 December 1972
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 511(1),(21(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
22 December 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 1, we report on Brezhnev's speech yesterday,
covering those portions on the Vietnam war, rela-
tions with the US and China, as well as European
matters.
Analysis of Soviet military spending figures pre-
sented last Monday shows that next year the USSR
will spend about 22 billion rubles on defense--the
equivalent of nearly $70 billion valued at 1970
US costs. (Page 3)
The electoral front put together in Argentina by
Peron is in danger of falling apart. (Page 4)
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USSR
In his speech_honoring the USSR's 50th anniver-
sary yesterday, Brezhnev sharply attacked the in-
creased US bombing in North Vietnam and criticized
the "unseemly behavior" of the US that was "artifi-
cially delaying" a peace settlement. He routinely
pledged "all-round support" for his North Vietnam-
ese allies, but also said that Moscow would render
"active assistance" to gain a just end to the war,
He refrained from endorsing any specific proposals,
suggesting that Moscow is more Concerned with get?
ting an agreement than with its exact terms.
? Near the end of his comments on relations with
the US, Brezhnev said that "much would depend on
haw events develop in. the immediate future and no-
tably what- turn the question of ending the war will
take."'
This is the first .time a Soviet leader has
linked developments in Indochina publicly
with over-all prospects for Soviet-US re-
lations since Premier Kosygin!s.election
speech in June 1971. The nature of Brezh-
nev's audience-which included senior
North and South Vietnamese Communists and
representatives of most of the Communist
parties throughout the world--made this
formulation virtually mandatory.
The tone of Brezhnev's.remarks on the US, aside
from Vietnam, was favorable-. He placed strong em-
phasis on the necessity for the great powers to live
in peaceful coexistence and included hopeful refer-
ences to the prospects for SALT and for closer So?
-
viet-US economic cooperation. On arms limitation,
Brezhnev said that "it would not be a bad idea" to
begin thinking about a permanent cutback of strategic
weapons and "the. establishment of certain limits on
their qualitative improvement."
Brezhnev presented a long list of difficulties
the Chinese have caused. He accused them of "absurd
claims" to Soviet territory,. "malicious slandering" -
of the USSR, and "open sabotage" of Soviet efforts
at disarmament and easing international tension.
He left the door open for improved relations, but
made it clearthat the Chinese would have to take
the next steps.
(continued)
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On European matters, Brezhnev reiterated Soviet
support for a Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, but he also acknowledged Western interest
in a freer exchange of ideas and people and put the
USSR on record as favoring this, on condition that
it is done with "mutual respect...and not from posi-
tions of cold war." Brezhnev was less forthcoming
on force reductions in Europe, on which he merely
said the Soviet Union stands for "the serious prepa-
ration and efficient handling of these talks."
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USSR
We have examined further the Soviet military
and science spending figures presented last Monday
and have compared them with our estimates of ex-
penditures based on observed Soviet programs.
Based on this study, we project an increase of be-
tween two and three percent in Moscow's spending
in 1973 for defense. Most of the increase will go
for military research and development.
As we noted earlier, the announced de-
fense budget of 17.9 billion rubles is
unchan ed rom 1972.
/ Total outlays
in 1973 for both deployed forces and
research and development should reach
about 22 billion rubles--the equivalent
of nearly $70 billion valued at 1970
US costs.
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ARGENTINA
The electoral front put together during Juan
Peron's 27 days in Argentina is now in danger of
falling apart. The front's biggest component,
Peron's own party, is divided over the selection of
Hector Campora as the presidential candidate, and
the largest non-Peronist party is threatening to
pull out over the vice-presidential candidate. The
selection of candidates for congress and provincial
governorships, under way this week, has further ag-
gravated the problem. Several provincial conven-
tions have degenerated into physical combat among
rival factions, and one top Peronist leader had to
take refuge in a police station after he was at-
tacked while trying to pass on Peron's instructions
to a provincial caucus.
Campora is anathema to the military, which
could legally disqualify him as a presidential can-
didate.
Since President Lanusse first announced
that elections would take place, one of
his goals has been to discredit Peron and
divide his followers. It could be that
Peron has now done this himself.
The government-sponsored coalition of provin-
cial parties, which is expected to nominate recently
retired air force General Ezequiel Martinez for pres-
ident, is now talking of naming Jorge Paladino as
its vice-presidential candidate.
Paladino preceded Campora as Peron's per-
sonal representative and still has a fol-
lowing among moderate Peronists. If La-
nusse approves the selection of Paladino,
it would show that he plans to take full
advantage of Peron's problems in an at-
tempt to shatter once and for all the
long-feared Peronist political juggernaut.
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NOTES
Finland: The Finnish Minister of Foreign
Trade traveled to Moscow this week to deposit with
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
a draft treaty for his country's cooperation with
the Soviet-dominated economic grouping. The draft
does not imply a desire for membership, and the
limited arrangements it proposes would have little
immediate impact on Finland's commercial transac-
tions with the Communists. Its main impact is
political and psychological. The Soviets will
find it useful to count a second non-Communist
state--after Iraq--in association with CEMA, while
the Finns--with leftist domestic opposition pre-
sumably satisfied--might have an easier time in -
finally signing an economic arrangement with the
Common Market.
Philippines: A number of petitions have been
filed with the Supreme Court seeking to block a
national referendum on President Marcos' new con-
stitution, which is scheduled for 15 January. Op-
position political leaders assert that there is
too little time, and conditions of martial law
are too restrictive, for a full and free discussion
of the issues. While Marcos can count on the
court to do his bidding, he might find it politic
to reset the date of the plebiscite to 15 February.
Marcos' only real problem seems to be popular
apathy; he wants at least 80 percent of the people
to vote, but his latest poll indicates that only
40 percent intend to do so.
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Top Secret
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