THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 31 JANUARY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993730
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 31, 1973

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A6-11500010026-1
The President's Daily Brief
31 January 1973
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
31 January 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Sharp fighting is going on in Quang Tri Province,
but military activity is tapering off in the rest
of South Vietnam. (Page 1)
Peace negotiations in Laos are reaching a serious
stage. (Page 2)
For the first time, exiled Prince Sihanouk has ex-
pressed interest in a compromise solution for the
political situation in Cambodia. (Page 3)
Japan
West German
(Page 4)
(Page 5)
(Page 6)
Most Latin American foreign ministers are reluctant
to attend the UN Security Council meeting in Panama,
but Castro and Allende may be thinking of going.
(Page 7)
President Marcos is concerned that the US may be
displeased about his martial law policies. (Page 8)
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108 110
Demilitarized Zone
Thach Han-Cua Vier Rivers
Duang Tri
Da NangmR 1
R3
Capital Special Zone
?10 10?
MR 2
South
China
Sea
16-
14-
12?
Gulf of
Thailand
104
MR 4
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
110
554062 1-73
?
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Sharp fighting is under way in Quang Tri Prov-
ince along the Cua Viet River. Communist attacks
since 30 January have forced South Vietnamese Ma-
rines to abandon their newly won foothold at the
mouth of the river. Government paratroopers along
the Thach Han River, a few miles southwest of Quang
Tri City, are taking heavy artillery, fire and inter-
cepts indicate that a small number of North Vietnam-
ese troops are trying to cross the river in order
to disrupt what looked to them as paratroop prepara-
tions for an assault.
Throughout the rest of the country, military.
activity continues to taper off. Sporadic clashes
are occurring in the.coastal_provinces, as both
sides vie for control of hamlets that dominate many
points of.Route 1. The enemy still holds-many areas
in-Quang Ngai Province, and has raised the Viet COng,
flag in several districts. Last minute ground gains
are.still being contested in Binh-Dinh and Phu Yen
provinces, but the government has recaptured nearly
a score. of hamlets in Binh Thuan Province. In the
central highlands,,roads to Kontum City are cut
and the enemy is trying to isolate'Pleiku as well.
No significant fighting has been reported
around Tay Ninh City and all roads and waterways. in
the region are said to be open to government forces.
In the delta, the Communists continue to make a-
large-number of small-scale attacks.
South Vietnamese interrogationof a' prisoner
captured on 26 January indicates that North Vietnam-
ese troops in Military' Region I have been told that
"older" soldiers among. them will be sent-home,.
Troops nearing the age' of 25 will be considered for
evacuation north to establish families, but- younger
men will remain to assist in the reconstruction of
liberated areas. When men in the latter age group
reach 25, their status will be reviewed to deter-
mine whether or not they should return home'
This account is plausible, inasmuch as
earlier reports from prisoners had indi-
cated that wounded and older North Viet-
namese soldiers would be sent home within
60 days of a cease-fire. Most reports,
however, indicate that the bulk of the
North Vietnamese troops will remain in
the south.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Both sides in the Lao conflict are attaching.
considerable importance to the session yesterday,
when the Communists appeared ready to get down to
serious business in negotiating a: settlement.
Communist chief negotiator Phoune- Sipraseuth called
the meeting a "turning point." Late yesterday,.
the government agreed to a private meeting of top
negotiators of both sides to be held in Vientiane
this afternoon. Prime Minister Souvanna is not
due back home until later this week from his trip
to New Delhi and Bangkok..
The private talks could be arduous. The
two sides have not.yetresOlved major
que8tions such as the shape and composi-
tion of,a new.provisional:government and
arrangements for the implementationand.
supervision of?a cease-fire. During the
session yesterday, the Communists.made
no issue of the continued US bombing in.
Laos and apparently do not intend to let
this stand in the way of increasing the
tempo of the negotiations.
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CAMBODIA
Sihanouk has for the first time publicly ex-
pressed interest in some sort of compromise solu-
tion for Cambodia. Before departing yesterday on
a brief visit to Hanoi, he told a French journalist
in Peking that in the next few days he and his "gov-
ernment" will "re-examine their attitudes" and "an-
alyze the situation" in the wake of the Vietnam
cease-fire. Sihanouk stated that such political
soul-searching was necessary because "our friends"--
a reference to his Chinese backers--had warned him
that he risked being labeled a "warmonger" at a
time when Lon Nol was launching a peace campaign.
This admonition most likely was offered by Chinese
Premier Chou En-lai, who met with Sihanouk last
weekend.
Sihanouk nevertheless continued to insist that
Lon Nol's removal is a prerequisite for any settle-
ment. He said that he had rejected what he claimed
was US and French pressure for a tripartite confer-
ence on Cambodia involving his "government," Wash-
ington, and Phnom Penh. Any political settlement,
he argued, will require bilateral talks between
his rump government and the US. He appeared skep-
tical about the prospects for such talks, however,
citing his belief that the US would not abandon
Lon Nol.
Sihanouk, while seeking to be responsive
to Peking's desire for progress toward a
negotiated settlement, apparently has
some doubt that Hanoi and the Communist-
dominated Khmer insurgents will go along.
Sihanouk hinted that he might have difficulty
working out a common position with the North Viet-
namese. His remarks strongly suggest that he be-
lieves Hanoi may be at odds with Peking over Cam-
bodia.
Over the years, Sihanouk has looked to
China as Cambodia's principal benefactor
and, Peking presumably would like to see
him in some kind of major role in Cambo-
dia. The North Vietnamese, however, in
view of their large investment in the
Khmer insurgency, are presumably not
enthusiastic at the prospect of being
upstaged by Sihanouk.
We have seen no significant change in the mod-
erate level of enemy activity since the Cambodian
Army's suspension of offensive actions on 29 Janu-
ary.
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JAPAN
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WEST GERMANY MBFR
As initial Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.
talks-Open today, key government.leadersin Bonn are
continuing to debate whether West Germany should ad,
vocate'a reduction of German- as well as stationed
forces. Defense Ministry officials take the view.
that German forces-should be. cut at the same. time
foreign' forces are reduced.- They argue that Bonn
must share'in_the benefits ofMBFR just as it shares
the burden of common defense, and' contend that re-
ducing-only US and,Soviet forces would quickly gen-.
erate.domestic pressure for:matching cuts in the
Getman forces.' They are alSo concerned that once
the public becomes aroused over the issue of troop
cuts, the government is likely to find it increas--
ingly-difficultto obtain adequate defense budgets.
Disarmament experts and Foreign Office offi-'
dials, however,_favor limiting initial troopreduc-
tions,in Europe to "stationed" forces.. They: believe
that Bonn must accommodate-US desires on this issue'
and hope. that US reductions in the MBFR context will
eliminate the possibility of unilateral US cuts.
They arealso-concerned that an. early reduction' of
German forces would raise the issue of a Soviet-role-
in verifying reductions, and that it could open the
way for the USSR to influence the manner in which
Bonn' reorganizes its armed forces.
Foreign: Minister Scheel and Defense Minister
Leber will-meet soon to attempt to reconcile these
views, but the final decision will be made by the
cabinet and Chancellor Brandt. ?
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JORDAN-EGYPT-SYRIA
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PANAMA
Most Latin American foreign ministers are re-
luctant to attend the UN Security Council meeting
in Panama in March because they do not wish to be
drawn into the dispute over the Canal Zone.
On the other hand, they also are reluctant..
to be left out of a hemispheric. "event.
If the larger countries decide to send
high-level delegations, a bandwagon ef--
feet would develop quickly.
Cuban Prime
Minister Castro and Chilean President Allende will
attend. We would have been inclined to view rthS
report with reserve had not the UN chief of secu-
rity been instructed this week to coordinate ar-
rangements on the basis of similar information re-
ceived by the UN.
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NOTES
Philippines: President Marcos, who is counting
on the US to provide the bulk of the aid he will
need to carry out his ambitious reforms, is con-
cerned over what he interprets to be signs of US
displeasure over his martial law policies. He seems
to be particularly upset over the exclusion of the
Philippines from Vice-President Agnew's itinerary-.
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Top Secret
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