THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976638
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 27, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
27 February 1969
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MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
MIDDLE EAST
Eshkol's death removes a balance wheel from the compli-
cated machinery of government in Tel Aviv. Basic Israeli
policy will probably not be much affected, but with Eshkol
no longer on the scene there may follow a period of divided
counsels and more erratic performance. In any event a strug-
gle for succession within the ruling Labor Party can be ex-
pected.
General Allon's selection as Acting Prime Minister is
clearly a stop-gap measure, although he may be able to use
the office to recoup his recently declining political for-
tunes. Allon, a leader in the 1948 war, had been named dep-
uty prime minister last June by Eshkol as a counter to De-
fense Minister Dayan. In the past few months, Allon had not
been in the good graces of the Labor Party old guard, and
Eshkol had been grooming Secretary-General Pinas Sapir as
his heir apparent.
Sapir is a tough, hard-working member of the old guard,
but is rather colorless. Another strike against him is his
reputation for being relatively soft on the peace settlement
issue. The old guard would probably like to stay with Sapir,
but it may find itself compelled .to turn to a younger, more
popular man to lead the party to victory this fall.
This could be Allon, if he can work his passage back, but
it would more likely be Dayan, who is unquestionably the most
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popular man in Israel today; He is probably the only figure
who could lead Israel into a compromise tettlementWithout a
major political upheaval.
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EUROPE
The embassy in Rome reports that the Italians are strongly
behind the British in the current imbroglio with the French.
Alone of the Five, they do not think London is pushing the is-
sue too hard. They even take the position that WEU can take .
decisions if the French are not present, and they expect that
an opportunity to do so will come up before long.
SOVIET APFAiRS
According to the West Berlin representative who attended
the meeting in East Berlin with the East Germans yesterday, no
specific progress was made but the atmosphere was friendly
and both sides expressed an interest in remaining in touch.
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The West Berliners plan to suggest a continuation of the talks
in West Berlin this afternoon. In essence the feeling in West
Berlin is that this meeting was "a good beginning."
Yesterday's meeting opened with the East Germans asking
for a statement that the West German presidential election
would not be held in Berlin. This, of course, the West Ber-
liners were not prepared to give. It was apparent that the
East German negotiator had no leeway to go beyond this'initial
assertion, and' last night he implied that unless this precon-
dition is met he will not discuss matters with the West Ber-
liners further. The West Berlin negotiator, however, apparently
expects a more acceptable offer will eventually be forthcoming
from the East Germans, after which Mayor Schuetz would inform
Chancellor Kiesinger.
VIETNAM
'Communist forces continued to press their offensive
throughout South Vietnam on 26 ?February, with the major
focus once again shifting to the III Corps provinces ring-
ing Saigon. Economy-of-force tactics continued to dominate
enemy actions as local force, guerrilla, and sapper units
carried the burden of combat, while main force units for the
most part remained uncommitted.
No enemy actions were reported in Saigon, Hue, or Da
Nang. Some clue as to the planned duration of the current
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offensive has been provided by a document captured on 24 Feb-
ruary in Long An Province, southwest of Saigon. The docu-
ment--a letter dated 23 February--called for countrywide at-
tacks to commence on 22-23 February and continue for some
34 days.
The Communists continued to maintain strong pressure
against major allied military bases and some urban centers
in the outlying provinces of III Corps. Allied forces at
the Bien Hoa - Long Binh military complex northeast of Sai-
gon and at Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province, con-
tinued to be the most seriously threatened, as growing enemy
troop concentrations were reported within easy striking dis-
tance of these objectives. In I Corps, sharp ground fighting
continued on the approaches to the province capitals of Tam
Ky and Quang Ngai City; however, pressure against allied
strongpoints along the Demilitarized Zone eased considerably.
No significant ground actions occurred in II Corps, although
enemy forces continued to shell allied special forces camps
in the highlands and sabotage lines of communication along
the coast. Viet Cong forces in the Delta shelled a large
number of targets, including at least four provincial capi-
tals; the situation around Chau Doc City--where more than
150 enemy were killed in heavy fighting on 25 February--
is being closely watched.
We see nothing new on the Communist side concerning the
talks, but it is increasingly clear that Hanoi is putting
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many chips on the current offensive. The enemy obviously
wants to redress the appearance of Communist passivity dur-
ing the last few months, when allied programs have gained
momentum. The Communists also want to demonstrate that they
remain militarily strong and that only a political solution
to the war offers prospects for reducing the US commitment.
One of the best indicators that Hanoi intends to keep
up its offensive over a fairly long period is the continued
high rate of infiltration from the North. Preliminary re-
ports say that more than 18,000 new infiltrators have been
spotted on the move so far in February, more already than
last month. Since early December the total number of in-
filtrators detected in communications is in excess of 65,000.
No matter how Communist loss rates in the South are manipu-
lated, it is clear that the enemy's manpower input in recent
months exceeds his losses. This almost certainly means that
Hanoi anticipates a high level of violence in the coming
months. Moreover, present trends indicate the Communists
will have enough men in place to sustain a level of fighting
generally comparable to the first half of last year. Even if
they take heavy casualties in the current offensive, the Com-
munists will apparently be back up to present strength levels
by early summer.
It is not clear to what degree the DRV is prepared to
risk resumption of US bombing as a result of the offensive.
Newly available intercepts show that North Vietnam took at
least some limited steps both before and after the offensive
began to guard against the chance of renewed US air attacks.
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We believe, however, that the North Vietnamese do not expect
a large-scale or prolonged period of bombing and that they
have proceeded with the offensive on the assumption that they
can get away with some bending of the "understanding" on the
bombing halt. The light rocket attacks on Saigon of 23 Feb-
ruary have not been repeated. At this point we do not believe
they were meant as a real test on this issue.
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II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
CAMBODIA
There has been relatively mild reaction among Cambodia's
neighbors to President Nixon's overture to Sihanouk and the
possibility that the US will declare its recognition of Cam-
bodia's borders. The toughest line was taken by Thai Foreign
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Minister Thanat, who was skeptical that a rapprochement would
help solve the problem of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambo-
dian territory. In Vientiane, the Lao are themselves moving
to reach a border agreement with Cambodia.
Reaction in Saigon, which has a number of border disputes
with Phnom Penh still outstanding, was
The South Vietnamese response may have
by preoccupation with other problems.
surprisingly low-keyed.
been tempered, however,
ITALY - COMMUNIST CHINA
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the Italians were hoping for some
reaction to Nenni's announcement last month that Italy was in-
terested in establishing relations. It would not be surprising
if the Chinese made their usual demands,
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the "sole and lawful government of the Chinese people," that 50X1
relations be broken with Taiwan, and that Peking be restored
to its "rightful place" in the UN. The Italians would not be
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particularly fazed by such a reaction, however, and we believe
they would continue to edge in the direction of recognition.
PERU
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
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