THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 APRIL 1972
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993244
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 13, 1972
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The President's Daily Brief
13 April 1972
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
13 April 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The situation in Vietnam is discussed on Page 1.
Hanoi has called on its allies and friends to do
more to help the North Vietnamese war effort; Brezh-
nev and Chou En-lai have responded. (Page 2)
President Bhutto's draft interim constitution will
not satisfy Pakistani opposition leaders. (Page 5)
A serious government crisis is brewing in Turkey.
(Page 6)
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104
?16
MAILAND
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SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
110
110
552833 4-72 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
The provincial capital of An'Loc is under heavy
attack. Pilots have seen as many as 25 enemy tanks
in the vicinity of. the town. Enemy ambushes along
Route 13 are keeping some South Vietnamese reinforce-
ments from reaching the town, although others have
been airlifted into the defense perimeter. General:
Minh, commander of Military Region 3, believes that
An Loc is the enemy's main objective in the region
at this time Communications intercepts suggest
that a second enemy division is involved in the as-
sault.
There is evidence, however, that Viet Cong. units
may be. preparing to go into action deeper within
Military Region 3. Cadre in-a Communist command
west of Saigon, for example, have been instructed
to conduct mortar and sapper attacks in and near the
capital as-well as in nearby Gia Dinh Province,
In the north, intercepts and increasing artil-
lery and infantry probes provide fresh indications
that enemy forces are preparing for new attacks
near Quang Tri city and. Hue. Prisoner claims that
there are now two North Vietnamese tank regiments
in Quang Tri Province have been supported by visual
sightings.
There was a marked upsurge of shellings and
ground assaults against outposts in the central'high-
lands yesterday,.suggesting that larger assaults in -
Kontum Province may be imminent.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM - USSR - CHINA
The North Vietnamese have called on allies and
friends to do more to help "fight US aggression."
The appeal was issued Tuesday in the form of an open
government communique. Although largely a propa-
ganda tract designed to buttress Hanoi's view of
its current offensive, the document also served to
elicit responses from the Soviets and the Chinese,
who had been somewhat reticent with their verbal
support, partly because of their new relations with
the US. Yesterday, the senior North Vietnamese
diplomats in Moscow and Peking apparently delivered
copies of their government's appeal to Brezhnev and
Chou En-lai.
Prior to yesterday, the USSR had yet to
respond officially to a similar request
for support made by the North Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry on 6 April. Soviet
media had reported the foreign ministry
call for support, but only after deleting
all of Hanoi's critical references to the
US. Brezhnev, nevertheless, responded
indirectly on 10 April in a communiqUg
he signed jointly with East German party
chief Honecker that condemned US bombing
of North Vietnam.
Moscow's press account of Brezhnev's meeting
with the North Vietnamese ambassador failed to men-
tion the latest appeal. According to Soviet domes-
tic radio, Brezhnev "exchanged opinions" with his
guest on Soviet - North Vietnamese cooperation.
Later in the meeting, he demanded an "immediate end
to ?the bombing," and made the first promise since
Hanoi began its offensive of continued Soviet "sup-
port and assistance." Brezhnev made no threats,
however, and said nothing about the fighting in
South Vietnam.
? As reported, by Peking, Chou's statements to the
North Vietnamese charge d'affaires are the highest
level of support China has yet offered for Hanoi's.
offensive. Chou went beyond the Chinese Foreign
Ministry's response to Hanoi's earlier request, and
said Peking was closely following the US attack on
North Vietnam which constituted a "serious incident...
expanding the war." He said China would give Hanoi
"all-out support and assistance."
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USSR
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CAMBOD IA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PAKISTAN-INDIA
President Bhutto has given party leaders: the
text of a draft interim constitution-that will be
presented to the National Assembly when it convenes
tomorrow. The constitution would. give provincial
administrations increased powers, but place the
provinces in. the. hands of presidentially appointed.
governors. The US Embassy-in.Islamabad believes
that unless Bhutto is willing to compromise and ac-
cord.some'real'authority-to the opposition forces,.
the National Awami Party and others may walk out
of the National Assembly
The draft fails to live up to the impres-
sion Bhutto had been giving that the pro-
vincial governments would have a consid-
erable degree of autonomy. Most strik-
ingly, there is no provision for provin-
cial assemblies to choose chief ministers
who would actually run the governments,
as is the case in the Indian states.
Bhutto may. yet compromise, however. Yes-
terday he -told reporters that provincial
power should indeed lie with-chief min-
isters.responsible to party majorities.
He might also indicate a short duration
for the interim constitution-,perhaps
running only until August.- when- martial
law isLacheduled to end.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY
The Turkish Government appears to be approach-
ing its most serious political crisis in over a year.
Prime Minister Erim, increasingly frustrated over
continuing leftist terrorism and his inability to
push broad social, economic, and political reforms
through Parliament, has again tendered his resigna-
tion. This time, President Sunay and the military
have apparently accepted it/
Acting through Sunay and the military-
dominated National Security Council, Erim
had sought from Parliament both temporary
authority to rule by executive decree and
a temporary halt in partisan political ac-
tivity. The major political parties, how-
ever, unanimously rejected both these re-
quests, even though this raised the possi-
bility that the military would assume
direct authority.
There are no obvious candidates to succeed
Erim--and he may be asked to serve again--
but the search is under way to find a can-
didate acceptable to the political parties
and the military. Unsuccessful in their
aim of achieving a workable non-partisan
government, military leaders may now ac-
cept a coalition government, which they
hope would be more successful in working
through normal parliamentary procedures.
To compound the problem, the military--
traditionally the guardian of the republic
and protector of the constitution--appears
to be sharply split over how to deal with
the current political crisis, and impa-
tience and frustration could result in a
military takeover regardless of arliamen-
tar develo ments.
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NOTE
Lebanon-Fedayeen-Israel: The number of feda-
yeen in the Arqub area of southern Lebanon has
reached the level which existed just prior to the
Israeli raids in? late February,
Because the Lebanese Army has im-
posed strict controls on guerrilla activity, the
fedayeen are planning new tactics for infiltrating
into Israel. Even if no raids materialize, the mere
presence of large numbers of fedayeen in southern
Lebanon might cause the Israelis to strike at the
guerrilla concentrations.
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