THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 APRIL 1972

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005993244
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 13, 1972
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? *a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 The President's Daily Brief 13 April 1972 25 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 2 5X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 April 1972 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS The situation in Vietnam is discussed on Page 1. Hanoi has called on its allies and friends to do more to help the North Vietnamese war effort; Brezh- nev and Chou En-lai have responded. (Page 2) President Bhutto's draft interim constitution will not satisfy Pakistani opposition leaders. (Page 5) A serious government crisis is brewing in Turkey. (Page 6) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 104 ?16 MAILAND ?14 Tonle Sap , I -PHNOM PENH ?10 Gulf of Thailand CAMBODIA CH ?U DOC Mekong TAY NINH KIEN KIEN TUONG *HONG AN GUANO KI EN I ? NG DEC PHONG DINH CH UONG T HIEN AN XU Y EN VIM 14 LONG NORTH VIE TNA 1I8 110 Demilitarized Zone ang Tri \tie ? THUA THIEN - :a OUANG,TRI \` LAOS ? PH LIOC LONG LONG 'A Loc SINN DUONG HAU NO 14 IA ON SINK BINU PA EU YEN.,_ SAC LIEU MR 4 104 116 HOW LONG KNANN BIEN HOG IG GUANO NAM AyWi4G,'hea GUANO NG?I PLEIKU DARLAC GUANO DUG FL!km DoNG BINH Toy P?=0/"M'It 3 PHU BON OUC MR I BIN -4 DI NI / PHU EN KM'ANH HOA CAM SINK r)le4,1 ANH NINH HU?Nhi- Capital Special Zone 178 16- 14 ? MR 2 South China Sea 12- 10- SOUTH VIETNAM MILES 110 110 552833 4-72 CIA ? a. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SOUTH VIETNAM The provincial capital of An'Loc is under heavy attack. Pilots have seen as many as 25 enemy tanks in the vicinity of. the town. Enemy ambushes along Route 13 are keeping some South Vietnamese reinforce- ments from reaching the town, although others have been airlifted into the defense perimeter. General: Minh, commander of Military Region 3, believes that An Loc is the enemy's main objective in the region at this time Communications intercepts suggest that a second enemy division is involved in the as- sault. There is evidence, however, that Viet Cong. units may be. preparing to go into action deeper within Military Region 3. Cadre in-a Communist command west of Saigon, for example, have been instructed to conduct mortar and sapper attacks in and near the capital as-well as in nearby Gia Dinh Province, In the north, intercepts and increasing artil- lery and infantry probes provide fresh indications that enemy forces are preparing for new attacks near Quang Tri city and. Hue. Prisoner claims that there are now two North Vietnamese tank regiments in Quang Tri Province have been supported by visual sightings. There was a marked upsurge of shellings and ground assaults against outposts in the central'high- lands yesterday,.suggesting that larger assaults in - Kontum Province may be imminent. 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NORTH VIETNAM - USSR - CHINA The North Vietnamese have called on allies and friends to do more to help "fight US aggression." The appeal was issued Tuesday in the form of an open government communique. Although largely a propa- ganda tract designed to buttress Hanoi's view of its current offensive, the document also served to elicit responses from the Soviets and the Chinese, who had been somewhat reticent with their verbal support, partly because of their new relations with the US. Yesterday, the senior North Vietnamese diplomats in Moscow and Peking apparently delivered copies of their government's appeal to Brezhnev and Chou En-lai. Prior to yesterday, the USSR had yet to respond officially to a similar request for support made by the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry on 6 April. Soviet media had reported the foreign ministry call for support, but only after deleting all of Hanoi's critical references to the US. Brezhnev, nevertheless, responded indirectly on 10 April in a communiqUg he signed jointly with East German party chief Honecker that condemned US bombing of North Vietnam. Moscow's press account of Brezhnev's meeting with the North Vietnamese ambassador failed to men- tion the latest appeal. According to Soviet domes- tic radio, Brezhnev "exchanged opinions" with his guest on Soviet - North Vietnamese cooperation. Later in the meeting, he demanded an "immediate end to ?the bombing," and made the first promise since Hanoi began its offensive of continued Soviet "sup- port and assistance." Brezhnev made no threats, however, and said nothing about the fighting in South Vietnam. ? As reported, by Peking, Chou's statements to the North Vietnamese charge d'affaires are the highest level of support China has yet offered for Hanoi's. offensive. Chou went beyond the Chinese Foreign Ministry's response to Hanoi's earlier request, and said Peking was closely following the US attack on North Vietnam which constituted a "serious incident... expanding the war." He said China would give Hanoi "all-out support and assistance." 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY USSR 25X1 3 FOR THE P SIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CAMBOD IA FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY PAKISTAN-INDIA President Bhutto has given party leaders: the text of a draft interim constitution-that will be presented to the National Assembly when it convenes tomorrow. The constitution would. give provincial administrations increased powers, but place the provinces in. the. hands of presidentially appointed. governors. The US Embassy-in.Islamabad believes that unless Bhutto is willing to compromise and ac- cord.some'real'authority-to the opposition forces,. the National Awami Party and others may walk out of the National Assembly The draft fails to live up to the impres- sion Bhutto had been giving that the pro- vincial governments would have a consid- erable degree of autonomy. Most strik- ingly, there is no provision for provin- cial assemblies to choose chief ministers who would actually run the governments, as is the case in the Indian states. Bhutto may. yet compromise, however. Yes- terday he -told reporters that provincial power should indeed lie with-chief min- isters.responsible to party majorities. He might also indicate a short duration for the interim constitution-,perhaps running only until August.- when- martial law isLacheduled to end. 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY TURKEY The Turkish Government appears to be approach- ing its most serious political crisis in over a year. Prime Minister Erim, increasingly frustrated over continuing leftist terrorism and his inability to push broad social, economic, and political reforms through Parliament, has again tendered his resigna- tion. This time, President Sunay and the military have apparently accepted it/ Acting through Sunay and the military- dominated National Security Council, Erim had sought from Parliament both temporary authority to rule by executive decree and a temporary halt in partisan political ac- tivity. The major political parties, how- ever, unanimously rejected both these re- quests, even though this raised the possi- bility that the military would assume direct authority. There are no obvious candidates to succeed Erim--and he may be asked to serve again-- but the search is under way to find a can- didate acceptable to the political parties and the military. Unsuccessful in their aim of achieving a workable non-partisan government, military leaders may now ac- cept a coalition government, which they hope would be more successful in working through normal parliamentary procedures. To compound the problem, the military-- traditionally the guardian of the republic and protector of the constitution--appears to be sharply split over how to deal with the current political crisis, and impa- tience and frustration could result in a military takeover regardless of arliamen- tar develo ments. 6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTE Lebanon-Fedayeen-Israel: The number of feda- yeen in the Arqub area of southern Lebanon has reached the level which existed just prior to the Israeli raids in? late February, Because the Lebanese Army has im- posed strict controls on guerrilla activity, the fedayeen are planning new tactics for infiltrating into Israel. Even if no raids materialize, the mere presence of large numbers of fedayeen in southern Lebanon might cause the Israelis to strike at the guerrilla concentrations. 7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600110001-7