THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 JANUARY 1977
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006466950
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 17, 1977
File:
Attachment | Size |
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DOC_0006466950.pdf | 272.92 KB |
Body:
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The President's Daily Brief
/
January 17, 1977
2
--7-,6r.sts4e.L__15X1
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 5B( I ).(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 17, 1977
Table of Contents
Egypt-Jordan: The public call by President Sadat and King Husayn
for a resumption of the Geneva talks and for a Palestinian
state with strong ties to Amman appears designed to keep the
pressure on the US and Israel to move toward serious negotia-
tions--and on the Palestinians to accept some compromise on
a Palestinian state. (Page 1)
USSR: A Soviet intelligence ship is in position to monitor today's
scheduled initial test-firing of the US Trident SLBM from
Cape Canaveral. (Page 1)
Thailand: The dissatisfaction of the Thai ruling military council
with Prime Minister Thanin has prompted consideration of a
new administration. (Page 2)
Notes: Benin; International (Pages 4 and 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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North
Atlantic
Ocean
French Guiana
Cape Verde
Islands
,R2
0Ascension
Island
South
Atlantic
Ocean
1000
Kilometers
620907 I 77
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT-JORDAN: The call
by President Sadat and
King Husayn for a Pal-
estinian state with
strong ties to Amman
and for a resumption
of the Geneva talks
appears designed pri-
marily to underscore
Arab solidarity and to
keep the pressure on
the US and Israel for
serious Middle East
negotiations.
Sadat has also stepped
up pressure on the PLO
to accept a compromise
solution.
USSR: A Soviet intel-
ligence-collection ship
is in position near
Ascension Island to
monitor today's sched-
uled initial test-fir-
ing of the US Trident
SLBM from Cape Canaveral.
The joint statement issued this
weekend insists on equal and in-
dependent PLO participation in the
Geneva talks. By enlisting Husayn's
support on this issue, Sadat hopes
to discourage Israeli leaders
from believing they can split the
Arab camp on PLO participation in
negotiations.
At the same time, Sadat is again
suggesting the possibility of some
compromise between the establish-
ment of a West Bank Palestinian
state and Israel's demand that
the Palestinian question be re-
solved within a Jordanian context.
The PLO thus far has not rejected
the idea of a truncated Palestin-
ian state. Over the weekend, in
fact, a PLO spokesman endorsed
the idea of closer relations with
Jordan. This moderate stance
probably reflects the perception
of PLO leaders that they have no
alternative at this point but to
follow the lead taken by the ma-
jor Arab leaders.
Husayn, for his part, has probably
gone along with Sadat for similar
reasons, fearing that to oppose
Egypt now would leave Jordan iso-
lated in the Arab world.
* * *
The Soviet ship had been on this
station last November, when the
initial test-firing of the Trident
missile was postponed. Instead
of returning to its home base on
the Black Sea, the ship conducted
1
--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THAILAND: Thai mili-
tary dissatisfaction
with Prime Minister
Thanin may be reaching
a crisis stage.
operations between the Cape Verde
Islands and French Guiana, and
then made a port call to Guinea.
The ship returned to the Ascension
Island area by January 10.
The ruling military council has
reportedly agreed to give Thanin
another 60 days to demonstrate a
greater ability to deal with the
country's pressing political and
economic problems. The council
is already thinking in terms of a
new administration, however.
The military leaders have been un-
comfortable with Thanin almost
from the time he became prime min-
ister in October. His reputation
as a well-known jurist of spotless
integrity and as an academic
specialist on counterinsurgency
suggested he would be the ideal
front man.
--continued
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Some members of the
military council would
like the military to
take a more direct
role in running the
government.
retired
Air Chief Marshal Thawi
ChunZasap is a likely
successor to Thanin.
But Thanin's extreme right-wing
views have been disquieting to
many Thai and somewhat at odds
with the consensus among the Thai
leadership that a modus vivendi
must be reached with their Indo-
chinese neighbors. While he has
been more restrained in his public
pronouncements lately, the mili-
tary are impatient with the gen-
eral lack of movement on a number
of national problems, including
stalled relations with Hanoi and
indecision on domestic economic
issues such as foreign investment
regulations.
The leaders of the council are
concerned, however, that such a
move would expose them as mili-
tary dictators. They clearly
would prefer to continue to mask
the military's role with a civil-
ian apparatus--a preference that
may continue to be a restraint on
dumping Thanin.
In view of Thawi's unsavory repu-
tation for corruption, his appoint-
ment would do little for the gov-
ernment's image. On the contrary,
a government shakeup so soon after
the October coup would only add
to the impression of a tentative
and fumbling regime little better
than the parliamentary administra-
tions it replaced in the name of
stability and progress.
* * *
3
--continued
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Canary Is (sp
We,. ern
' Sahara
orocco
27Capoe Verde
Mauritania
Sen
Gambia
Guinea
Bissau,
Guinea
Upper
Volta
Sudan
Suer
Leone
Togo
Ghana
Benin
Nigeria
Ube
Cameroon
Central African
Empire
la
,?Eq. Guinea,'
Sao Tome and
principeg
Uganda
Kenya
Gabon
Congo
zair e Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Angola
Zambia
Namibia
Walvis Bay
(S At)
Botswana
hodesia
Mo
Mada
ambique
Swaziland
South Africa Qs
1000
Kilometers
tho
620904 I 12
Indian
Ocean
95
A
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The VS embassy in Cotonou
anticipates a possible
anti-white backlash fol-
lowing the unsuccessful
attempt to overthrow
President Kerekou of
Benin (formerly Dahomey).
The world's five major
natural rubber export-
ing countries?Malay-
sia, Indonesia, Thai-
land, Sri Lanka, and
Singapore?are meeting
in Geneva this week to
discuss plans to bring
the international rub-
ber market under greater
control.
NOTES
Government troops repelled a small
invading party, probably composed
of European mercenaries and sup-
porters of exiled opponents of
Kerekou. Looking for invaders who
may have stayed behind, government
forces made a house-to-house search
in the city. The residence of the
US ambassador, unoccupied at the
time, was apparently fired on by
Beninese troops after two armed
whites were seen nearby. Some
whites also were reportedly shot
in the street and others were tak25X1
to prison camps.
Their plans, first proposed last
November, call for setting floor
and ceiling prices for natural rub-
ber and establishing a buffer stock
to dampen price movements.
Market forces will prevent natural
rubber producers from taking OPEC-
like actions to rig price movements.
Synthetic rubber producers have
substantial excess capacity, and
demand for rubber is expected to
grow only moderately over the next
few years. Nevertheless, oil-
related increases in synthetic rub-
ber costs should provide a lucra-
tive and gradually rising floor
price for natural rubber.
4
--continued
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Rubber supplies are likely to be
more than adequate to cope with
the anticipated rising demand be-
tween now and 1980. By our esti-
mates, natural and synthetic rub-
ber industries together will have
the capability to produce 15-16
million tons by 1980--some 15 per-
cent more than projected consump-
tion.
Natural Rubber Production
Thousand Tons
1975 1980
Malaysia
1,478
2,000
Indonesia
825
1,000
Thailand
349
485
Sri Lanka
149
190
India
136
185
Africa
208
260
Other
153
200
Total
3,298
4,320/
'Minimum estimate
5
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,
Top Secret
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