THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 NOVEMBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007867
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 13, 1974

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
The President's Daily Brief
November 13, 1974
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5B( 1 )A2).(3)
declassified onht on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
?40, ? w
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T60936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
November 13, 1974
Table of Contents
Japan: Prime Minister Tanaka may resign shortly
after your visit. (Page 1)
China-USSR: China dampens speculation on
Sino-Soviet relations. (Page 2)
USSR-US: Soviet media comment on recent
tions. (Page 3)
improved
US elec7
OAS: The future of the OAS and the inter-American
dialogue will be critically examined after the
Quito meeting. (Page 4)
Cyprus-Greece: Archbishop Makarios is almost cer-
tain to return to Cyprus. (Page 5)
Turkey: Independent to be named today as prime
minister. (Page 6)
Notes: Portugal; Iran; Angola (Page 7)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Declassified in Part - Sanzed Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
JAPAN
Chances are increasing that Prime
Minister Tanaka will resign shortly
after your visit.
The faction leaders within his ruling Liberal
Democratic Party are keeping the truce that they
promised would last until your visit is over, but
Tanaka has lost ground in recent days by his own
actions. The Prime Minister was unable to strengthen
his position by reorganizing his cabinet, and his
efforts to defend himself publicly against charges
of financial corruption have been ineffective.
The Japanese ambassador in Washington recently
told Ambassador Habib that, based on his contacts
in Japanese political circles, he personally be-
lieved that Tanaka would definitely resign soon
after your visit.
Tanaka himself, moreover, has again surfaced
an idea he privately put around before his recent
trip to Southeast Asia. He suggests that a care-
taker government headed by party vice president
Shiina be installed until a real successor could
be elected at the party convention next summer.
Tanaka would undergo a "diplomatic" hospitalization
to pave the way for his resignation.
Both major contenders for Tanaka's job--Finance
Minister Ohira and former finance minister Fukuda--
have opposed the caretaker arrangement. The party
may decide soon that Tanaka's ouster is more impera-
tive than the outcome of the struggle between Ohira
and Fukuda and may agree on Shiina or some other
neutral figure to head an interim government.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
- -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA-USSR
Chinese diplomats have been quick to
throw a wet blanket on speculation that
China's proposal for dealing with the Sino-
Soviet border signals an improvement in
Sino-Soviet relations.
A Chinese military attache in Moscow has twice
in recent days indicated to US officials that the pro-
mcsal_=mtalamzng_new, and
that the proposal merely re-
stated positions China first advanced in 1969. The
Chinese embassy in Moscow did, however, take special
pains to distribute the full text of the proposal to
foreign embassies and news services after Moscow bad
published it only in censored form.
The substance and tone of Chinese and Soviet prop-
aganda directed at each other have not changed since
the proposal was made. The Soviets are probably re-
luctant to make any authoritative response until they
determine whether the Chinese intended anything more
in publicizing their proposal than to gain some prop-
aganda advantage.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79?00936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-US
Soviet media are ascribing the recent
US election results to American domestic
issues?particularly economic problems and
Watergate. They have raised the prospect
that Democratic congressional gains could
have a "significant influence" on the for-
eign policy of your administration.
Pravda, citing various US sOurces to buttress
its ariaTITErs, concluded last Thursday that progress
on important questions of foreign as well as domes-
tic policy will depend on confidence and cooperation
between the US executive and a Congress firmly Con-
trolled by the opposition party. The article spe-
cifically cited the Middle East, international trade
and finance, and arms control.. as problems demanding
coordination between the White House and Congress.
Pravda implied that Moscow's relations with Washing-
ton Will be complicated by a strengthened opposition
party, but makes no explicit mention of US-Soviet
affairs.
Other Soviet commentators have taken the line
that policy toward the USSR is still being debated
in the US. They claim that Democratic gains should
not affect bilateral relations, and that most newly
elected congressmen favor continued international
detente.
The Soviets have previously displayed concern
over both the depth of your commitment to detente
and your ability to follow through on a supporting
program. Although Moscow has been assured on the
first, the results of last week's elections will
reinforce misgivings about prospects for congres-
sional support of administration policy toward the
USSR.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
The future of the OAS, already con-
sidered by many a weak and unresponsive
organization, will be even more uncer-
tain in light of what most OAS members
will cal/ the Quito debacle. More im-
portant, in the wake of the foreign min-
isters' meeting, the broader question
of the inter-American dialogue will come
under critical examination in most OAS
capitals.
A barrage of angry and petulant statements can
be expected from most of the Organization of Ameri-
can States foreign ministers as they return home
from the Quito meeting. The twelve who voted to
rescind the Cuba sanctions are embarrassed at their
diplomatic failure to attract the two more votes
needed for a two-thirds majority. The fact that
only three negative votes were cast adds to their
frustrations.
Criticism will fall heavily on the US for its
abstention. Several of the other five abstentions
will be linked to the US position, and the sponsors
of the aborted resolution are probably convinced
that the responsibility for their failure rests
with the US.
? The Cuba sanctions remain juridically in ef-
fect, but will become increasingly ineffective.
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Honduras have
announced they will move soon to establish rela-
tions with Havana.
Havana has made clear its preference that
Latin American governments establish ties with the
Castro regime in violation of OAS rules. Castro
remains unalterably opposed to the organization
and would like to be able to take credit for its
demise.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized dopy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CYPRUS-GREECE
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis is
reported to be neutral on the question
of Archbishop Makarios' return to Cyprus.
This makes it almost certain that the
archbishop will soon go through with his
plan to get back to the island.
25X1
25X1
Makarios has agreed to Karamanlis request
that the archbishop stop in Athens en route to
Cyprus so that they can review the Cyprus situa-
tion. Cypriot Acting President Clerides is also
expected to attend the meeting, which will prob-
ably take place shortly after the Greek elections
on Sunday.
Makarios has reportedly instructed his fol-
lowers in Cyprus to prepare for his return and to
do nothing to upset internal order within the
Greek Cypriot community.
Turkish Cypriot Vice President Denktash told
the US ambassador that serious negotiations toward
a political settlement would have to await the
clarification of Clerides' role as negotiator for
the Greek Cypriot side. Denktash said negotiations
cannot be conducted with Clerides if it turns out
that Makarios is calling the tune from behind the
scenes once he returns to the island.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY
President Koruturk named Sadi Irmak,
an independent, as Turkey's prime minis-
ter, breaking an eight-week political
stalemate. The 70-year-old former uni-
versity professor will form a coalition
government and prepare for elections,
probably next spring or summer. Irmak's
cabinet reportedly will include Ecevit's
Republican People's Party, the Democratic
Party, and the Republican Reliance Party.
Such a government will be virtually a caretaker
regime. Although it will have a working majority--
at least 240 seats and possibly some additional in.-
dependent votes in the 450-member National Assembly--
party differences., especially on economic matters,.
preclude any substantial new programs.
With elections only a few months away, all
parties will be reluctant to make any concessions
on Cyprus. Irmak's political independence, however,
may leave him in a position to concede, whereas the
leader of a single party might feel he could not af-
ford to do so. This could be particularly true now
that concern is growing in military and government
circles that Turkey will lose US military aid un-
less substantial progress is made toward the Cyprus
dispute.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Portugal: The Portuguese Communist Party
appears to be increasingly expanding its influence
and its base. The recent conversion of the Communist-
dominated Portuguese Democratic Movement into a po-
litical party will allow it to attract votes the
Communist Party would have lost to the Socialists
and other center-left parties in the elections next
March. The provisional government, which assumed
control of the Portuguese news agency last week, has
appointed a self-proclaimed Communist as its direc-
tor.
Iran: Oil receipts this year will jump by an
additional $900 million as a result of last, week's
agreement with the consortium of Western oil com-
panies. This is the third agreement this year grant-
ing Iran higher revenues; essentially it gives Iran
the benefit of earlier payments increases reached
with other Gulf producers. Iran's oil receipts in
1974 now are likely to be about $18.2 billion and
should boost the balance-of-payments surplus to some
$9 billion. Consumers of Iranian oil should not pay
higher prices because the oil companies had been
paying lower revenues per barrel to Iran while sell-
ing oil at prevailing Gulf prices in anticipation of
the Shah's demands. At least some of these funds
were set aside in interest-bearing accounts.
Angola: Portuguese military forces in Luanda
have been unable to stem the wave of violence that
has spread through the capital since last week. As
of Sunday, at least 50 persons had been killed.
The new trouble involves racial clashes, looting,
and skirmishes between supporters of rival insur-
gent organizations. At least one rebel group--the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola--report-
edly has put a number of its troops into the streets
to help the military restore order. Further serious
disorders are likely if the semi-autonomous military
junta there cannot soon reimpose its authority.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010044-2