THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 MAY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977480
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 29, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
29 May 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
29 May 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The situation in Cambodia is discussed on Page 1.
South VietnaM
(Page 3)
Insurgents in Thailand are becoming more active.
(Page 4)
Arab countries in conflict with Israel are planning
to hold a summit conference in Cairo early next month.
(Page 5)
At Annex we submit our views on how the Communist
world is looking at the current situation in Indo-
china.
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Cambodia: Current Situation
LAOS
THAILAND
Laba Si
attambang
iez,?Iee .
///
tung) eng
Komez,?nn
Tang
rasang
hhlong
e
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Phnom Penh
GULF
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Kompong),So
(SihanoukVIle)
NAM
QF
THAILAND
o Government-controlled location
0 Communist-controlled location
1--1 Communist-controlled
///// Contested or under Communist
influence
0
50
MILES
SOUTH
.CHINA. SEA
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987065-70 CIA ,
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CAMBODIA
Prime Minister Lon Nol told the US Defense Atta-
che on 28 May that the Thais have agreed to partici-
pate in military operations along a portion of Cam-
bodia's northern border. According to Lon Nol, Thai
Deputy Prime Minister Praphat during his two-day
visit to Phnom Penh agreed to help defend the area
between the Thai-Lao-Cambodian border and the Mekong
River. Lon Nol did not provide any operational de-
tails but did indicate that Lao forces also would
participate.
Lon Nol may have been exaggerating the ex-
tent of the commitment made by the Thai
delegation. In subsequent remarks to the
press, Praphat indicated that Thai troops
would not be sent into Cambodia, although
he referred to the possibility of opera-
tions similar to those along the Malaysian
border. In these, Thai troops cooperate
with the Malaysian security forces but
stay in Thailand.
that the,govern-
ment, must retain what little. groun it holds in-
Ratanakiri Province. Although he acknowledged that
Communist pressure may force the evacuation of the
capital at Lomphat, he said he intended to hold the
neighboring town of Labansiek at all costs. More-
over, he wanted to hold the town of Bo Kheo. His
objective is to secure as much of Route 19 as possible
in order to insure, overland access to Pleiku in the
South Vietnamese central highlands.
In their most significant attack in the past two
weeks, Communist troops, preceded by an artillery
barrage, moved into Prey Veng city on the night of
27-28 May. The city, which is 35 miles east of Phnom
Penh, has been under steady Communist harasSment-re-
cently, and such an attack was. expected. At last
report the town was back under government control.
The Communists also struck hard in Kompong Thom
Province on 27 May, capturing the town of Tang Kra-
sang, 15 miles southeast of the provincial capital.
They also overran several smaller government posi-
tions just east of Tang Krasang. This activity prob-
ably is a prelude to an enemy attack on Kompong Thom
city.
4
(continued)
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At Annex we submit our views on how the Commu?
nist world is looking at the current situation in
Indochina.
2
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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Insurgent Activity Increases in Thailand
98 1 162 106
".)
pick
NORTH GULF
V IETNA M OF
Insurgents ambush
\ Thai border police TONKIN
LAOS
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Insurgent activity On the rise
VIETNAM
i
....f ..
THAILAND
1
*BANGKOK
ANDA N
SEA
CAMBODIA
GULF OF
?
-10
,
987O5'510 CIA
r--1 Area of insurgent activity
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THAILAND
Government forces are being hit hard by tribal
insurgents in the north. The insurgents ambushed a
road construction crew operating in Nan Province near
the Lao border on 22 May, killing five workers as
well as five members of a border police platoon pro-
viding security for the operation. The action oc-
curred in the general area where the government suf-
fered sizable casualties during an unsuccessful
sweep operation in early April.
The insurgents also are having greater opera-
tional success in the northeast, where the Communists
appear to be strengthening their village support base.
Assassinations, armed propaganda meetings, and other
indicators of insurgent activity rose substantially
last month in the northeast. .
The insurgents' strong resistance to gov-
ernment efforts to re-establish a presence
in these areas demonstrates the high value
the Communists place on holding this "lib-
erated" border territory. The Thais have
not met this challenge directly and con-
tinue to underestimate Communist strength.
Bangkok appears to be preoccupied with
fighting the Communists on the Lao side
of the border in joint operations with
the Lao Army and is reluctant to commit
the necessary resources to cope with the
trouble spots on its own side of the bor-
der.
4
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ARAB STATES
King Husayn has informed Chargg Odell that an
Arab summit conference of states involved in the con-
flict with Israel has been proposed for 5 June in
Cairo.
The conference was originally scheduled for
August, but apparently the UAR wants to
move it up to coincide with the third anni-
versary of the war. The sudden change in
the timing of the conference may be related
to Nasir's campaign to deter the US from
promising further military aid to Israel.
Husayn does not like the new scheduling and
has already requested a different date.
Husayn wants to be in Amman during the anni-
versary activities, which could be touchy
because of the participation of various feda-
yeen organizations.
5
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THE COMMUNISTS AND INDOCHINA
The Communist world has clearly been in turmoil about
Indochina, but what this signifies?particularly in
terms of specific Communist intentions on the ground
in Southeast Asia--is hard to discern. We do know
that the Soviets are upset and the Chinese Communists
are elated, and that Le Duan had a long and unproduc-
tive stay in Moscow and a short, pleasant one in Pe-
king.
We also know that Hanoi has been putting out a tough
propaganda Zine and has redirected some of its mili-
tary assets to Cambodia. The bulk of Hanoi's forces
there, however, are still operating in support of
the main war effort in Vietnam. Moreover, on the eve
of Sihanouk's visit to North Vietnam, Radio Hanoi was
emphasizing that the "liberation" of each country is
primarily a job for the people of that country.
At the same time, activity on the Ho Chi Minh trail
is resuming after a two-week partial standdown that
was clearly caused by allied actions in Cambodia,
and there have been some new inputs to the infiltra-
tion pipeline after we thought the rainy season pause
had begun.
No radical change of policy is apparent in these bits
and pieces. Leaving aside the propaganda atmospherics,
we are actually struck by how little has changed in
the Communist attitude. Hanoi does seem to have
closed off the option of negotiations for the time
being, and this by itself may go a long way toward
explaining Moscow's unhappiness. But with this major
exception, Hanoi's tactics and priorities seem to be
about what they have been for the last year or so:
the Communists are still avoiding the commitment of
most of their troops; they are still sending substan-
tial but not massive numbers of North Vietnamese sol-
diers south; and they still attach the highest pri-
ority to making up their losses in Cambodia and pro-
tecting, consolidating, and gradually building up
their assets in South Vietnam. Under present cir-
cumstances this inevitably involves more activity in
both Cambodia and southern Laos than the Communists
had planned on, but all this activity is almost cer-
tainly geared to the long-term war in South Vietnam.
The Communists probably will try to retain control
of much larger areas of Cambodia than they had before,
particularly in the northeast, and we believe they are
fairly confident they can cope with whatever allied
forces remain in Cambodia after 30 June. It is doubt-
ful, however, that the North Vietnamese Army intends
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to try to take over Cambodia as the US moves out.
Although we do not accept the idea that the North
Vietnamese are at the end of their tether and that
their leadership is on the verge of a split, they ap-
pear to be stretched fairly thin and therefore will
be reluctant to divert many more of their resources
to Cambodia. Because of the risks and political
liabilities of such a course, the Communists will
probably rely on the long haul insurgency route
against Lon Nol and Sink Matak.
The prospect of an increase, albeit circumscribed,
in Hanoi's efforts in Cambodia may help explain Mos-
cow's gloom and Peking's pleasure. Another reason
on the Soviet side probably can be found in Moscow's
low estimate of Vietnamese Communist capabilities,
coupled with a fear that an uncompromising line in
Hanoi will require another increase in Soviet support.
In the final analysis, however, recent developments
in Indochina are important for both the Soviets and
the Chinese, primarily because of their larger impli-
cations. The depth of the USSR's concern can best
be explained in terms of the effect of recent events
on its position vis-a-vis the other great powers.
We suspect that the Soviets may have spent much of
Le Duan's visit arguing that Hanoi was underesti-
mating US combativeness, and they may have considered
this gloomy view vindicated by US action in Cambodia.
The same developments, of course, also left them
holding an empty negotiations bag and enhanced Com-
munist China's posture at their expense. For their
part, the Chinese found the North Vietnamese moving
closer to their own views on the war, and this,
coupled with Sihanouk 's availability in Peking, gave
them their strongest hand in years in Indochina.
The turmoil thus seems to reflect the changes in
Moscow's and Peking's relationships with each other
(and with the US) that resulted from the events in
Cambodia. We therefore can expect more: the Chi-
nese will keep trying to score points against both
the Soviets and the US, and the Soviets will remain
on the defensive. At the same time, Hanoi will prob-
ably continue to make clear that its views are now
closer to those of Peking than to Moscow's, but it
certainly will not cut itself off from the Soviets
and will do its utmost to keep the dispute between
its two patrons from interfering with the war.
As for the war itself, we do not anticipate radically
new developments. Peking seems as reluctant as ever
to involve itself directly in the conflict, and its
aim essentially is still to keep the war going rather
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than to step it up. The North Vietnamese show every
sign of determination to cope with the new dangers
allied operations in Cambodia have posed to their
long-term effort in South Vietnam. What this requires
will depend on Hanoi's estimate of the damage that has
been done up to now, as well as its view of how much
more the South Vietnamese Army will be doing. In
general, however, we see no indication that the Com-
munists are thinking of compromise or giving up the
struggle, but at this stage neither do we see them
preparing to alter their priorities or greatly to en-
large the war.
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