THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 DECEMBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007895
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 17, 1974

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012400010013-5
The President's Daily Brief
December 17, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5B( I )t2)(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
I 1 II A
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
December 17, 1974
Table of Contents
? Cambodia: Khmer communists are planning a major
effort to interdict the Mekong River south of
Phnom Penh. (Page 1)
Egypt: President Sadat on Sunday made his first
comment on negotiating prospects in some time.
(Page 2)
Palestinians: A government-in-exile is not likely
to be formed soon. (Page 3)
USSR:
(Page 5)
USSR: The Communist Party Central Committee held
a session yesterday on economic programs for
next year. (Page 6)
Notes: Norway; Iraq (Page 7
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
? Mekong River Levels at Phnom Penh
High point \
Low point
III I I I I I I
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
15
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Primary
o,. Communist
objective
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Neak Luong
3
30
Primary Communist objective
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Government Positions
A Battalion
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CAMBODIA
The Khmer communists are planning a
major effort to interdict the Mekong River
south of Phnom Penh during the next few
months. This may turn out to be the most
concerted communist attempt to cut this
vital supply route since the spring of
1973.
Messages intercepted during the past month
indicate the communists will commit the bulk of
their forces in the southeastern part of the coun-
try--over 10,000 troops--to a series of attacks
against government strongpoints along the 50-mile
stretch of river between Phnom Penh and the South
Vietnamese border. The major objective appears to
be the elimination of government defenses guarding
narrows 25 and 40 miles downstream from the capi-
tal. From these areas, the communists could shell
government convoys at close range. They might also
try to barricade the Mekong River as they did the
Tonle Sap River last summer. ,
Although insurgent elements have already be-
gun probing some government positions along the
Mekong, many units scheduled to participate in
the interdiction effort are still engaged in fight-
ing along the Bassac River near Phnom Penh and
around the provincial capital of Svay Rieng in the
far southeast. These units will probably have to
rest and refit before they can be committed to new
efforts. Insurgent commanders may also want to
wait until water levels drop further and riverside
terrain dries out before implementihg their attack
plans. Details on the timing of the campaign may
be disclosed following the conclusion of several
tactical planning conferences currently under way.
Cambodian army commanders are aware of com-
munist intentions and plan to make 1,700 reinforce-
ments available to help man defenses along the Me-
kong. This will raise government troop strength
along the river to over 8,000. The air force and
navy are heavily committed both to escorting river
convoys and to supporting ground units along the
river.
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EGYPT
President Sadat, in his first public
comment on negotiating prospects for some
- time, said on Sunday that he is continuing
talks with the US to probe the usefulness
of the step-by-step approach to peace ne-
gotiations favored by Washington.
Sadat was critical, however, of the "slack"
in negotiating momentum since the Egyptian and
Syrian disengagement agreements in January and May.
He asserted that if progress is not soon evident,
"We will be going to Geneva according to the Soviet
theory." Sadat said he would make a decision on
this in the "very near future."
His comments clearly indicate a desire to keep
the step-by-step option open. He made no reference
to Foreign Minister Fahmi's statement of last Fri-
day, with its list of tough conditions for a final
settlement.
Sadat's remarks also suggest that Cairo's
patience is growing short. He had never before
pointed so openly to the Soviet alternative to the
US method of negotiating. His reference to the
"very near future" may mean that he has Soviet party
chief Brezhnev's visit next month in mind as a
deadline for action.
Sadat referred to "rigid positions" recently
adopted by the Israelis and said they have clouded
his usual optimism. Although the Egyptians may be
willing for the present to shelve their own new
rigid positions--on immigration, for instance--
Sadat's remarks suggest that this restraint may
well depend on signs that Israel is willing to
reciprocate.
An aide of Fahmi has told US officials in
Cairo that there will be no official explanation
of Fahmi's demand for an end to Israeli immigra-
tion. The aide termed the demand a "disaster" and
said he hoped it would soon be forgotten.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PALESTINIANS
Leaders of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and its international back-
ers are divided on the question of form-
ing a Palestinian government-in-exile.
As a result, PLO Chairman Arafat, who is
favorably disposed toward such a step
and has been weighing its possible ad-
vantages, appears likely to delay fur-
ther.
The basic obstacle to the formation of a gov-
ernment-in-exile is the inability of the several
fedayeen factions to agree on its composition or
leadership. Arafat and other leaders of Fatah,
the largest fedayeen group, would prefer a govern-
ment in which nonfedayeen "independent" Palestin-
ians play a substantial role. They are convinced
such a group would be sympathetic to Fatah's rela-
tively moderate policies.
Leaders of Saiga, the Syrian-controlled feda-
yeen organization, and the Popular Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which has
close ties to Moscow, would prefer a government
drawn from the existing leadership of the PLO.
These two groups endorse most Fatah policies, but
are apprehensive that Arafat would use a govern-
ment-in-exile to strengthen his and Fatah's posi-
tion at their expense.
The more radical groups that cooperate under
the label of the Rejection Front are generally op-
posed to a government-in-exile. They are con-
vinced such an entity would seek to exclude them
completely from Palestinian policy-making, and
that it would abandon the Palestinians' rightful
claims in order to win concessions from the US and
Israel.
When Arafat visited Moscow recently, the Soviet
Union reportedly advised against the formation of a
government at this time. The Soviets, in principle,
support the idea of a government-in-exile as a use-
ful means of dignifying the PLO and its claims for
eventual inclusion in formal peace negotiations.
Moscow will not urge Arafat to create a provisional
government, however, until the Palestinians them-
selves are able to agree on its composition and
policies. Above all, the Soviets would like evi-
dence that fedayeen sympathetic to Moscow's policies
and susceptible to its influence will play a signif-
icant role in such a government.
(continued)
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The moderate Arab states, which provide impor-
tant backing to Arafat, may now also be lukewarm
about forming a government at this time. Egypt and
Saudi Arabia/
/are said to be concerned that
a government obviously dominated by the PLO would
be unacceptable to the US, and that it would there-
fore prove an impediment rather than a step toward
a Middle East settlement.
Syria is now the most important proponent of
government-in-exile.
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USSR
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
The Communist Party Central Commit-
tee held a one-day session yesterday to
discuss and approve the 1975 economic
plan and next year's state budget. The
plenum accomplished the winimum in terms
of personnel shifts when it removed Petr
Demichev from the secretariat.
Demichev, who remains a candidate Politburo
member, was expected to be removed because of his
recent appointment as minister' of culture. The
failure to announce a new party secretary in
DemicheV's place suggests either that an incumbent
secretary has picked up his cultural portfolio or
that the leadership has not decided who to choose.
Whoever gets the responsibility will have a direct
impact on the implementation of cultural policy,
and thus on the USSR's image abroad during this
time of detente.
The plenum's decisions on the budget and eco-
nomic plan will be approved at tomorrow's scheduled
meeting of the Supreme Soviet. The one-day gap be-
tween the party plenum and the parliamentary con-
clave is unusual, but not unprecedented.
Neither speeches nor the full text of the
plenum's resolution, which apparently focuses on
the economic issues, are yet available.
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NOTES
Norway: The Norwegian foreign minister's
statement of December 10, which, in effect, laid
Norway's claim to the continental shelf around
the Svalbard Archipelago, continues to arouse con-
cern. The French reportedly have protested orally,
and the UK, Denmark, and the US have expressed
reservations. The Netherlands is the latest to
consider a protest. The Dutch are worried that
Norway might grant the Soviets preferential treat-
ment in exploiting potential mineral resources in
the archipelago. Underlying this concern is Dutch
anxiety over the whole question of how best to
counter Soviet advantages in the area and how to
maintain the security of oil installations in
adjacent seas.
Iraq: The Iraqi air force lost two aircraft
to Iranian surface-to-air missiles this past week-
end; one was a TU-16 medium jet bomber. Baghdad
radio claimed the aircraft were hit by American-
made Hawk missiles fired by Iranian units.. The
Iranians do not have Hawk missiles in Iraq, but
a week ago two units equipped with British-made
Rapier missiles moved into the area of the shoot-
down. Since the hostilities against the Kurds
resumed some nine months ago, Iraq has lost more
than 40 planes, about 10 percent of its aircraft
and helicopter force.
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Top Secret
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