THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992580
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 10, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
10 April 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
10 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 2, we comment on the changes in the Soviet
Politburo.
The situation in Pakistan is discussed on Page 3.
In Ceylon, security remains precarious and there has
been scattered rebel activity in Colombo. (Page 4)
On Page 5, we discuss our current problems in at-
tempting to monitor and analyze the flow of south-
bound infiltration from North Vietnam.
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USSR
The changes in the Politburo that Brezhnev announced
at yesterday's closing session of the party congress
add up to some substantial political gains for the
general secretary. At least three of the four offi-
cials added to the Politburo have been closely iden-
tified with Brezhnev in the past. Although al./ 11
previous incumbents on the Politburo were retained,
several who have been in opposition to Brezhnev on
occasion in the past have slipped in protocol rank-
ings.
The new members are Kazakh Republic party boss
Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Ukrainian Premier Vladimir
Shcherbitsky, and first secretary of the Moscow city
party organization Viktor Grishin?all three of whom
were elevated from candidate members of the Polit-
buro?and party secretary Fedor Kulakov. Kunayev
has been one of Brezhnev's most unabashed public
promoters. Shcherbitsky comes from Brezhnev's home
territory of Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine and worked
there directly under Brezhnev's ally Kirilenko for a
number of years. Kulakov has worked closely with
Brezhnev and Deputy Premier Polyansky in formulating
policy for agriculture, which is to enjoy a higher
priority, under the new five-year plan. Grishin's
ties to Brezhnev are the most nebulous, but he has
warmly praised Brezhnev in public speeches and may
also have ties to Kirilenko. All four of the new
men appear to be competent but uninspiring party
bureaucrats, and their addition does not seem to
herald any change in Soviet policy.
Politburo members who suffered protocol snubs in
yesterday's announcement include Premier Kosygin,
Premier of the Russian Republic Voronov, and trade
union head Shelepin; candidate member Mzhavanadze,
who is party boss in Georgia, and party secretary
Demichev also slipped in the protocol ranking. All
of them have apparently been in opposition to
Brezhnev ,at one time or another. On the other hand,
the independent-minded veteran party secretary,
Suslov, seems to have maintained his high standing.
While the composition of the party secretariat and
other key ruling organs remains unchanged, Brezhnev
now seems to have gained a working majority on the
party's top body. By, in effect, packing the Polit-
buro, he has diluted the influence of his old col-
leagues and he may even now have enough support to
remove them at some future time should he find it
expedient to do so.
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BAY OF BENGAL
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PAKISTAN
There are indications that government troops
are beginning to move farther into the countryside.
The Indian press claims that an ?army column is moving
from Jessore against the provisional Bengali capital
at Chuadanga. Another column may be advancing to-
ward Khulna, while other troops, according to the
press, have moved half way to Kushtia by water and
are now trying to move overland toward the city.
In the north,
that army units from both Saidpur and Rangpur are
attacking toward small towns but have made only
limited advances.
the Bengalis are
running Low on ammunition in some areas.
India presumablu continues to supply small
arms, and
a dozen or two Indian military advisers
have been sent to East Pakistan.
A senior East Pakistani civil servant has ex-
pressed his fear of possible famine to US officials
in Dacca. He expects that current food stocks and
grain yet to be harvested will be consumed in some
areas by September, and he believes that the break-
down of the food distribution system will lead to
severe conditions.
A number of factors, such as disruption
of the distribution of seed, fertilizer,
and pesticides, and of normal sowing and
cropping patterns will aggravate the
yearly grain problem in East Pakistan;
production normally runs about two million
tons short of requirements.
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CEYLON
The main fighting continues to be in the Kegalla
area in the center of the island, but there has been
some scattered insurgent activity in Colombo and rumors
are widespread that the capital's water supply may be
poisoned. With the situation still precarious and the
insurgents still in control in several areas, morale
is sagging among many government security forces who
have been on duty for long hours without adequate
equipment for this type of insurgency.
Heretofore, the rebels have avoided the
large cities and their recent actions in
and around the capital have markedly in-
creased public apprehension. Many people
simply want the issue resolved, even if the
rebels win. The government appears bewil-
dered and various spokesmen have been casting
about randomly for support, often making
contradictory statements as to the nature
of the insurgency. Although the regime is
getting some encouragement from traditional
supporters, no trade union unaffiliated with
a government party has spoken up in favor of
the prime minister.
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NORTH VIETNAM
For about three years between late 1.967 and early
1971, US intelligence was able to monitor the flow
of southbound North Vietnamese infiltrators with con-
siderable accuracy. Analysis of infiltration gave
us valuable insights not just into Hanoi's manpower
commitments but also into its strategic intentions
in the war. The accuracy of our analysis was based--
and indeed dependent--on a heavy flow of intercepted
messages from throughout the infiltration system,
but particularly from its northern end.
As we reported in The President's Daily Brief of 17
and 24 February, we have not had access to infiltra-
tion messages from the upper end of the system since
the first of the year,.apparently because Hanoi in-
stituted a series of communications changes that
made infiltration reporting more secure. Intercepts
are still available from farther down the trail, but
only sporadically. For instance, new messages indi-
cate that five, and possibly even twelve, infiltra-
tion groups--as many as 4,000-5,000 men--not only
passed into Laos but even reached the COSVN area
without being detected in intercepts. Even with this
reduced information base we have been able to esti-
mate with reasonable confidence that around 75,000-
80,000 infiltrators have moved south since the dry
season began last October. (About 15,000 other
ground combat troops that moved in integral units to
southern Laos and northern South Vietnam from North
Vietnam in the same period are not included in this
total.) This total may require moderate upward re-
vision in the next month or so.
The firmness of the dry season estimate, however, is
due principally to the fact that the bulk of the in-
filtrators this dry season entered the system in 1970,
when we still had a good reading on the flow inside
North Vietnam itself. In the future, until current
US efforts to regain comprehensive access to infil-
tration message traffic are successful, infiltration
data are likely to be 'a less comprehensive and re-
liable intelligence tool than they have been in the
past.
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NOTE
JORDAN: Today the government is planning to
surround areas in Amman where the fedayeen have been
concentrated and to search for weapons. With the
commandos continuing to pull out of the capital, the
chances of a major showdown appear to have lessened,
but there may be scattered incidents. The govern-
ment intends to station security force units perma-
nently in these areas to guard against resurgence
of a fedayeen threat to the city's security.
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Top Secret
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