THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 SEPTEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992837
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 1, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
1 September 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
1 September 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
? Two articles published recently in authoritative
North Vietnamese journals provide some hints that
the party line on the war is in flux. (Page 1)
Some of the contingency measures adopted by the
Indian armed forces are reviewed on page 2?.
An assessment of the Cambodian political situation
appears on page 3.
The French are still lobbying against MBFR negotia-
tions. (Page 5)
The two Soviet Mars probes have passed the halfway
point. (Page 6)
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NORTH VIETNAM
Two authoritative political articles have been pub-
lished recently that are markedly different in tone
from other Hanoi pronouncements of the past several
months. They could mean that the party line on the
war is in flux.
Both articles commemorate the 1945 August Revolution
in North Vietnam. The first was published in the
party theoretical journal and was broadcast in sum-
mary form by Radio Hanoi in mid-August; the second
appeared in the army monthly magazine and was broad-
cast on 29 August. Both articles are replete with
customary Marxist jargon, some of which reflects
Hanoi's continuing concern over its international
position in the wake ?of contacts between Washington
and Peking. In their treatment of the war, however,
both articles omit any reference to the 19th party
Central Committee plenum, which took place sometime
around the turn of the year and which called for an
increased Communist war effort. Nor does either
article tout the battles in southern Laos and Cambodia
last spring as "strategically significant" Communist
victories--a hitherto standard bit of jargon that
implied that Hanoi viewed those battles as a spring-
board for further Communist military gains in the
not-too-distant future.
The concept that the Vietnamese Communists are point-
ing toward large-scale military action in the war--a
theme that has pervaded their propaganda since at
least last March--is conspicuously weakened in these
two articZes. The army magazine even picks up an
odd line which has appeared once or twice in other
recent publications to the effect that the worst of
the fighting is over. Both articles, in addition,
have long passages emphasizing the unvarying "cor-
rectness" and "creativity" of the Vietnamese Commu-
nist party line. The North Vietnamese have in the
past reverted to such topics either when there seemed
to be differences within the leadership to be papered
over or when a policy shift was in preparation.
Hanoi's other, less authoritative media have con-
tinued to replay the themes omitted in the party and
army journals. If the shifts in the theme begin to
appear in the other media, the impression that a
policy change may be in the wind will be strength-
ened. The comprehensive reports that traditionally
are given by government leaders in connection with
the national day celebrations on 2 September may
provide further clues.
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
Indian forces are in an increased state of
readiness but they have not assumed the state of
alert which would be preliminary to immediate hos-
tilities. leaves
have been canceled as ot 1 September, but personnel
already on leave will not be recalled. A rear area
brigade in the west has left its normal station,
which may mean that units are moving closer to the
West Pakistan border.
India also is taking protective measures for
its aircraft and personnel at five airfields near
the border with West Pakistan.
the construction of
aircraft revetments and personnel trenches that-be-
gan in February at these fields is still continuing.
Caution rather than a decision to go to
war seems to have dictated,these moves.
If New Delhi expected combat soon it would
move its armored units-in central India
closer to the front, but there is no sign
so far of such a move. Moreover, flood-
ing in the east during the current monsoon
would seem to preclude major operations
there until the dry season; which normally
begins-at the end of September.
India also is taking precautions to assure ade-
quate petroleum supplies. The government asked
three foreign refineries it had previously prohibited
from producing beyond about 75.percent?of capacity,
to expand production and to camouflage all their
bulk storage 'areas,
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CAMBODIA
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/observations on the key political problems
confronting Sink Matak upon his return to Cambodia
on 30 August:
--One of Matak's first tasks will be to help
Lon NoZ avert a showdown with the National As-
sembly over its impending interpellation of
Finance Minister Sok Chhong on the government's
economic policies. Although Chhong is said to
have the firm backing of the cabinet, he has
made clear his desire to quit. Thus, it is
possible that Lon NoZ and Matak will placate
the Assembly by accepting Chhong's resignation
or even reshuffling the cabinet.
--Matak also is likely to be called on to re-
duce the bad blood between Lon NoZ and Chief
of State Cheng Heng, who believes the prime
minister is no longer fit to govern. Although
Matak should be able to patch things up tem-
porarily between the two leaders, he may have
less luck in disabusing First Deputy Prime Min-
ister In Tam and other senior officials of
their similar belief that Lon NoZ must go.
Matak must tread carefully, however, to pro-
tect his own position from opponents--particu-
larly Lon Nol's brother Lon Non--who are in-
tent on forcing him out of the government.
--Phnom Penh's increasingly strained relations
with Saigon will also demand Matak's attention.
Public reaction to mistreatment of Cambodian
civilians by South Vietnamese troops is again
creating pressure for a reduction of Cambodia's
military dependence on South Vietnamese forces.
For the moment, Lon Nol's recent request for
the elimination of a ten-mile corridor along
the border in which the South Vietnamese can
operate without high-level Cambodian coordina-
tion should reduce public concern. As long as
the present Zull in the fighting continues,
however, anti-Vietnamese sentiments in Cambodia
are likely to grow.
(continued)
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--It probably will not take Matak long to be-
come aware of the gradual erosion of public
respect and admiration for Lon Nol, and the
two leaders can be expected to work together
to reverse this trend. It is conceivable, how-
ever, that Lon NoZ--who probably is aware of
his declining popularity, and who is still con-
cerned about his health?may well decide to re-
tire from political life in the not-too-distant
future.
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FRANCE
Now that the Berlin agreement has cleared the way
for other European security issues, the French have
been busy reiterating their opposition to Mutual
and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations.
/the French are
now advocating,the buildup of "strong, closely co-
operating European national forces."
Paris realizes that it cannot avoid some form of
security discussions but it will continue to press
for an agenda which emphasizes political topics
rather than force reductions. This approach is in
accord with the French argument that detente must
precede technic al and military discussions such as
MB FR.
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USSR
The two Soviet Mars probes launched in May
have passed the halfway point)
The probes are likely meant either to land
a scientific package or to put a payload
in orbit around the planet. The first
should reach Mars in late November and the
second a few days later.
Completion of the probes' missions would
mark the first successes for the Soviet
Mars program. Two probes in the early
1960s failed!
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trTh
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USSR:
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NOTES
USSR:
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,
Top Secret
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