THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 JANUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015013
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 26, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
January 26, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. I 1652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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January 26, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The cease-fire was marred by only minor
skirmishes over the weekend; Cairo is showing
signs of worry about Damascus' motives.
(Page 1)
USSR-Angola:
USSR-Cuba-Angola: The intelligence community esti-
mates the value of Soviet, East European, and
Cuban support to the Popular Movement from
March through December 1975
(Page 4)
Note: USSR (Page 7)
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LEBANON
The cease-fire was marred only by
minor skirmishes over the weekend that
were easily contained by the Syrian-
Lebanese-Palestinian peace commission.
Syria's role in the truce agreement
has drawn sharp accusations from the
Egyptian media that almost certainly
reflect Cairo's suspicion of Damascus'
motives.
The commission was granted policing authority
on Saturday as a result of an agreement between
Muslim and Christian leaders worked out by Syrian
Foreign Minister Khaddam. Subcommittees of the
commission, which are to be established throughout
the country, will include a Syrian and a Lebanese
officer and either a Palestinian or Christian rep-
resentative, depending on the dominant faction in
each subcommittee's jurisdiction.
In an apparent effort to ease Christian con-
cern that this arrangement could favor the Muslims,
half of the 60 Syrian officers sent to serve on
the subcommittees are Christians.
The most explicit expression of Egypt's unease
over Syria's role in Lebanon appeared in the author-
itative newspaper Al-Ahram, which charged that
Damascus, prodded by the Soviets, had prolonged
the Lebanese crisis in order to gain greater con-
trol over both Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation
Organization. Syria's quick success in gaining a
settlement that only recently seemed nearly impos-
sible clearly nettles Egypt.
Suspicion of Damascus' role apparently figured
in Cairo's recent decision to send a battalion of
the Ain Jallut brigade--a contingent of the Pales-
tine Liberation Army normally based in Egypt--to
Lebanon. Yasir Arafat reportedly plans to use the
battalion as a counterweight to Syrian-controlled
PLA units in Lebanon.
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USSR-ANGOLA
(continued)
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Current Military Situation
J12 16 20 24
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Kenyan President Kenyatta tried twice last year
to bring Angola's rival groups together. Whatever
his response, there are no indications that Agos-
tinho Neto, president of the Popular Movement, would
be receptive to an approach from Savimbi.
Savimbi requested Kenya's mediation the day
after he met Zairian President Mobutu in Kinshasa.
On the military front, Cuban-led Popular Move-
ment forces have reportedly driven the National
Union out of the port of Novo Redondo, some 100
miles north of the National Union's key rail and
port complex at Lobito. The Popular Movement also
claims its forces have crossed the Cuvo River and
are moving toward Alto Hama, an important road
junction some 50 miles from Huambo.
Fighting continued over the weekend around the
eastern city of Teixeira de Sousa, with neither the
National Union nor the Popular Movement making sig-
nificant gains. In northern Angola, the Popular
Movement still has not begun a determined drive
on the National Front's remaining strongpoints
at San Antonio do Zaire and Sao Salvador.
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USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA
We present the key points of an Inter-
Agency Intelligence Memorandum--"Soviet
and Cuban Aid to the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola from March through
December 1975"--issued on January 24.
The intelligence community estimates that the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba shipped about
20,000 tons of military equipment to the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola from March
through December 1975.
--Soviet and East European sea shipments to-
taled some 12,500 tons, and a Soviet airlift
added another 2,000 tons.
--Cuban merchant ships delivered about 5,500
tons of military equipment.
Cuba also sent to Angola in this period some
7,500 Cuban military personnel, and the USSR sent
about 400 military advisers.
(A Soviet-Cuban airlift has continued to move
Cuban troops into Angola since the end of 1975. As
of January 22, 1976, a total of about 11,000 Cuban
military personnel had been sent to Angola. On that
date, this troop airlift came to an end, at least
temporarily, although additional Cuban troops may
still be moving into Angola by ship.)
Valued in equivalent US prices, this Soviet
and Cuban support from March through December 1975
would be on the order of $200 million. With the
evidence available to us, we can calculate an es-
timate of $179 million. Since this figure has been
deliberately based on conservative judgments, how-
ever, and taking into account some evidence which
cannot yet be quantified, we believe that this may
understate the total by some $20 million.
(Since January 1, 1976, the Soviet and Cuban
sealift/airlift in support of the Popular Movement
has continued. Between January 1 and 22, the cut-
off date of this report, there have been two voy-
ages by Soviet ships carrying military equipment to
the Angolan region; two additional Soviet arms car-
riers are probably en route.
(continued)
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(There have also been four voyages by Cuban-
owned or controlled ships carrying Cuban troops
and/or military equipment, and six additional ships
with similar cargo mixes are probably en route to
the Angolan region.
(In addition, three Cubana Bristol Brittania
aircraft flights have been made to West Africa with
Cuban troops, and 14 Soviet-piloted long-range IL-62
flights have ferried Cuban troops to the Angolan
region.
(There were no Soviet flights originating in
the USSR to the Angola region between January 1 and
20, but several flights to Angola left the USSR on
January 21-22. We cannot estimate the monetary
value of these additional deliveries until further
information becomes available.)
--Military equipment delivered to Angola from
March through December 1975 accounts for $144
million of the estimated $179 million.
--The cost (wages, maintenance, etc.) of So-
viet and Cuban personnel in Angola accounts
for $22 million.
--The cost of transporting Soviet and Cuban
equipment and personnel to Angola accounts for
$13 million.
(Some reports indicate that the Popular Move-
ment may have MIG-type jets. We have no confirma-
tion of this. If the Soviets have sent MIGs to
Angola, however, they would probably be either
MIG-17 or MIG-21s. The US equivalent price for a
single MIG-17 is $750,000, and the US equivalent
price for a single MIG-21 is $1.7 million.
(In addition, we believe that the Popular Move-
ment possesses surface-to-air misslies, but we are
unable to determine how many. Thus, we have not
included them in our estimates on the value of the
military equipment sent to Angola.
(Assuming that the Soviet missiles are roughly
comparable to the US Redeye missile, each Soviet
surface-to-air missile sent to Angola would raise
the total by about $14,300 in equivalent US prices.)
(continued)
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With this Soviet and Cuban assistance--both
materiel and trained manpower--the Popular Movement
has become by far the best equipped and militarily
the strongest of the contending factions in Angola.
The equipment provided to the Popular Movement has
included:
--T-34 medium tanks and PT-76 light tanks.
--BRDM armored cars and armored personnel
carriers.
--122-mm. long-range rockets and truck-mounted
rocket launchers.
--Antiaircraft guns.
--Sagger antitank missiles.
--Recoilless rifles.
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NOTE
The Soviet Kresta II guided-missile cruiser
that has been stationed near Conakry since January
11 has left port and is moving south.
The cruiser probably will rendezvous with the
landing ship now in the Gulf of Guinea and could
arrive there by Tuesday or Wednesday. Four Soviet
ships--a Kotlin-class destroyer and three oilers--
apparently remain at Conakry.
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,
Top Secret
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