THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 SEPTEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992841
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 3, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
3 September 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 September 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Ky is planning new moves, including both legal and
"irregular" activities, to persuade Thieu to post-
pone the presidential election. (Page 1)
The latest developments at the SALT talks are dis-
cussed on Page 2.
The enthusiastic reception in Japan for a senior
Chinese official has helped to crystallize the pro-
China mood there. (Page 4)
Brandt is fearful that West Germany is being left
behind by France and other West European countries
in their efforts to improve relations with the USSR
and Communist China. (Page 5)
Romani4
/(Page 6)
Luna 18 should reach the vicinity of the moon on
6 September. (Page 8)
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Vice President Ky is planning new moves to per-
suade President Thieu to postpone the presidential
election, Ky
is encouraging his followers to plan for both legal
and "irregular" activities, including covert politi-
cal action and military pressure. The vice presi-
dent hopes to persuade senior South Vietnamese Army
generals to join a "military high committee" which
would demand that Thieu resign to pave the way for
a new election.
Most army commanders remain responsive to
Thieu, however, and Ky is not likely to
take any rash action without some substan-
tial backing from the military.
Ky also is attempting to organize a broad po-
litical opposition to Thieu. He is meeting with a
wide spectrum of political figures ranging from usu-
ally progovernment northern Catholics to outspoken
antigovernment politicians and leaders of militant
veterans groups.
It seems doubtful that these groups would
be able to agree on effective cooperation
with one another, and that they would Zook
to Ky for leadership. The vice president
has had few ties with opposition circles
in the past.
Thieu's public reaffirmation yesterday
that he intends to go ahead with the elec-
tion as scheduled reflects his determina-
tion to resist pressure for a postponement.
Although Thieu almost certainly will not
be swayed by Ky 's maneuvers, the vice pres-
ident's activities mean the uneasy politi-
cal situation is likely to persist and
quite possibly grow worse.
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SALT
At the plenary on 31 August Semenov countered
the two-and-one ABM proposal submitted by the US on
20 Augustwith the proposal that each 'side be al-
lowed to protect two "administrative-industrial" lo-
cations of its own choosing. These two would have
a total of 200 launchers and 200 interceptors, and
a 200-kilometer deployment limit from the center of
each protected area. Semenov indicated that Moscow
would not consider a trade-off of two sites protect-
ing ICBM fields for two sites protecting "admini-
strative-industrial complexes" as meeting the stip-
ulations of the new proposal,
The Soviets have avoided specific defini-
tions of "administrative-industrial" com-
plexes, however, and earlier Soviet comment
suggests there may be some flexibility on
this issue. Despite the continued absence
of agreement on ABM levels and deployment,
the Soviet delegation obviously is anxious
to prepare a document before recess with
as much agreed language as possible, even
if the major issue remains unresolved.
There currently are three different work-
ing groups concentrating on the various
provisions of the draft defensive agree-
ments in an effort to find common ground.
Semenov has told Smith that he would like
the ?working groups to try and reconcile
"even in parts" the outstanding differences
in substance. Timerbaev has stated that
he hoped for a paper analogous to the ac-
cident measures report negotiated during
the Vienna round and completed during the
present round. This appears to be a fair
statement of the Soviet goal.
In addition to the question of the ABM
levels and deployment, the question of
radar deployment and of what constitutes
an ABM radar continue to be major sticking
points. Kishilov has twice suggested in-
formally that Moscow could reduce its pro-
posed 200-kilometer ABM deployment radius
to the US position of 100 kilometers if
the US dropped its deployment limitations
on radars within the 100-kilometer radius.
(continued)
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On the subject of offensive limitations, Se-
menov at the plenary formally stated the USSR's re-
jection of the inclusion of submarine-launched bal-
listic missiles (SLBMs) in any freeze on offensive
weapons. When Ambassador Smith protested following
the meeting, Semenov again elliptically raised the
issue of forward-based systems.
This suggests that Moscow will continue
to use the threat of reopening this con-
tentious issue to avoid consideration of
SLBMs at this time.
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JAPAN CHINA
The enthusiastic public reception in Japan
for Wang Kuo-ch'uan (see The President's
Daily Brief of 26 August) has helped to
crystallize further the pro-China mood
there. Indeed, the China issue is in-
creasingly isolating Prime Minister Sato.
Wang saw a wide spectrum of business and polit-
ical leaders and made a good impression throughout
his visit. He met opposition party leaders as well
as several of Sato's most outspoken critics within
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, including the
head of a Diet delegation going to Peking this month.
Leaders of Japan's powerful business community, such
.as the chairman of New Japan Steel, were particularly
eager to meet with Wang.
By not initiating substantive contact with
government leaders, Wang confirmed Peking's
desire to keep its distance from the be-
leaguered Sato government and to encourage
a broader and more united front of all
Japanese who hope to bring the Sato era
and its policies to an early end.
Former foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira, who
heads the faction in the ruling party second only
to Sato's in strength, now has broken openly with
the prime minister on China. In a speech on 1 Sep-
tember he called for rapid establishment of govern-
mental contacts with Peking to facilitate its early
recognition by Japan.
Ohira, who is one of Foreign Minister
Fukuda's most powerful opponents in the
coming struggle to succeed Sato as prime
minister, will continue to press the China
issue to advance his campaign. As Sato's
position weakens, the jockeying among con-
tenders for his position will continue to
intensify.
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WEST GERMANY
Chancellpr Brandt is worried ?that West Germany
is being left behind by France and other West Euro?
-
pean countries in their efforts to.pv relations
with the USSR and Communist China.
Many. Germans have long feared that a period
of detente would result in the diplomatic
isolation of the Federal Republic. While
the advent of Ostpolitik and the improved
atmosphere in German-Soviet relations re-
duced those fears, they have been revived
in recent months by the developments in
US-Chinese relations. The Brandt govern-
ment believes that it cannot at this time
actively seek better relations with Peking
for fear of offending Moscow and risking
the fruits of Ostpolitik in Eastern Europe.
Brandt-,
angling for an
cow before the
, is
invitation for another visit to Mos-
German-Soviet treaty is ratified.
Brandt might use
agreement and a
this occasion to sign a cultural
long-pending trade pact.
Although Brandt does not now intend to seek
diplomatic relations with Peking before 1974,
Bonn may become more active
relations once its treaties with Mos-
cow and Warsaw are ratified.
in its foreign
Earlier he indicated he expected German-
Chinese trade relations to expand, de-
spite the fact that Peking has been unin-
terested in an exchange of trade missions.
He will probably also attempt to improve
the atmosphere by other means, such as
through the establishment of a German-
Chinese friendship society which would en-
roll some important German political per-
sonalities.
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USSR-ROMANIA
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EAST PAKISTAN
The jute industry, the mainstay of the East
wing's economy, has been hard hit by the Bengali
rebels. Bombings of mills and threats to workers
resulted in a 15-percent drop in production last
month. Most mills are now operating ata loss,
with output only about 20 to 35 percent of normal.
At least 85,000 bales of raw jute have been de-
stroyed by the rebels, and transportation disrup-
tions apparently are preventing replenishment of
jute stocks. In the face of growing uncertainty
over the availability of Pakistani jute, foreign
consumers may increasingly turn to substitute ma-
terials.
Other areas of East Pakistan's economy are
similarly bleak. Retail sales are well below 50
percent of normal, worker attendance in Dacca is
only half of normal, tea plants are closing be-
cause of fuel shortages, banks are unable to find
low risk borrowers despite an easing of credit,
and there has been considerable flood damage re-
cently to crops and transportation links.
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NOTES
USSR: Luna 18, launched from Tyuratam yester-
day, should reach the vicinity of the moon on 6 Sep-
tember. This unmanned probe is likely to orbit the
moon before attempting a soft landing; its mission
after landing is not yet known. This is the eighth
successful firing in the last nine launch attempts
of the SL-12 booster, which now has an over-all rec-
ord of 14 successes and 14 failures.
North Vietnam: Official pronouncements on
North Vietnam's national day, including Premier Pham
Van Dong's keynote speech, provide no further clues
concerning a possible change in Hanoi's line on the
war. Pham Van Dong's speech, in fact, was a typical
anniversary performance, long on words and short on
substance, and contained neither the unusual themes
that had recently appeared in two authoritative jour-
nals nor the calls for increased military action
that had becone standard propaganda fare over the
previous several months.
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Top Secret
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