THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 FEBRUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993131
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 10, 1972

Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010400100001-0
The President's Daily Brief
10 February 1972
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
10 February 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Greek Government is dismayed over Makarios' ac-
quisition of Czech arms and is worried that the Turks
will intervene unilaterally if Athens cannot control
the Greek Cypriots. (Page 1)
An editorial in the Soviet publication Kommunist
pinpoints Brezhnev as the principal Soviet advocate
of detente and makes it clear he will be the chief
participant in President Nixon's talks in Moscow
this May. (Page 2)
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CYPRUS
Greek Foreign Minister Palamas told Ambassador
Tasca on Tuesday of his government's dismay over
the recent arrival of a shipment of Czech arms on
Cyprus. Palamas said that Athens now regards Presi-
dent Makarios as an obstacle to any Greek-Turkish
agreement on Cyprus, and implied that the Greek Gov-
ernment would like to see Makarios replaced. When
asked how Athens proposed to get Makarios to turn
over the arms, Palamas referred to the special
rights of intervention that Greece and Turkey have
under the London-Zurich accords. Palamas concluded
by stating--without clarification--that the arms
question "would be settled in a few days." A high-
level Greek Government meeting yesterday dealt with
the Czech arms problem and with ways to resume the
intercommunal talks.
Mainland Greek officials have several
reasons for their sharp reaction. Maka-
rios did not consult Greece before import-
ing the arms. He has refused to turn
them over to the Greek-controlled National
Guard. Athens suspects that the arms will
be given to the Communists, who could be-
come Makarios' allies in opposing any
coup attempt by General Grivas.
The Greeks especially fear that Ankara
will conclude that Athens cannot control
the Greek Cypriots and so consider inter-
vening unilaterally.
Turkssh Foreign Minister Bayulken told
Ambassador Handley last Saturday that an
arms shipment to the Turkish community
"might have to be considered."
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USSR
An editorial in the January issue of Kommunist
unequivocally identifies Brezhnev as the Soviet
Union's principal advocate of detente. The edito-
rial makes it clear that he will be the chief par-
ticipant in the President's talks in Moscow next
May, citing his "very important" negotiations with
Pompidou and Brandt last year. Brezhnev's name is
not associated with passages critical of the US or
its allies, whereas Premier Kosygin and President
Podgorny are identified with Soviet support of
North Vietnam and Egypt.
The editorial justifies Moscow's current peace
offensive as entailing no sacrifice of Soviet posi-
tions. It defends the development of relations
with the US, including SALT and President Nixon's
visit to Moscow, and assures its readers that no
"unstable foreign policy compromises" will result.
At pains to explain the Presidential visit against
the background of parallel US and Chinese policies
during the recent crisis in the Indian subcontinent,
the editorial ?stresses the "defeat" of the USSR's
adversaries, thus implying that it is Washington,
not Moscow, which requires the visit more.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010400100001-0
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