THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 JANUARY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992451
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 30, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
30 January 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
30 January 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat has taken a hard line
toward Washington in recent conversations with Com-
monwealth diplomats in Bangkok. (Page 1)
The international oil negotiations are discussed on
Page 3.
Egypt is taking steps to increase its military pre-
paredness as the end of the formal cease-fire period
nears. (Page 4)
The Panamanians have outlined their objectives in
forthcoming Canal treaty negotiations. (Page 5)
Argentina
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THAILAND
Foreign Minister Thanat took a very hard line
toward Washington in several recent conversations
:with members of the Commonwealth's diplomatic corps
in Thailand.
The British ambassador to Thailand told Ambas-
sador Unger yesterday that he had participated in
three significant parleys with ?Thanat, apparently
at the latter's initiative, within the past two
weeks. In these Thanat railed against US policy
?in Indochina, arguing that the French were the only
ones working for a negotiated settlement of the war.
He said that he favored Big Minh over Thieu and Ky
in the coming presidential race in South Vietnam
because Minh could negotiate successfully with the
Communists.
In one of the conversations on 26 January which
included the British, Canadian and Indian ambassadors,
Thanat claimed he had received a clear message from
Hanoi that they were looking for someone who could
get the Paris negotiations off dead center and fa-
cilitate a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia.
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Thanat said that while the North Vietnamese
may have had him in mind as their peacebroker, Thai-
land was in no position to play such a role, but
the Canadians were. He said that he would propose
to Hanoi that they get in touch with Canadian Am-
bassador Cox on this score.
In discussing a peace settlement, Thanat stated
that he was prepared to accept Communist domination
of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Thailand, he
said, would be able to hold its own and not fall
into the Communist camp. In making these statements,
Thanat gave no indication that they had the blessing
of other Thai leaders, although he said a day-long
cabinet meeting had preceded his remarks.
(continued)
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For over two years Thanat has been in the
forefront of those Thai leaders who have
been pressing for a more flexible and in-
dependent foreign policy--in short, a
policy calling for improved relations
with Communist countries as a hedge against
the diminishing US presence in Southeast
Asia. In addition to his flirtations with
Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi, Thanat has Zed
the recent criticism against Washington's
proposed sale of PL-480 rice and surplus
rubber to some of Thailand's traditional
Asian markets.
Although Thanat has in the past exercised
considerable influence over Thailand's
foreign policy, he has made relatively
little headway recently in redirecting
its course. His failure is in part the
consequence of recent events in Cambodia
and Laos which have increased Thailand's
dependence on the US for its security.
Thailand's room for diplomatic maneuver
has been further circumscribed by Peking's
failure to pick up public and private
overtures from Bangkok.
There is also a continuing question of
how much support Thanat can command from
Bangkok's military leadership for impor-
tant shifts in the country's foreign
policy. In particular, it is unclear
where Prime Minister Thanom's heir-appar-
ent, General Praphat?a staunch anti-
Communist and strong advocate of close
US ties--stands. Praphat's relations
with Thanat have been strained for some
time.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INTERNATIONAL OIL
Oil company representatives and the Persian
Gulf committee of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) exchanged sub-
stantive proposals Thursday, the first such
exchange since the discussions began on 19
January. As expected, the offers are far
apart--for example, OPEC countries have de-
manded a posted price increase of 54 cents
per barrel, while the companies are offering
15 cents.
The head of the oil company team has told the
American Embassy in Tehran that he is disturbed
at the wide disparity between the offers and
believes a settlement .close to what oil com-
panies see as reasonable will be difficult to
achieve. The general consensus of industry
negotiators is that the situation is "gloomy
but not hopeless." Iranian negotiators are
talking optimistically about an early settle-
ment, but this is in part to avoid drastic ac-
tion, such as production cutbacks or shutdowns
that radical producing countries may urge when
all OPEC countries meet in Tehran on 3 February.
Libya still refuses to meet with oil company
representatives in the parallel negotiations
that the companies are trying to start in
Tripoli. The Libyans insist on separate ,talks
with each ?company. Libyan officials have re-
fused to receive the oil companies' joint pro-
posal?the equivalent of the one presented
Thursday to the Persian Gulf group?although
they say it can be mailed to them. The Libyans
appear uncertain at this point as to their
next step. Oil Minister Mabruk has threatened,
however, that "a dangerous situation" will
exist on 3 February if the oil companies have
not reached separate settlements with the Lib-
yan Government by that time.
Syria's agreement to reopen the damaged Trans-
Arabian pipeline, out of service since last
May, could reduce slightly Libya's leverage in
the negotiations. TAPLINE officials estimate
that 500,000 barrels per day of Saudi Arabian
oil will reach Mediterranean ports by the end
of next week. This is 15 percent of current
production in Libya. In addition, the avail-
ability in the Mediterranean of another 500,000
barrels per day of "short-haul" oil for Europe
will ease the tight world tanker situation by
increasing transport capability by about three
percent.
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EGYPT ISRAEL
press reports that Egypt is
taking steps to increase its military preparedness
as the end of the formal cease-fire period nears.
All this has been accompanied by a chorus from
Egypt's public media about the failure of various
efforts to achieve any diplomatic progress and the
inability of Cairo ?to extend the cease-fire without
tangible results in the political sphere.
Egyptian leaders evidently hope that the
creation of a warlike atmosphere will in-
crease pressure on Israel to make a sub-
stantive offer on the issue of withdrawal.
Some of Cairo's actions, however, are only
normal defensive precautions taken in light
of the uncertainty that will prevail if the
cease-fire is not formally renewed. Although
Egypt no doubt has various contingency plans
for military actions against Israeli forces
in the Sinai, there are no indications now
that any such operation is imminent. Is-
rael likewise has displayed no intentions
to resume hostilities but as usual is on
the alert for any contingency.
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PANAMA
A six-point Panamanian position paper in-
dicates that Panama will stress questions
of sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction,
and economic benefits in forthcoming Canal
treaty negotiations.
According to the paper, Panama will demand full
political, fiscal, labor, judicial and administrative
jurisdiction over the Canal Zone. Panama acknowl-
edges 'a need for US technical and administrative know-
how., but calls for increasing Panamanian participa-
tion in the operation and maintenance of the Canal
and for greatly expanded commercial and economic
concessions. Panama wants the US military presence
tb be. limited to Canal defense and to be "for a lim-
ited.period of time with the cooperation of the Pana-
manian-armed forces."
Foreign Minister Tack told Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State Hurwitch on Thursday that while Pan-
ama would not accept a perpetuity clause, it would
not insist on a fixed termination date for defense
arrangements and would accept a Canal treaty that
could be revised every 20-25 years to meet changing
conditions. Tack said that any transfer of juris-
diction over the Zone could be programmed over a num-
ber of years.
This initial presentation has come more
than a year after General Torrijos first
expressed an interest in resuming negotia-
tions, but the Panamanians are likely to
push now for a more rapid negotiating pace.
The government's urgency will increase sub-
stantially by summer as its budget prob-
lems mount. As negotiations proceed, there
will be always the danger that the erratic
Torrijos will react impulsively to any de-
lays or setbacks.
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NOTES
Argentina:
Laos: Government harassing operations against
the Communist infiltration corridor in the central
panhandle (south Of,Muong.Nong where the communists
have built a new road) are continuing to meet_only-
moderate resistance. There are indications, how-
ever,.that- stiffer opposition may-be in,the offing,
possibly involving aregimentof the North Vietnam-
ese 320th Division that redently entered Laos and
may be on the Move in this general area.
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Top Secret
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