THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 JULY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977581
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 23, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
23 July 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
23 July 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Recent developments in Cambodia are discussed on
Page 1.
Israel \Soviet/
(Page 4)
Finns/
(Page 5)
Bolivia has agreed to release the ten prisoners de-
manded by a guerrilla group in return for two German
hostages. (Page 6)
The Soviets have rejected the latest Allied proposals
for improvements in Berlin. (Page 7)
The Soviet economy during the first half of 1970
improved significantly. (Page 7)
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Government forces in the center-of Kirirom re-
main pinned down by enemy troops./
four trucks- carry-
ing food and other supplies were ambushed and de-
stroyed on the only road into Kirirom on 21 July;
some supplies were then airdropped to government
forces in the city.
.The Communists also attacked several other gov-
ernment positions near. Route 4 in Kompong Speu Prov-
ince yesterday. Thirty government' defenders'at-Sre
KhlonTabandoned their post. there and headed' for
Kompong Speu city, following a heavy enemy mortar
attack. Twelve miles southeast ofthe city, the
Communists have dug in along the road leading to
the village of Srang, which they, apparently still
occupy. Press reports indicate that government'
forces are still some distance from Srang.
The. military training center at Romeas in Kom-
pong ChhnanT.Province remains- under attack, but air
strikes may enable: the badly battered government'
defenders thereto hold their ground. According
to government messages, .a large-enemy force is-
moving to attack the Lovek depot from the north,
and another group of 600 Communist troops is head,?
ing.southward from the lower endof the TonleSap
in order to block road and river traffic to Kompong
Chhnang-city.
In Kompong. Thorn Province, the governor says
the Communists are: attempting to prevent reinforce-
ments and supplies from reachingKompong Thom city
by placing troops in. ambush along the Stung Sen'
River, south of the city. He expects renewed at-
tacks on the city soon. The local military.com-
mander believes he-can hold the city as long as he
gets air, support..
1
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Lon Nol continues to receive widespread
and enthusiastic popular support, and key
government leaders are working cooper-
atively together. Sihanouk has been ef-
fectively discredited, and it appears that
he could muster little public support for
his "government" if he should return. As
the war drags on, however, some political
dissatisfaction with the government is
bound to crop up.
The government believes that Cambodian Com-
munist elements in the countryside number
less than a thousand, and do not pose a
serious problem. Many of the Cambodians
fighting alongside the Communists probably
are doing so involuntarily. Phnom Penh's
estimate that only about 10 percent of the
population in Communist areas willingly
cooperate with them cannot be verified at
this time, but probably is too conserva-
tive. The longer the Communists remain
in these areas, the greater will be the
number of their local supporters. What-
ever the case, it probably will be some
time before the Communists can establish
a solid infrastructure.
There are signs that the army's combat
performance is improving, and the morale
of the armed forces remains high despite
their initial reverses. Still, the Cam-
bodian Army continues to be plagued by a
lack of effective communications, trans-
portation facilities, tactical air sup-
port, and centralized training. Military
leadership evidently is not as bad as
originally supposed, and there is no doubt
that the army will remain loyal to Lon Nol
and fight as best it can against the Com-
munists.
Although government leaders are now firmly
committed to a hard policy toward the Viet-
namese Communists, the possibility of an
accommodation with them should not be
ruled out. If either Hanoi or Moscow, for
example, begins to push openly for nego-
tiations to end the war in Cambodia--
without the return of Sihanouk--the regime
would find it difficult to refuse such a
bid, because its claim to neutrality would
be called into question and it would be-
come increasingly identified with Saigon
and the war in Vietnam.
(continued)
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USSR-ISRAEL-EGYPT
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FINLAND
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BOLIVIA
The government has agreed to release the ten
prisoners demanded by the pro-Castro Army of National
Liberation (ELN) in return for the two German hos-
tages taken in Sunday's raid by the ELN on a US-owned
mining company. The prisoners are to be flown to
Chile at which time the hostages will be released.
Guerrilla activity, teachers' strikes
throughout the country., and increasing
student violence are posing new difficul-
ties for President Ovando. If Ovando vac-
illates in dealing with these problems,
military confidence in his leadership
could weaken. The state of siege declared
Tuesday gives the president the authority
to take firm action to put down strikes
and prevent disorders., but Ovando's style
tends more toward compromise than decisive
action.
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NOTES
USSR-Berlin: The Soviets advanced nothing new
and rejected Allied proposals for improvements in
Berlin at Tuesday's session of the four power talks.
The Soviets also showed little interest in producing
an expanded communique that would have served as a
token of progress in the talks. Bonn has hoped that
this would help to placate domestic critics of its.
own talks in Moscow, but the USSR apparently feels
under no compulsion to show movement in Berlin now
for the sake of the bilateral negotiations. The
next meeting will be in September.
USSR: The Soviet economy during the first half.
of 1970 improved significantly over the poor perform-
ance of a year ago. Industrial production was up
8.5 percent and labor productivity 7.5 percent.
Moscow says all branches of heavy industry and sev-
eral agricultural sectors improved, but less glowing
achievements were claimed for the consumer goods in-
dustry. In general, the gains are not remarkable
when compared to Soviet figures over the longer term.
Soviet leaders can be expected to continue to seek
new measures to stimulate technological progress and
economic growth.
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