THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 JULY 1974

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0006004756
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 5, 1974
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T0093-6A012200010005-6 25X1 The President's Daily Brief July 5, 1974 5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 58(1),(3),(3) declauified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence 9m1 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF July 5, 1974 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS The Arab League Secretary General says that sev- eral secret resolutions were adopted in support of Lebanon and the fedayeen. A Beirut paper, how- ever, will indicate that Lebanon rejected all of- fers of aid. (Page 1) General Galvao de Melo, a member of Portugal's junta and a olose associate of President Spinola, recently approached the US deputy chief of mission on Portugal's pressing need for economic aid from the US. (Page 3) (Page 4) Emperor Haile Selassie has agreed to military su- pervision of the government and to acceleration of constitutional changes that will make him a figure- head. (Page 5) In Laos, the cabinet again postponed recognition of the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Gov- ernment, prompting a fresh Communist threat to pull out of the coalition. (Page 6) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY ARAB STATES In a vaguely worded statement issued at the conclusion of the two-day Arab League Defense Council meeting in Cairo, Secretary General Riyad said that several secret reolutions were adopted in support of Lebanon and the Palestinians. Although Riyad did not elaborate, he said the Arab states agreed to pro- vide Beirut and the Palestinians with military, fi- nancial, and political support. According to a correspondent's dispatch from Cairo to a usually well-informed Beirut newspaper, however, the Lebanese--in closed meetings of the council--rejected all offers for financial and mil- itary aid for both Lebanon and the Palestinians. The Lebanese apparently made it clear that they did not want either the Arab troops or the sophisti- cated air and air defense equipment that was offered by other Arab states, for fear that this would pro- voke direct hostilities with Israel. There had been earlier indications that Beirut would seek at least financial assistance for a long-range defense program that it could plan itself. The Lebanese also reportedly succeeded in turn- ing aside Palestinian demands for aid. The dispatch quoted fedayeen leader Zuhayr Muhsin as saying that Beirut vetoed requests both for financialaid for the construction of shelters in Palestinian refugee camps and for additional SA-7 missiles to augment the Syrian-manned missile units sent last week to defend the camps in Lebanon. The delegates from Lebanon apparently.felt.that accepting assistance from other Arabs at this time would place their government under an obligation to states that do not share its inclination to remain relatively uninvolved in Arab-Israeli affairs. They probably felt that permitting aid to the fedayeen would infringe on their sovereignty--already a-sore point in Lebanese-fedayeen relations. (continued) 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Lebanon's reported unwillingness to accept aid could have broad and serious consequences. The feda- yeen, under pressure from Lebanon and other moderates, pledged earlier this week to suspend cross-border raids into Israel. The fedayeen may now feel that Lebanon's position at the Cairo meeting releases them from this pledge. Many Arabs, including the Egyptians, will be apprehensive that the Lebanese position weakens Arab clout and could strengthen Israel's propensity for expansionism. Egypt's offer two weeks ago of planes and pilots for Lebanon's defense was intended, as was the Defense Council meeting itself, to remind Israel and the US that the Arabs can back their words with action when they feel it necessary. The appar- ent failure of the Arab states to come up with a unified position, however, belies that warning. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY PORTUGAL General Galvao de Melo, a member of Portugal's junta and a close associate of President Spinola, recently approached the US deputy chief of mission on Portugal's pressing need for aid. Emphasizing that he was raising the matter officially, Galvao de Melo said the most important immediate require- ment from the US is economic assistance. He en- dorsed President Nixon's suggestion that the forum for discussing such aid could be the current nego- tiations on the US base in the Azores. In the course of the same conversation with the US embassy officer, Galvao de Melo said that he plans to leave the junta soon in order to found a centrist political party. The party will campaign for Galvao de Melo himself as vice president and for General Spinola as president of the republic. The party will have the support of the armed forces chief of staff, General Costa Gomes. Galvao de Melo did not indicate, and perhaps does not know, whether the party will have the crucial support of middle-echelon and junior officers. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00966A012200010005-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 25X1i G.J/V I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY ETHIOPIA Emperor Haile Selassie has agreed to military supervision of the government and to acceleration of constitutional changes that will make him a figurehead. The agreement, reached on Wednesday, leaves the Endalkatchew government intact but pro- vides for "close collaboration" between the cabinet and the military. A revised constitution, now being prepared by a committee appointed last March, is , expected to establish a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary cabinet. The military scored a major gain by securing the appointment of General Aman Mikael Andom as the new chief of staff. Aman, who enjoys wide respect in the military, has long advocated the political and social changes that the military have now forced the Emperor to accept. Haile Selassie also agreed to grant amnesty to political prisoners and to all political exiles who left the country because of differences with him. While the moderates who now dominate the mili- tary can enforce their views when they intervene in the political process, they are not a tightly knit group and therefore will not be able to provide firmness and continuity in the direction of the gov- ernment. 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00966A012200010005-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTE Laos: For the third time in as many meetings, the Lao cabinet on July 3 postponed recognition of the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Govern- ment. The Communist minister of foreign affairs, Phoumi Vongvichit, reiterated the Pathet Lao threat to pull out of the coalition government if the pro- posal to recognize the PRG is not accepted. The non-Communist ministers successfully argued that the entire 18-point program the Communists pushed through the Joint National Political Council must first be debated. One of these 18 points calls for recogni- tion of world revolutionary movements--a category that would include the PRG. 6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6 ..? Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012200010005-6