THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 DECEMBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977845
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 11, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
11 December 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 December 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Lon Nol has requested and Saigon has approved a
greater. Vietnamese role in trying to reopen major
roads leading to Phnom Penh. (Page 1)
North Vietnam is taking increased precautions in
apparent anticipation of further raids on its ter-
ritory. (Page 3)
Developments at the SALT talks are discussed on
Page 5.
On Page 6, we comment on Ulbricht's speech to the
East German central committee.
An imminent rightist coup against the Vientiane
government seems to have been thwarted. (Page 7)
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Cambodia: Current Situation
Skoun
Ene y held
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CAMBODIA
Prime Minister Lon Nol told a US Embassy offi-
cer on 9 December that he had asked the South Viet-
namese to send troops and helicopters for use in re-
opening vital lines of communication southwest and
northeast of Phnom Penh. Under his plan the Viet-
namese would help clear Communist blocking positions
along Route 4 and along Routes 6 and 7 in the Skoun -
Kompong Cham area.
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Lon NoZ's appeal to Saigon indicates that.
he now believes that Cambodian troops.are
incapable of rectifying the situations
around'Kompong Cham and on Route 4.without
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outside help.
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(continued)
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No major new Communist troop movements
have been detected since the Viet Cong
272nd Regiment moved to the west bank of
the Mekong last week. Previous Communist
performance suggests that they are not
Likely to oppose South Vietnamese troops
head on if the latter move to clear Route
7 between Kompong Cham and Skoun.
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NORTH VIETNAM
special
precautions are being taken throughout the country
against the possibility of more Y.US raids /'
/the North Vietnamese press
has been full of articles about increased defense
readiness, particularly in the southern provinces.
On 10 December thefl government and the Communist
Party central committee issued an extraordinary_
joint statement warning that North Vietnam faces
new. US attacks and calling for even greater pre-
paredness.
The current alarm goes well beyond the
tightening up we saw in the immediate
aftermath of the Son Tay raid. It is
also at a higher pitch than the air de-
fense precautions taken in the spring of
1969 when the North Vietnamese expected
retaliatory US air strikes to follow a
new Communist offensive in South Vietnam.
The current measures strongly suggest
that Hanoi genuinely expects fresh air
and ground raids at any time, especially
in the southern portions of North Vietnam
and Laos.
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JORDAN
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SALT?
At yesterday's meeting Semenov reverted to the
Soviet argument on forward-based systems, repeating
the "radical" solution and tabling the "partial"
solution. The latter entails a reduction in FBS but
also a cut in US intercontinental systems. In addi-
tion, he reaffirmed Moscow's position on bomber
limitations and explicitly rejected the US formula
limiting silo modification.'
In discussing "modernization," Semenov asserted
that national means of verification permit a distinc-
tion as to which missiles--light or heavy--are de-
ployed in existing, modernized, or new silos. The
US delegation suggests that this statement may have
implied Soviet readiness to accept a separate numeri-
cal limit on modern, large missile launchers. The
next session, which may be the last formal exchange,
will be held on 16 December.
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EAST GERMANY
In a speech before the East German central com-
mittee this week, Ulbricht Claimed he is ready for
additional movement in East-West negotiations on
Europe, but he did not make any new proposals to
further this movement, On Berlin, Ulbricht said an
agreement on reciprocal transit traffic would be pos-
sible only if Bonn ceased its "unlawful" interference
in WeSt:Betlin. Ulbricht also said his Warsaw Pact
allies fully support his demand that relations with
West :Germany be established on "the basis of inter-
national law" and. several times ridiculed Bonn's
position that a "special relationship" should exist
between the two Germanies. He:flatly stated that the
is suspicious of-Brandts motives and believes that
West Germany intends.torsubvert the Communist world
through the popularization of social democratic
ideas..
Ulbricht's remarks show he is not entirely
pleased with the Warsaw Pact policy to
which he is committed. His stand against
social democracy in Western Europe, for
example, pits him against Soviet ideolo-
gists, who have promulgated a doctrine of
renewed cooperation between Communists and
socialists in the West. Ulbricht also
seemed bitter about the West German -
Polish treaty and particularly about
Brandt's warm reception in Poland.
His vague reference to West German activi-
ties in West Berlin may mean that East
Germany will not insist on a complete
withdrawal of the West German presence
from West Berlin. Instead, the East Ger-
mans may be prepared to settle for a prom-
ise that West Germans will not conduct of-
ficial or semiofficial political business
in the city. It could also mean that Ul-
bricht wants Bonn's agreement to unhind-
ered transit of East German travelers and
goods to the West.
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NOTE
Laos: An imminent move by antigovernment con-
spirators to gain control of Savannakhet appears to
have been thwarted by the arrest in Thailand last
night of former. Lao colonel Bounleut Saycocie.
prior to the ar-
rest a number. of Bounleut's cohorts had infiltrated
Savannakhet from nearby points in Thailand, but that
tightened security imposed by forewarned Lao offi-
cials has kept them from taking any action. Although
the current tension in Laos is now likely to ease
somewhat, it is still not clear, whether the erratic
Bounleut was plotting a coup largely on his own or
was acting to further the political designs of more
powerful Lao rightists.
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Top Secret
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