THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014898
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 10, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
September 10, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1 ).(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 10, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The Socialist Party remains concerned
that its gains could be wiped out by an attempt
from either the left or right to seize power.
(Page 1)
Egypt: The US embassy in Cairo has provided an as-
sessment of why President Sadat, anticipating
Arab criticism of the Egyptian-Israeli disen-
gagement agreement, still risked signing an
accord that does not fully satisfy even Egypt's
demands. (Page 2)
Lebanon: Muslims and Christians in northern Lebanon
fought to a near standstill yesterday. (Page 4)
Angola-Zaire: The Popular Movement for the Liber-
ation of Angola has forced the rival National
Front for the Liberation of Angola from its
stronghold at Caxito. (Page 5)
UN: Reaction of both developed and developing coun-
tries to the US speech--delivered on the first
day of the Special Session of the UN General
Assembly--continues to be generally favorable.
(Page 6)
Notes: Romania; Cambodia; Cyprus (Page 7)
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PORTUGAL
The Socialist Party is taking
advantage of the Communists' recent
setbacks, but it remains concerned
that its gains could be wiped out by
an attempt from either the left or
right to seize power.
Socialist sources have told the US embassy
that prime minister - designate Azevedo has agreed
to form a government based on the Socialist program
and that the new cabinet could be announced as
early as today? These sources claim that the party
turned down an opportunity to form a Socialist gov-
ernment because it wanted to avoid criticism from
other political parties at a time when tough deci-
sions are necessary?
The Socialists say that they will be given at
least five of the approximately 15 cabinet posts,
although they may be including in this number inde-
pendents sympathetic to their cause. According to
the Socialist version of the new government, the
Popular Democrats--who finished a respectable second
to the Socialists in the elections last April--will
receive two posts, and the Communists will be given
at least one and possibly two.
The Socialists hope to gain effective control
of the government? The party will try to get the
military back into the barracks and hopes to disarm
the various revolutionary groups, including the
Communist paramilitary apparatus which the Social-
ists claim totals approximately 6,000 in the Lisbon
area.
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EGYPT
The US embassy in Cairo has pro-
vided an assessment of why President
Sadat, anticipating Arab criticism of
the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
agreement, still risked signing an ac-
cord that does not fully satisfy even
Egypt's demands.
Our embassy believes that the answer lies in
a synthesis of considerations, none of which has
been overriding on its own. These are:
--Sadat judged that this was the last real
chance to demonstrate that his shift in for-
eign policy--from dependence on the Soviets to
confidence in the US--is working and has not
hopelessly stalled, as his critics have
charged. Believing election year in the US
will make impossible bold US diplomacy, Sadat
concluded it was now or never.
--Sadat perceived other options offered vir-
tually nothing for Egypt. He knows he cannot
"win" a war. Further, he is in the awkward
position of knowing that if he takes preemp-
tive military action, he is likely to lose
carefully cultivated US support.
--As for a reconvened Geneva conference rather
than the just concluded negotiations, Sadat
knew it would have been a dangerously sterile
operation, resulting in polarization of the
Soviets and Arabs versus the US and Israel,
and consequently an admission that his policy
was bankrupt.
--Sadat was impressed with the argument that
an Israeli withdrawal, obtained through nego-
tiations and not war, constitutes an important
symbolic victory and the actual beginning of
the peace process.
--Sadat hopes he has sealed his borders against
Israeli attack at a time of relative Egyptian
military weakness.
(continued)
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--As it became obvious during the negotiations
that Egyptian minimal demands were to be met
(oil fields returned and Israelis "out" of the
passes), Sadat's ability to turn down the agree-
ment diminished sharply. Without a significant
pretext, refusal to accept the accord would
have been equivalent to a slap at the Americans.
--The Egyptian people are in a mood to accept
even a "bad" agreement. Businessmen want sta-
bility. The army is not afraid to fight but
knows the severe disadvantage it faces. Most
Egyptians are tired of war and yearn for eco-
nomic improvements.
--Sadat retains full confidence in your and
Secretary Kissinger's determination to con-
tinue to move the peace process along.
Sadat, therefore--for lack of anything better--
agreed to sign the accord. He knows the risks are
high, for he has left himself open to attack on al-
most every tenet of Arab solidarity. He has agreed
to a de facto suspension of the state of belligerency
and to the reintroduction of superpower "imperial-
ists" in the area.
He has been unable to obtain a public declara-
tion of US determination to seek a significant
Israeli pullback from the Golan immediately. He
has nothing to offer the Palestinians except a state-
ment that he has urged the US to begin a dialogue
with the Palestinians.
In short, Sadat will be hard pressed to refute
charges that his is a self-seeking "Egypt first"
policy that flies in the face of Arab nationalist
principles.
The inevitable result initially will be an in-
creasing flood of leftist propaganda. At least for
the interim, Sadat's moral and real influence in
the Arab world will diminish.
From all indications, however, Sadat is con-
fident he can handle whatever domestic dissent out-
side provocateurs manage to stir up. Most of his
senior colleagues do not fully share his confidence.
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MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
RMARAT
Ihf$
Golan
Heights
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON
Muslims and Christians in northern
Lebanon fought to a near standstill yes-
terday. With casualties and property
damage very heavy in both Tripoli and
Zagharta, militiamen on each side have
abandoned hand-to-hand combat and re-
turned to their usual tactic of shelling
from fixed positions.
The militia of the right-wing Phalanges Party,
which played a central role in the violence in
Beirut earlier this year, still has not become
significantly involved in the fighting. The party
is Lebanon's largest Christian political organiza-
tion, but is not strong in the area where hostil-
ities are taking place.
The major fedayeen groups also are staying on
the sidelines, despite the presence of some 16,000
Palestinians in two refugee camps near Tripoli.
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A few far-left fedayeen--presumably those in
the pay of Libya and Iraq--have attempted to inten-
sify the fighting. These Palestinians have been
joined by pro-Iraq Lebanese politicians
ing the government's inaction.
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in condemn-
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the government continues to resist calling in the
army. Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the Progres-
sive Socialist Party, has warned Prime Minister
Karami against use of the army, and leaders of
Beirut's Muslim community have predicted civil war
if the army becomes involved.
The cabinet met for the second time in two
days yesterday, but has not yet announced action
to stop the violence. Newspapers in Beirut reported
this morning that the army would be ordered today
to intervene in the fighting. They said that the
cabinet yesterday had agreed to give army commander
Iskandar Ghanim a six-month leave of absence. Ghanim
is a Christian and a long-time supporter of President
Franjiyah. Ghanim might be replaced by army chief of
staff Nasrallah, a Druze, who would be acceptable to
both sides in the present dispute.
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NGO
Braz,3011.2
Kinshasa
AIRE
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12-
'Shavuma
MBIA
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Ondangua
SOU 1H-WEST AFRICA
(Intern tional Territory)
12
16 20
SW
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ANGOLA-ZAIRE
The Popular Movement for the Liber-
ation of Angola has forced the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola from
its stronghold at Caxito, some 40 miles
northeast of Luanda.
The fall of Caxito is a serious defeat for
the National Front and may prelude a major offen-
sive by the Popular Movement to push the other na-
tionalist aro= out of Anaola entirely.
The Front had capitalized on its presence in
Caxito to maintain its military credibility after
being forced out of Luanda in July and to discredit
the Popular Movement's claims that it is the only
organization capable of assuming power when Angola
achieves independence. Unless the Front can stage
a dramatic comeback in the very near future, it
could lose any chance of consideration as a par-
ticipant in the post-independence government in
Angola.
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UN
The reaction of both the developed
and developing world to the US speech--
delivered on the first day of the Spe-
cial Session of the UN General Assembly--
continues to be generally favorable.
Our embassy in Paris reports that French offi-
cials are generally pleased with the speech because
it brings Washington into the dialogue with the
developing states. The Japanese Foreign Ministry
is satisfied for the same reason.
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NOTES
Romanian President Ceausescu suf-
fered a bruised ego at the Helsinki summit
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Ceausescu-- 25X1
was upset be- 25X1
cause he was not in the spotlight at Helsinki.
He was annoyed by the Romanian Foreign Ministry's
failure to line up more talks for him with other
chiefs of state. the East 25X1
European leaders tended to ignore him and treated
him like an outsider. 25X1
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Prince Sihanouk and his party received a fes-
tive welcome when they arrived in the Cambodian
capital yesterday.
The Prince was accompanied by Deputy Prime
Minister Khieu Samphan; Deputy Prime Minister for
National Defense Son Sen delivered the welcome
address. The Prince's visit to Phnom Penh will
apparently be short. During October, he is sched-
uled to be in Peking at both the beginning and
end of the month and, in between those dates, to
address the UN General Assembly and go to North
Korea. Following this round of travel, Sihanouk
may be resigned to spending most of his time in
Phnom Penh.
UN Secretary General Waldheim failed again
yesterday to get Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotia-
tors Clerides and Denktash to agree on an agenda for
formal discussions.
Denktash said that he cannot discuss the terri-
torial question until later in the year, after the
senate elections in Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot
elections. Clerides refuses to participate in
formal talks unless Denktash presents concrete pro-
posals on the territorial question. Waldheim in-
tends to call a session today that he hopes will at
least pave the way for another round of talks at a
later date.
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Top Secret
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