THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 AUGUST 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993893
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 4, 1973

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700020004-2
The President's Daily Brief
4 August 1973
45
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Exempt from general
declaulfication scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category 51,111,01.(31
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
4 August 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
George Papadopoulos' position has been strengthened
by the plebiscite last month that made him president
of Greece until June 1981, but criticism of his per-
sonal role will continue and could eventually develop
into a move by his colleagues to unseat him. (Page 1)
The North Vietnamese still seem reasonably satisfied
with the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.
(Page 3)
The composition of the new cabinet in Afghanistan
apparently represents a compromise between Daud and
the young officers who seized power in his name.
(Page 4)
Notes on Chinese grain purchases, the latest Sino-
Soviet trade agreement', Soviet
Libya, and the health of
North Vietnamese party boss Le Duan appear on Page 5.
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GREECE
George Papadopoulos' position has been strengthened,
at least for a time, by the vote on July 29 that
confirmed the new republic and made him president
until June 1981. Criticism of his personal role
will continue, however, and could develop into a
move by one or another of his colleagues to unseat
him.
Papadopoulos worries about three categories of op-
position forces. The least worrisome are the pre-
revolutionary political leaders. The most vocal of
these are in exile and are more of a nuisance than
a threat. Many of them represent the extreme right
or left in pre-revolutionary politics and have lit-
tle or no following at home. More moderate poli-
ticians in this group, exemplified by former pre-
mier Karamanlis, are beginning to stir again, and
there are signs that they are cooperating with each
other. They have no leverage on the present govern-
ment, and it will be a long time before they can
hope to rally popular support in Greece.
The second group is an amorphous band of "super-
revolutionaries" made up of younger officers of the
Greek armed forces, who want to "purify" the revolu-
tion and carry it even further than their superiors.
It is those who comprise the third category, his
comrades of the 1967 coup, that Papadopoulos must
persuade or, more typically, outmaneuver if he is
to stay in power. The big four--Pattakos, Makarezos,
Angelis, and Ioannides--control either directly or
through their subordinates most of the units in the
armed forces. Ioannides alone could make or break
a coup through his control of the military's inter-
nal security apparatus and his personal following
among second-rank officers. Papadopoulos has been
able to play his colleagues off against each other,
and most of them would rather have him out in front
anyway. They know, however, that he would prefer
to rule without them, and they rankle at the inroads
he is making into their individual and collective
authority.
Most of the trouble Papadopoulos encountered during
the pre-plebiscite period came from these leaders.
Although most of them favored the switch from mon-
archy to republic, there was consternation among
them when Papadopoulos moved so swiftly, leaving
them no time to object to the details of his plans.
They dislike the idea that Papadopoulos gains even
more power under the new republic, while theirs may
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be substantially diminished. Some senior military
people-.- likeIoannides--fear that parliamentary elec-
tions would open the door to the influences their
1967 move was intended to suppress.
They chafe most of all, however, over PapadopouZos'
secrecy, which has separated them from policy-making.
During the next month or so, PapadopouZos and his
senior colleagues will be testing each other's
strength. They will also be establishing the gov-
ernment apparatus for the new republic. There will
be minor institutional changes; for example, a con-
stitutional court may soon be set up to oversee the
eventual formation of political parties. Some cabi-
net members may be installed in office, but the im-
portant posts will not be filled until fall. That
should give PapadopouZos time to decide which of his
military associates he can safely fire and which
must be kept on.
Later in the fall, Papadopoulos will face renewed
criticism from outside the regime. The students have
promised to resume their agitation for educational
reform. Their demonstrations last spring turned
into an attack on the regime, and Papadopoulos'
heavy-handed tactics were an embarrassment to many
government leaders, including key military officers.
Inflation, an even more serious problem, could lead
to protest strikes in the big cities.
These and other problems may significantly weaken
PapadopouZos' position. Having committed himself
to parliamentary elections in 1974, PapadopouZos
will be under international pressure to meet that
deadZine. During the same period, military resist-
ance to elections is likely to rise, and some time
before the voting actually occurs, PapadopouZos could
face a concerted effort by his associates to bring
him down.
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VIETNAM
North Vietnam's propaganda on the first six
months of the cease-fire suggests that Hanoi is
reasonably satisfied with the implementation of the
agreement so far. The assessments, which include a
Foreign Ministry statement and an interview with Le
Duc Tho, are relatively balanced between what Hanoi
views as "positive" and "negative" aspects of the
agreement.
On the positive side, Hanoi touts the "victories"
achieved in the withdrawal of US military forces, the
return of Communist POWs, and the consolidation of
the Communist hold on the "liberated" areas of the
South. Continued fighting in the South is given as
a negative factor and is of course blamed on Saigon
and the US. The negative aspects, however, are
treated in a relatively low key, suggesting that
Hanoi is not trying to manufacture an excuse for a
return to large-scale military operations.
In contrast to the tone set by Hanoi, there
have been reports that key cadre in the South are
disappointed with the gains made by the Communist
side since the cease-fire and hope that Hanoi will
return to a more militant policy.
These cadre will find little comfort in
Hanoi's current propaganda, which seems
designed to inform the rank and file that
North Vietnam is willing to live with the
cease-fire accord for the time being.
The propaganda makes it clear that Hanoi
is sensitive to the US position that the
North Vietnamese must stop the fighting
in the South and withdraw their forces
from Laos and Cambodia before any agree-
ment on US aid to North Vietnam can be
reached. Le Duc Tho claims that these
"preconditions" are a delaying tactic
on the part of the US. Tho's relatively
moderate language on this point suggests
that Hanoi may eventually be willing to
make concessions to the US stand.
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AFGHANISTAN
The composition of the new cabinet appears
to be a compromise between Daud and the
junior officers who staged the coup in
his name.
Daud has taken the top posts of prime minister,
foreign minister, and defense minister and is ex-
pected to keep economic planning as well. The dep-
uty prime minister and several lesser ministers are
close to Daud. Three of the young officers involved
in the coup and two civilians allied to them have
been given portfolios, including finance and interior.
Ambassador Neumann has termed the cabinet
a "peculiar hodgepodge" and doubts that
it will be effective. Daud may be able
to exploit the inexperience and disunity
of the cabinet to increase his personal
control, but in the long run his ability
to stay on top may depend more on how
effectively he deals with the country's
many problems. The cabinet is unlikely
to be of much help in this regard.
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NOTES
China: Chinese grain purchases for delivery
in fiscal year 1974 now total nearly 6.7 million
tons, of which about 5.6 million tons will come
from the US. Last fiscal year, Peking imported
about 6.3 million tons of grain including 1.4 mil-
lion tons from the US.
China-USSR: The Sino-Soviet trade agreement,
signed in Moscow on 1 August, calls for the same
level of trade as in 1972--$250 million. The agree-
ment covers Chinese purchases of 11 AN-24 aircraft
?and electric power equipment.
USSR:
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North Vietnam - USSR: The Soviet press announced
on 3 August that North Vietnamese party boss Le Duan
had left Moscow for the Crimea, suggesting that he
has recovered from the pneumonia he caught in Moscow
about two weeks ago. Soviet party leader Brezhnev
also is believed to be vacationing in the Crimea,
and the two may get together to discuss unresolved
issues such as economic aid for 1974.
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Top Secret
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