THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 JANUARY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993712
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 10, 1973

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
The President's Daily Brief
10 January 1973
l5
o et 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
10 January 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Syria has received substantial materiel from the
Soviet Union since last summer, including new SAM
and antiaircraft equipment. (Page 2)
Australia's Prime Minister Whitlam has reiterated
his firm support for Canberra's alliance with the
United States. In defending his decision not to
intervene openly in the recent boycott of US ship-
ping, he said such action would have been both il-
legal and politically unrealistic in view of left-
wing pressures within the Labor Party. (Page 3)
Lao Government troops have been driven from Saravane
for the third time since they first retook it last
October. In the north the shelling of Bouam Long
25X1
has resumed. (Page 4)
The Cambodian military situation is essentially a
stalemate. (Page 5)
25X1
25X1
The Soviets
25X1
(Page
6)
The Chinese
25X1
25X1
(Page 6)
At Annex we examine the stalemated military situ-
ation in Cambodia, the inherent instability of the
Lon Nol government, and incipient divisions among
the insurgents.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-SYRIA
Since last summer, when the Soviets began to
accelerate deliveries of arms, Syria has received
substantial quantities of new SAM and antiaircraft
equipment.
The air force has received at least 18 new air-
craft, mostly MIG-21s. The navy has received two
Osa guided missile patrol boats, and the army has
acquired about 60 T-62 tanks.
The size of the Soviet military contingent in
Syria has increased. Last summer there were ap-
proximately 800 Soviet technicians and advisers in
Syria. There are now about 1.100
Some could well be Instructors to train the Syrians
in the use of their new equipment.
As of now, Syria does not have enough
trained pilots to operate the approxi-
mately 300 fighter and bomber aircraft
in its inventory. The shortage of pilots
has been aggravated by recent combat
losses to Israel and by a serious air
crash in December in which 15 pilots are
reported to have been killed. Syria,
moreover, has yet to fire a SAM at an
attacking aircraft, apparently because
its crews are not yet proficient in
using the system. We believe that
considerable time and further Soviet
deliveries will be required before
Syria can begin to defend itself prop-
erly against the Israelis.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
AUSTRALIA
Prime Minister Whitlam, in talking with the
US ambassador on 8 January, defended his decision
not to intervene openly to head off the seamen's
and dockworkers' recent boycott of US shipping.
He said such action would have been both illegal
and politically unrealistic in view of left-wing
pressures within the Labor Party.
Whitlam pointed out that Canberra's position
on the boycott--instituted to protest US Vietnam
policy--had been complicated by the government's
own position on Vietnam. He said the new Labor
government had a mandate not only to end Australia's
participation in the war but to do what it could
to ensure a speedy settlement. He stated that if
talks should again be suspended and the war inten-
sified, Canberra would consider initiatives in the
United Nations.
There is considerable anti-war sentiment
within the Labor Party, and Whitlam's
remarks presumably reflect his own con-
victions as well as domestic political
realities.
The prime minister, concluded his remarks to
the ambassador by stressing his firm support for
Australia's alliance with the United States and
specifically noting that he proposed no changes in
existing defense arrangements between the two na-
tions.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
fry
SI:161119g resume's -Boo? ?
ong.
-
an Ban.
--^ Ouangvillerc.;
72
,rz
r ? /
o
Ph'a
"r" \ ? I L'
F
\
,
?
I
'
?
-
Dong Henn'
? Government-held location
? Communist-held location
Muong
Phalane
25
MILES
50
THAILAND
I
/A .?... ? or .,
OUT
\
..--?.('
i
- - e -f! 23 , ? ? \
' --,Govirnme t oop /
,...
4:1
,13'`',4 , i onstithdra ", r- / .41' _ - ,..-?
1VIETNAM
I' '''. \ e Done ' orovan /\\, /, i
,.....
S
tI ? , ? ... 06. it
i-) / - 1
Kilo g 231 . Thateng . ,
Sedo I "4
\
16 96 /
to'
?
t s 'AP`:?.''
. . ..-
1 . ,---''
Jr" . ?, N cit'O'`,-
/ Poksong ....f
?.-1
23'T
,t ..1
- :?'18oldvens' ' ..,.
? . , I ..'
Plateau , -.," Thtope4L.u
0:1),
553975 1-73 CIA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Government units have been forced to withdraw
south and west from Saravane although one irregular
battalion still holds the airstrip. These troops
report that the North Vietnamese have moved anti-
aircraft guns into the town.
This is the third time the irregulars
have been driven from Saravane since they
first retook it in October 1972. Fight-
ing over Saravane during the past two
months has been some of the most intense
seen in south Laos. Both sides have
taken heavy casualties, and the irregu-
lars have been able to remain in the
area only because of continued air sup-
port.
In the north the government is airlifting ir-
regular troops onto Route 13 south of Sala Phou
Khoun, a road junction which was seized by the Com-
munists in late December.
The arrival of these troops will free
others to move north again toward the
junction. These forces are unlikely to
retake Sala Phou Khoun without reinforce-
ments.
The North Vietnamese resumed shelling of Bouam
Long, north of the Plaine des Jarres, on 8 January,
and government defenders have sighted company-sized
enemy units advancing on the base from the west.
Intercepted messages indicate that two more 130-mm.
guns have been moved within range of Bouam Long.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA:RDP76-100936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
A moderate upsurge in insurgent offensive ac-
tivity began about 1 January. According to an in-
tercepted Khmer Communist message, it is to con?
-
tinue for at least another week. Most of the ac-
tivity has been along the roads south of Phnom Penh
and on the western and northeastern edges of the
capital's defense perimeter. The Cambodian Army
has taken some fairly heavy casualties in a few
engagements, but it does not appear in immediate
danger of losing any important positions.
The military situation has become essen-
tially a stalemate. We see little like-
lihood of any significant change until
Hanoi has had time to assess its position
following a cease-fire in South Vietnam.
Even then the prospects for an end to
the fighting will still be clouded by a
number of factors, including the inherent
instability of the Lon Nol government and
incipient divisions among the insurgents.
These factors are examined in greater
detail at Annex.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDR-79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
USSR:
China:
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
CAMBODIA
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP.79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA MARKS TIME
Cambodia, the last of the Indochinese states
to become directly involved in the war, faces im-
mense problems in resolving its share of the con-
flict.- As things now stand, a wide political gulf
separates the Lon Nol government and the Khmer Com-
munists and efforts to bridge it will be difficult.
The Cambodian Army, while capable of containing the
insurgent military threat, does not appear ready or
able to regain the initiative on the battlefield
and recover the large amount of countryside lost
during the past two years- Strong external pres-
sure may eventually be required to break the stale-
mate and force the two sides into serious political
negotiations. In the meantime, the shape of things
to come is clouded by the inherent instability and
disunity of the Phnom Penh regime and by the com-
plicated but obscure relationships and objectives
on the insurgent side.
Military Stalemate
With the return of most Vietnamese Communist
units to South Vietnam during the past year, the
struggle in Cambodia has become much more a civil
war--a development which in itself makes a settle-
ment more difficult to reach. In the past, Lon Nol
has consistently taken the view that most Khmer in-
surgents are misguided patriots who can be expected
to rally to Phnom Penh once Vietnamese Communist
forces have been withdrawn. Events may be forcing
Lon Nol to back away from this dubious assessment.
With the president's apparently reluctant approval,
the government is now attempting for the first time
to open a high-level dialogue with the insurgents.
So far there has been no evidence that the insur-
gents are ready to respond positively to such
probing. Their propaganda continues to oppose any
compromise with the Lon Nol government regardless
of the nature of settlement prospects in Vietnam
and Laos. This attitude has been adopted in large
part to accommodate the North Vietnamese, who would
prefer to see continued fighting in Cambodia until
their own interests in South Vietnam are nailed
down.
The insurgents' hard line is also based on
their favorable position in the Cambodian country-
side. They dominate most of the territory east of
the Mekong and north of the Tonle Sap and know that
the Cambodian Army cannot readily force them out of
most areas they choose to defend. Moreover, the in-
surgents have begun to demonstrate that they no
longer need rely on the Vietnamese Communists to do
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
their fighting. Over the past few months their
forces have shown a growing ability to organize and
coordinate tactical operations over large areas.
Insurgent troops have been largely responsible for
the road interdiction campaigns that continue to
threaten the supply system to the Cambodian capital.
In most cases, these actions are now carried out
with only a minimum of assistance from elements of
the few Vietnamese Communist units remaining in the
country, but the insurgents? continue to rely on
Peking and Hanoi for most of their military supplies
and equipment.
The gradual growth in insurgent military capa-
bility is alarming when compared with the govern-
ment's own uninspired combat performance. Although
increasingly better armed and trained than it was
in March 1970, the Cambodian Army has lost the en-
thusiasm and dedication it demonstrated during the
early days ofthe War. One of the few bright spots
in the present picture is the effort of Major Gen-
eral Sosthene.Fernandez, the recently appointed
chief of staff, to do something about the poor lead-
ership, corruption and lack of discipline that
plague the army Any fundamental turnaround in the
army's morale and effectiveness, however,, will be
slow in coming. Since the disastrous collapse a
year ago of the large-scale "Chenla II." operation
to open Route 6--Phnom Penh's worst defeat of the
war--the government has made few vigorous attempts
to regain lost:ground. If past performance is any
indication, the army will remain indefinitely in a
defensive posture with the bulk of its forces de-
ployed around population centers and major commu--
niCation lines.
Political- Question Marks on' the Government Side
The government's lackluster direction of, the
war, has been paralleled by its disappointing Polit-
ical performance. The increasingly isolated Lon
Nol has been Unable to sustain the broad confidence
and respect he enjoyed during the first year of his
rule--a fact demonstrated by his narrow victory in
last year's presidential election.' His reluctance
to share authority or modify his arbitrary style
has sent former backers like Sink Matak to the po-
litical sidelines and dashed hopes for a unified,
broadly based government.. At the moment, the mach-
inations of Lon Nol.'s younger. brother, Brigadier
General Lon Non, are adding to the political malaise
in Phnom Penh. Since Lon Non acquired a cabinet
position when the present government.was formed last
October, he has tried to extend his control over
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
governmental affairs--with the apparent approval of
Lon Nol. His efforts to undercut the positions of
two key government figures, First Minister Hang Thun
Hak and General Fernandez, have already impaired
their effectiveness.
Despite the rising level of political discon-
tent, Lon Nol's would-be rivals remain disunited
and lack an effective base of political or military
support. In these circumstances, the president's
health, rather than political opposition, may be
the key to the current government's life expectancy.
There are still no logi-
cal inheritors of Lon Nol s mantle insight.
And for the. Opposition
Phnom Penh's political problems and uncertain-
ties may be dwarfed by those existing in the insur-
gent camp. In any strict sense, the term "Khmer
Communist" does not accurately. describe the indige-
nous forces operating under the banner, of Sihanouk's
Peking-based ."Royal Government of National Union."
The insurgent movement includes. the "Khmer Rumdoh"--
non-ComMunist Cambodians who opposed Sihanouk's
ouster in March 1970--and "Khmer Rouge"--left-wing
but nationalist-oriented elements who were in op-
position to Sihanouk before his removal The third,
and now probably most important. faction, is made up
of members and, followers of the' shadowy Cambodian
Communist Party. This. group is largely made up of
those Cambodians who tOok up residence in North
Vietnam at the time of the 1954 Geneva settlement
and who have been returning over the past two years
to assume prominent positions in the expanding in-
surgent infrastructure. The insurgent forces al-
legedly are commanded by three "ministers" of Si-
hanouk.'s rump government, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim,
and' Hou Youn--all.of whom were in political opposi-
tion to Sihanouk until the late 1960s, when they
disappeared.. At that time, they were widely be-
lieved to have been executed by Sihanouk.
a basic national-
ist-Communist cleavage within the insurgent move-
ment. This is best reflected in Peking where Si?
hanouk and his small royalist entourage' maintain
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
what appear to be difficult and uncomfortable re-
lations with the Khmer Communist members of the
exile government. The apparent leader of the
latter group is Ieng Sary, who has a history of
leftist activity in Phnom Penh in the 1960s. He
then dropped out of sight for several years and
finally surfaced in Peking in 1971 as "special en-
voy from the interior." The treatment and pub-
licity he has received indicate that the Communists
expect him eventually to. play an important polit-
ical role in Cambodia.
Sihanouk's future undoubtedly poses the major
political problem for the insurgent movement. From
all accounts., Sihanouk definitely expects to return
to his homeland and serve as chief of state pre-
siding over a coalition regime which includes the
Communists. Although the Khmer Communists must
appreciate his skills as a propagandist, his ability
to attract diplomatic support, and his residual fol-
lowing among the Cambodian peasantry, they must
harbor considerable reservation about allowing him
to return to Cambodia in any position of real or
potential power. Such a reservation is one point
of possible common ground between the insurgents
and the Lon Nol government, which is adamantly op-
posed to any solution that would bring Sihanouk
back to Cambodia. A political Comeback for Si-
hanouk would be further complicated by the murky
status of his relationships with widely divergent
Communistmovements--the Khmers, the Vietnamese,
and the Chinese. (Moscow, through its continuing
but superficial support for the Lon Nol government,
stands to be the odd man out on the Communist side
in any serious deliberations over Cambodia's future.)
Peking has supported and probably will continue
to back Sihanouk because of his unswerving regard
for the Chinese as Cambodia's chief benefactor and
protector and.becauseSihanouk would represent a
hedge against undue North Vietnamese influence over
Cambodia. Hanoi is probably less enthusiastic.
The Vietnamese Communists have' been primarily re-
sponsible for training the Khmer insurgent forces,
and until recently they have borne the brunt of
the fighting. The triumphant return of a Sihanouk
openly pointing to his relationship to Peking as a
guarantee against Vietnamese encroaohment would
offer Hanoi little return on this substantial in-
vestment.
During the past year, the situation in Cambo-
dia has increasingly taken on the overtones of.
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
stalemate. Consequently, all parties concerned may
now consider that an end to the Cambodian conflict
will eventually require some form of compromise
between the existing regime in Phnom Penh and a
Communist-dominated insurgency. Until the key ques-
tion of Sihanouk's role in a political settlement
can be thrashed out within the insurgent camp and
in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Peking, however, it may
be easier to go on fighting.
A5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010008-1