THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014982
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 18, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
December 18, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2)(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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wiv J FL 1-,
December 18, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The cease-fire has restored a degree of
calm to central Beirut and the hotel district,
but heavy clashes are continuing in villages
southeast of the capital and in the northern
Tripoli-Zagharta area. (Page 1)
Angola: The vying political factions are waging
new diplomatic offensives in view of the al-
most certain postponement until after the
first of the year of any OAU summit on Angola.
(Page 3)
Cuba-Angola-USSR:
(Page 5)
Israel: Prime Minister Rabin is holding the line
against any significant policy shifts despite
pressure from both centrist and left-wing
factions in his ruling Labor Alignment.
(Page 7)
Timor: President Suharto is unlikely to pull back
from his involvement in Timor regardless of
the amount of resistance Fretilin can create.
(Page 8)
USSR: An official of the Soviet Union's USA Insti-
tute has concluded that Washington's adherence
to detente probably will not change following
the dismissal of Secretary of Defense Schle-
singer. (Page 11)
Notes: USSR; East Germany - West Germany (Page 12)
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LEBANON
Scattered shooting was reported in
Beirut overnight, but the cease-fire has
restored relative calm to the central
part of the city and the hotel district.
Shelling has been reduced between Chris-
tian and Muslim strongholds in the sub-
urbs. Heavy clashes continue in villages
southeast of the capital, and in the
northern Tripoli-Zagharta area.
On Tuesday, the militia of Camille Shamun's
National Liberal Party attacked a Muslim village
southeast of Beirut to halt increased sniping di-
rected at two nearby Christian villages. Lebanese
security forces intervened to halt a firefight
that left at least five persons dead.
The incident so far has not sparked widespread
clashes in Beirut, but--because it involved Muslims
allied to Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist
Party--it could still seriously complicate polit-
ical negotiations and lead indirectly to renewed
fighting. The leftists have boycotted one session
of Prime Minister Karami's higher coordination com-
mittee to protest the attack, and Jumblatt will try
to exploit it while pushing his political demands.
In Tripoli
Representatives of five Christian fami-
lies, led by Franjiyah's son, had called on Karami
on Tuesday to apologize for killing Lebanese army
troops and to solicit additional military assist-
ance in separating predominantly Muslim Tripoli
from Christian Zagharta, the President's hometown.
The prolonged fighting in Lebanon has led to
widespread unemployment and to significant popula-
tion shifts. As many as 200,000 foreign workers,
mostly Syrian and Egyptian, may have left the coun-
try altogether, and as many as 40,000 Shia Muslims
may have departed Beirut for their family homes in
(continued)
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southern Lebanon. For the most part, Palestinians
have taken over areas of Beirut vacated by these
departing workers.
Political activity in Beirut is continuing,
but so far to no particular end. The cabinet, the
higher coordination committee, and the parliamen?
tary committee considering political reforms have
all resumed their regular meetings.
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viv I I I L I ILL,J.LIJI...1 I. l_/1
ANGOLA
The National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola and the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola
are waging new diplomatic offensives
in view of the almost certain postpone-
ment until after the first of the year
of any Organization of African Unity
summit on Angola.
National Union President Jonas Savimbi is
traveling around trying to drum up support against
Cuban and Soviet involvement in Angola. He met
with Zairian President Mobutu on Tuesday and cur-
rently is in Kampala. He will arrive in Senegal
on Friday for talks with President Senghor. Sa-
vimbi reportedly will then go on to visit Cameroon
and Ivory Coast which, like Senegal, have called
for an end to all foreign intervention in Angola.
He reportedly also would like to make an appearance
at the UN.
Popular Movement Prime Minister Nascimento
left Luanda Tuesday night for a visit to Nigeria
to cement the ties that have developed between the
two regimes since Nigeria extended recognition late
last month. Lagos recently decided to extend non-
military aid to the Popular Movement regime.
The Nigerians apparently still believe, how-
ever, that a government of national unity can be
formed in Angola, and Nascimento probably will try
to convince them otherwise. The Popular Movement
fully realizes that Nigeria is a major voice in
African affairs and that its position will carry
weight with uncommitted states.
The Nascimento delegation also is taking with
it the four South African soldiers captured in re-
cent fighting in central Angola. The white South
Africans will be exhibited to the Nigerian govern-
ment and the international press as added weight
for the Popular Movement's case that it is the
victim of foreign aggression. Nigeria's recogni-
tion was prompted by South African support for the
National Union.
(continued)
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The Popular Movement undoubtedly will contend
that the National Union and National Front have
sold out to the white minority regime in Pretoria
and thus cannot be considered by Africans as true
Angolan nationalist groups.
In Angola,
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CUBA?ANGOLA?USSR
(continued)
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The Soviet central press has admitted for the
first time that both Moscow and Havana are providing
military support to the Popular Movement in Angola.
Moscow's decision to make public, even in an
unofficial way, its role in Angola coincides with
recent military and diplomatic gains of the Popu-
lar Movement, and suggests that the Soviets may
want to get their fair share of the credit for
these successes. The Soviets also may now feel
less compelled to mask the dimensions of their own
involvement because of the recent revelations in
the American press of US support for the Popular
Movement's rivals.
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ISRAEL
Prime Minister Rabin is holding the
Zine against any significant policy
shifts despite increasing criticism of
his handling of a number of issues by
centrist and left-wing factions of the
ruling Labor Alignment.
Rabin has been attacked for his:
--Apparent readiness to bow to conservative
pressures for new Jewish settlements in the
occupied territories.
--Inflexible position against negotiations
with the Palestinians.
--Failure to consult Labor Party leadership
forums in making governmental policy.
The stability of Rabin's fragile coalition de-
pends on his ability to retain the support of both
conservatives and centrists. The conservatives
wield much more political clout than their cabinet
colleagues, however, and Rabin looks to them for
his Knesset majority. Labor's centrist Mapai fac-
tion is not a cohesive block and, even with the
support of various left-wing factions and parties,
could not form a government.
The conservatives, together with the right-
wing opposition Likud bloc, would need only the
support of a handful of Knesset deputies from the
Mapai faction to form a government. Any alterna-
tive to Rabin, therefore, would be likely to be a
conservative who would be even less responsive to
pressure from Labor's center and left-wing elements.
For now, neither side seems inclined to permit
an open break that could topple the government.
Nevertheless, the increased grousing by Foreign
Minister Allon and other ministers has placed new
strains on the Rabin cabinet's precarious unity.
Any changes Rabin might make in response to
the recent criticism are likely to be non-substan-
tive ones, such as toning down his uncompromising
public remarks on the Palestinian issue.
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TIMOR
President Suharto, now that he has
finally authorized overt intervention in
Timor, is unlikely to pull back regard-
less of the amount of resistance Fretilin
can create. He is clearly prepared to
commit whatever forces are necessary to
restore order and begin a decolonization
process that will ensure integration of
the colony into Indonesia. The scenario
worked out by Indonesian officials is
along the lines of the agreements reached
with the Portuguese in conferences ear-
lier this year. The major difference is
that Jakarta rather than Lisbon will be
the administering power for the period
of the transition.
Indonesia plans to organize a referendum a few
months after order is restored to ratify its fait
accompli in Timor. Jakarta hopes to conduct the
decolonization process under the auspices of the UN
Security Council. Indonesian officials have said
they would welcome UN observers for the voting.
Local authorities in Timor would have little diffi-
culty restricting the movements of such observers,
thereby avoiding embarrassing disclosures about the
secrecy of the balloting or fairness of the outcome.
Jakarta expected Portugal to be a willing par-
ticipant in the behind-the-scenes activity that
would engineer a favorable UN resolution and is
clearly shocked at Lisbon's strong reaction to the
Indonesian invasion. Nevertheless, Indonesia hopes
that its friends in the Security Council will be
able to hammer out a resolution that in effect rec-
ognizes the new status quo.
Immediate Military Prospects
Indonesian forces have now established their
control over Portuguese Timor's two principal cities,
Dili and Baucau. Fretilin forces are withdrawing
to the hills and are not contesting Indonesia's
moves against major towns. Any difficulties Jakar-
ta experiences in moving into the remaining well-
populated areas more likely will result from com-
mand-and-control shortcomings, poor weather, and
bad communications than from Fretilin resistance.
(continued)
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Fretilin initially may try to retake some
areas occupied by pro-Indonesian forces, but so
long as Indonesian troops are present, Jakarta's
overwhelming superiority in men and materiel should
prevail.
Pacification of East Timor is in many respects
similar to the kind of internal security problems
that the Indonesian armed forces have dealt with
successfully in other parts of the archipelago.
With the departure of the last Portuguese and Aus-
tralians, there is no longer any known foreign pres-
ence other than the Indonesians. Any resistance
activity is likely to go largely unobserved by the
rest of the world.
Prospects for Guerrilla Resistance
The core of the Fretilin fighting forces con-
sists of Timorese trained under the Portuguese,
some of whom advanced as far as sergeant. After
the April 1974 coup in Portugal, the Timorese
troops evidently became highly politicized through
contact with newly arrived Portuguese officers who
have since departed. Estimates of the total Freti-
lin forces range from 5,000 to 10,000, but few of
these have had much military training.
Fretilin has enough resources to carry out
terrorist acts that could cause some international
embarrassment for the Indonesians. Rural dissi-
dence, moreover, will be extremely difficult for
Indonesia to eradicate.
Fretilin's successful exploitation of long-
standing tribal rivalries will give it more stay-
ing power in the countryside than it otherwise
would have. The organization apparently has been
able to ally itself with enemies of the pro-Indo-
nesian tribal groups in many areas. Fretilin has
attracted few international supporters, however,
who would be either able or willing to provide it
with supplies.
Jakarta's success at restoring order will de-
pend on how effective it is in manipulating the
tribal situation and in selecting local rulers.
This will be a difficult job for the Indonesians,
who do not share a common language with the Timor-
ese and have little knowledge of the tribal poli-
tics in Timor.
(continued)
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L _11.1.1_, 1 _IA
The International Dimension
Indonesia is less concerned about lingering
dissidence in the countryside than about problems
its action in Timor will cause at the United Na-
tions and in Jakarta's bilateral relations, partic-
ularly with Australia and the US.
Once Indonesia establishes military control of
the towns, it should be able to control the flow of
information. Fretilin spokesmen are still active
abroad, however, and they will probably be a source
for anti-Indonesia propaganda in the international
media for some time. There is a large reservoir of
sympathy for the Timorese in Australia among both
left-wing trade unionists and usually conservative
World War II veterans who served in Timor and have
an emotional attachment to it.
The main focus of the propaganda battle is
likely to be the UN. Jakarta realizes that it will
have to take some lumps from Portugal and the OAU
bloc. Indonesia's Asian friends will try to pre-
vent resolutions that harshly censure Jakarta or
demand restoration of Fretilin. The African bloc
already has engineered an expression of anti-Indo-
nesia sentiment in the UN decolonization committee.
Jakarta's friends believe they can head off
any move in the Security Council to impose sanc-
tions or otherwise force Indonesia's hand. If
those friends can contain the efforts of radical
Third World states, international interest in Timor
will probably wane very quickly. Even Jakarta's
Asian critics, Hanoi and Peking, have given Freti-
lin only limited media support.
Both China and the Soviet Union are trying to
improve their bilateral relations with Indonesia
and will not risk this effort by championing Freti-
lin's cause. India and the Arab states are work-
ing on Jakarta's behalf at the UN.
An exile Fretilin group probably will be ac-
tive for some time, but so long as Jakarta is able
to establish effective control of the more heavily
populated areas of Timor quickly and without exces-
sive casualties, Fretilin spokesmen will be little
more than a nuisance. They will probably be in
much the same position as the West Irian separa-
tist movement. Information on continuing resis-
tance in Irian rarely reaches the outside world.
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N., ? II, -a- BAJA-I -4_ J. \-/ A-J, J. `I J.- J I J-J
USSR
In a recent assessment of the dis-
missal of Secretary of Defense Schlesin-
ger, an official of the Soviet Union's
USA Institute concludes that US adher-
ence to detente will probably be substan-
tially unchanged.
The author of the article relies heavily on
the American press to make his points. Using nu-
merous quotes, he points out that you probably
wished to strengthen your position on the eve of
the election campaign, but he places the burden of
the dismissal primarily on Schlesinger's attitude
toward detente. The former defense secretary is
called a "stubborn opponent" of detente who had at-
tempted to use the "old bugaboo" of national secu-
rity to block arms limitations agreements.
The Soviet author also alleges that Schlesin-
ger's "noise" against defense budget cuts contrib-
uted to his downfall. The removal of the defense
secretary is seen as a victory for Secretary of
State Kissinger and a reflection of your desire to
"move further down the path of detente."
The article warns, however, that the installa-
tion of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld does not mean
that the Pentagon will change its position on de-
tente. Both the new Secretary and his predecessor
are seen as holding similar ideological views of
the world, and White House denials that Rumsfeld
would follow a softer line are underscored. The
author ends by citing your pledge to sustain US
foreign policy without change and to continue try-
ing to reach a second SALT agreement with the So-
viet Union.
The USA Institute official's article cautiously
replays, with only slight distortions, the discus-
sion in the US press of the significance of the
cabinet changes. The former defense secretary is,
however, linked directly to the obstacles in the
way of a new SALT agreement. The article, more-
over, identifies Secretary Rumsfeld's views with
those of Schlesinger more clearly than did initial
Soviet coverage of the personnel change. This por-
trayal of the new Secretary as a "hard-liner" may
reflect a Soviet need to maintain the Pentagon as a
believable scapegoat for US actions that Moscow
does not approve.
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Soviet Union
NOTES
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The East and West German governments plan to
announce today their agreement on a "package deal"
to improve road and rail transit routes to Berlin.
The accord is the most important single step
the two Germanies have taken to improve bilateral
affairs since they established diplomatic relations
in June 1974. Negotiations were stymied for a long
time by several problems, but Chancellor Schmidt
evidently saw an opportunity to reap political
benefits by concluding these highly visible accords
with the East Germans.
The improvement in transit routes should
boost his stock with West Berliners, who have con-
sidered Schmidt less attentive to their interests
than former chancellor Brandt. East Berlin will
gain some favorable publicity, as well as coveted
hard currency from highway construction projects.
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