THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 JANUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007909
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 4, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
January 4, 1975
5
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedulc of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B1 1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 4, 1975
Table of Contents
Cambodia: Government troops have recaptured some
territory since the communists launched their
offensive on New Year's Day. (Page 1)
Iran-Egypt-Jordan: The Shah's state visits next
week are part of his effort to improve ties
with moderate and conservative Arabs. (Page 2)
Rhodesia: Prime Minister Smith's truce agreement
with black insurgents appears to be taking
effect gradually. (Page 3)
At Annex we present the principal judgments of a
National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Naval
Policy and Programs.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh Area
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Government troops have recaptured
territory on both banks of the Mekong
near Phnom Penh and along Route 4 south-
west of the capital since the communists
launched their offensive on New Year's
Day.
Reports that the government had abandoned the
military fuel depot at Prek Pnou have proved false.
Cambodian forces still control the depot and are
holding the garrison against continued communist
attacks. Government clearing operations along
Route 5 just north of the fuel depot, however, con-
tinue to meet stiff resistance and the road there
remains cut. The government's 7th Division has
made some progress in clearing a secondary road
west of the fuel depot and in relieving some iso-
lated units.
Intercepted communications from unidentified
insurgent forces near Phnom Penh indicate that the
communists plan terrorist action inside the city
against government personnel and offices, military
facilities, and marketplaces. While the insurgents
could carry out some limited terrorist action in
the city, the scope of action outlined in the mes-
sage would seem to be beyond them.
Elsewhere in the country, insurgent forces have
increased their holdings along the Mekong River cor-
ridor. The river remains open, but resupply convoys
will be vulnerable unless government units are able
to retake some of the lost terrain. The next convoy
is scheduled to transit the Mekong from South Viet-
nam on January 7.
1
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IRAN-EGYPT-JORDAN
The Shah's state visits to Egypt and
Jordan next week will be the latest steps
in his effort to improve ties with moder-
ate and conservative Arab countries. He
has already wooed the Arabs by giving more
Zip service to the Arab cause against Is-
rael. The Shah hopes that the trip will
demonstrate his constructive, moderating
influence in regional politics and help
isolate .radical regimes such as Iraq's.
The visit to Egypt is the Shah's first state
visit there. Relations between the two countries
were chilly during Nasir's tenure, but have warmed
under Sadat. Both governments now favor limiting
the influence of radical Arab regimes and hope to
restrict the role played in the region by outside
powers. The Shah and Sadat want to develop areas
of mutual interest
Both sides have gained from closer relations.
Sadat has endorsed the Shah's attempts to foster
closer economic and security cooperation among
Indian Ocean countries and has acquiesced in Iran's
growing role in Persian Gulf security affairs.
Cairo has also ignored Iraqi requests that it pro-
test Iran's military support for the Kurds.
For its part, Cairo looks to Tehran mainly
for economic help. Last May the Shah agreed to
provide $870 million to support various Egyptian
economic projects, including rebuilding Port Said.
Tehran has also agreed to furnish 3 million tons
of Iranian crude oil, but is still unwilling to
give Cairo military equipment or money to purchase
arms.
As for Jordan, the Shah has maintained good
relations with King Husayn over the years. Iran
loaned Jordan $15 million last year and delivered
11 F-5 jet fighters; another 11 will be delivered
in 1975. Tehran has also provided flight training
to Jordanian pilots. Both countries provide mili-
tary aid to the Sultan of Oman for his fight against
the leftist rebellion there.
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RHODESIA
Prime Minister Smith's truce agree-
ment with black insurgent leaders appears
to be taking effect gradually. Prospects
are dim, however, for the early constitu-
tional conference called for in the agree-
ment.
Since Smith announced the truce on December 11,
the government has released at least 50 of some 400
black political detainees. The government claims,
however, that the insurgents are responsible for a
number of recent small-scale attacks on farmers and
security patrols, and Smith reportedly has informed
Rhodesian nationalist leaders that captured guer-
rillas will be set free only after all political
detainees are released. This enables him to hold
the guerrillas hostage until terrorist incidents
cease.
Smith and the black nationalists have been un-
able to agree on a site for the projected constitu-
tional conference. The nationalists are opposed to
Smith's plan to hold it in Salisbury, where they
fear he would preside and play them off against
each other. There are serious rivalries in the na-
tionalist movement; three insurgent groups, for
example, maintain separate offices in Lusaka, the
capital of neighboring Zambia.
When British Foreign Secretary Callaghan
visited Lusaka this week on his tour of six black
African capitals, Zambian President Kaunda report-
edly urged him to convene the constitutional con-
ference in London. Bishop Muzorewa, the chairman
of the Rhodesian African National Council, and the
principal insurgent leaders also favor the London
site. Smith is likely to resist such an arrange-
ment. Callaghan is also going to South Africa to-
day to consult with Prime Minister Vorster on the
Rhodesian problem.
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Disposition of Soviet Naval Forces
NN
?
Baltic Flet Pv
0 Ballistic missile submarines
47 Major surface ships
22 General purpose submarines
182 Major aircraft
Black Sea Fleet
0 Ballistic missile submarines
58 Major surface ships
? 24 General purpose submarines
143 Major aircraft
ty,s,
Northern Fleet
45 Ballistic missile stihmarines'1)
54 Majors1irfaa ships
128,Geiferlf-purpose suhmarines-?
198M6jor aircraft
()
?
-10
Pacific Fleet.
25 Ballis ic missile submarines ,
57 Majot surface ships
80 GenerallWiAsubmarines ,
225 Major agora a
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET NAVAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS
We present below the principal judg-
ments of a National Intelligence Estimate:
Soviet Naval Policy and Programs, which
was approved by the Intelligence Commu-
nity on December 23, 1974.
A primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to
furnish a deterrent to attack through the presence
of a credible and survivable ,SSBN (ballistic mis-
sile nuclear submarine) force, and, in time of gen-
eral war, to participate in the nuclear exchange
and strike at soft targets such as military instal-
lations, industries and government centers.
The Soviets routinely maintain five of their
operational SSBNs on station. The Soviets also
appear to keep SSBNs ready for deployment
the majority of these--
the Y-class SSBNs--will take about a week to ten
days to reach station after notice. This will
change appreciably during the next decade since in-
creasing numbers of D-class submarines will be
within missile range upon leaving home port.
Under conditions of sufficient warning to get
additional forces to firing stations, the Soviets
might currently expect as many as 400 sea-based
missiles to reach their targets in an initial strike.
Under conditions of no warning, successful NATO
damage limiting operations, delays in command and
control procedures, or deliberate Soviet decisions,
the Soviets might be able to launch only a few score
missiles from the Y-class and D-class SSBNs.
The Soviets are attempting to increase the
survivability of their SSBN force in several ways.
They are constructing tunnels near SSBN bases suit-
able for concealment and protection of the subma-
rines and have built dummy SSBNs probably to con-
ceal deployment levels during crises or to mislead
NATO targeting.
We expect the Soviet SSBN force to expand to
62 modern units by the late 1970s. The 62nd unit
is probably already under construction, and we be-
lieve all of them will be completed.
(continued)
Al
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If the proposed strategic arms limitation
agreement covering the 1977-1985 period is success-
fully concluded, the Soviets will be limited to a
total of 2,400 delivery vehicles--ICBMs, SLBMs.
(submarine launched ballistic missiles), and inter-
continental bombers--with no sublimit on SLBMs.
This would require some reductions in the numbers
and probably some changes in the mix of Soviet
strategic forces.
We believe the Soviets will retain a force at
the level of 62 modern SSBNs until about 1980. But
pressures will mount for change in the mix of stra-
-tegic forces in the 1980s and we are uncertain how
these will affect the SSBN force.
An extensive program to refit new and probably
MIRVed missiles to the force is expected to start
in the late 1970s, and to continue through the
mid-1980s.
Nuc ' Lear War
The Soviets continue to believe that a war
with the West will probably evolve into a short
nuclear conflict, but they also see some increasing
likelihood that a war could begin, and perhaps even
remain, at a conventional level. Soviet doctrine
calls for the earliest possible destruction of
enemy nuclear capabilities, including naval, in
the early phases of a conventional conflict.
Because the Soviets think it unlikely that a
war with the West would remain conventional, we
believe that they would seek to destroy SSBNs in
the early stages of a conflict. However, it is
possible, if the Soviets saw the opportunity to
contain the conflict at conventional levels and
given the low probability that they could actually
destroy an SSBN, that the Soviet leadership would
direct the Navy to refrain from attacking SSBNs in
order to reduce the chances of escalation.
Soviet capabilities for combating Western car-
rier strike forces--to them a first priority task--
include forces for the surveillance of NATO carrier
task forces in peacetime, and a combination of air,
submarine and surface forces for the destruction
of those NATO carrier task forces in war.
(continued)
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cp
US and Soviet Aircraft Carriers Compared
Feet
.100 1,000 900 800 700 800 590 400 300 200 100
lj
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US Kitty Hawkilclass
attacklaircraft carrier
?
US Hancock class
ASW aircrAt carrie
OD o
oviet Kiev class
ircraft carrier
V A
Soviet Moskva class
ASW helicopter carrier
Flight deck area
Aircraft elevators
, CONHO
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
We believe that, given time to coordinate all
of their surveillance assets, the Soviets would
probably be able to locate and track most US air-
craft carriers in the northeastern Atlantic, Nor-
wegian Sea, northwestern Pacific Ocean and the east-
ern Mediterranean. We believe that coordinated
strikes against Western carriers in these areas
would be at least partially successful.
The degree of success would depend upon the
location of the carriers, whether the Soviets use
conventional or nuclear weapons, and whether sur-
prise were achieved. If nuclear weapons were used
in a surprise attack, most of the carriers in these
areas could be destroyed. On the other hand, timely
warning of a Soviet attack would allow the carriers
to take action which would probably assure the sur-
vival of some carriers, especially against a conven-
tional attack.
We expect the Soviets to maintain the high
priority on combating enemy aircraft carrier task
forces.
Strike Capability
The strike capability of the Soviet Navy against
Western surface forces will be significantly improved
by the deployment with Soviet Naval Aviation of the
Backfire ASM strike aircraft. The Backfire's in-
creased range capability will give it coverage over
all the major sea lanes leading to Europe and extend
Pacific Ocean coverage to Hawaii--areas that were
formerly out of range of the strike aircraft of the
Soviet Navy.
Equally important, Backfire's capability for
high-subsonic, low-level flight will also give it
a better chance than the Badger of successfully
crossing potentially hostile land areas such as Tur-
key and Greece in order to opprate over the Mediter-
ranean, an area over which, in practical terms, the
Soviets could not now operate their naval strike
aircraft.
The Backfire's variable-flight profile and high-
speed capabilities--Mach 2 at high altitudes--will
give it a higher probability of penetrating carrier
defenses in the open ocean than is the case with
the Badger aircraft.
(continued)
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Soviet capabilities for anti-submarine warfare
(ASW)--countering Western SSBNs and defending
against attacks from Western general purpose sub-
marines--are inadequate. We expect the Soviets to
continue to pursue various approaches to anti-sub-
marine warfare, with emphasis on the anti-SSBN prob-
lem. Improved ASW sensors and supporting systems
and stand-off weapons will be more extensively de-
ployed. The construction rate of ASW submarines
probably will increase.
Although we believe the Soviets in wartime
would attempt to attack Western SSBNs, they have
no effective capability to do so in the open ocean
and will probably not acquire such a capability
during the next decade.
The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Na-
tional Security Agency believe that several of
the nonacoustic methods currently known to be
under investigation by the Soviets offer potential
for improving their detection of nuclear subma-
rines and thus could provide them with a capabil-
ity to threaten the survivability of a portion of
the US SSBN force deployed in the open ocean. The
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy, shares this view.
We cannot exlude, however, the possibility that
the Soviets might be able to detect a few SSBNs in
limited areas such as the western approach to the
Barents Sea or in strategic choke points such as the
Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. We do not expect that So-
viet forces will have systems for the reliable de-
tection of Western attack submarines beyond the
range of the latter's weapon systems during the
period of this estimate.
We believe that, if a conventional war in Eu-
rope were to continue for some time, the Soviets
would probably mount an interdiction campaign
against Western sea lines of communications. The
Soviets would have major problems in doing so.
They do not have forward bases for resupply,
and attempts to operate their small number of re-
supply ships beyond Soviet-controlled waters could
be easily countered. Thus their submarines would
almost certainly have to return through choke points
to an uncertain resupply situation.
(continued)
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Moreover, the North Atlantic sea lanes are
basically beyond the range of all but Bear and Back-
fire aircraft. In a prolonged conventional con-
flict, therefore, the Soviets could effect attri-
tion on NATO shipping, but could not disrupt it
completely. We believe it unlikely that, outside
of direct involvement in a war with the West, the
USSR would attack Western sea lines of communica-
tion, however vulnerable.
We do not believe the Soviets are building
naval forces for intervention in distant areas
against substantial opposition nor do we believe
they have much capability for such intervention
now. Soviet ability to sustain combat at sea for
long periods would be severely circumscribed by
logistics-related weaknesses.
Most of the new larger Soviet surface combatants
have no reloads for their major offensive weapons
systems, and the ships' limited underway replenish-
ment capability constrain Soviet abilities for sus-
tained combat at sea. The current forward posture
of the Soviet Navy depends upon the support of aux-
iliaries and merchant ships in anchorages and in
Third World ports, and presumes a non-hostile envi-
ronment.
Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy has diver-
sified its areas of operation. However, the rapid
growth rate in naval activity away from home waters
that characterized the late 1960s has slowed in the
1970s. Virtually the only increase in the last four
years has been related to unusual circumstances such
as minesweeping operations in 1974 in the Gulf of
Suez and the Bangladesh harbor-clearing operations
in 1971.
We believe that the majority of the Soviet
out-of-area operations, especially those in the Nor-
wegian Sea and the Pacific Ocean, have been related
primarily to training for operations against West-
ern navies. But we also believe that many of the
Soviet out-of-area operations reflect a Soviet de-
cision to use naval forces more extensively in fur-
thering Soviet foreign policy objectives in peace-
time.
Policy Objectives
Through their naval operations in peacetime
the Soviet leadership has sought to influence US
(continued)
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actions at some cost and risk while at the same
time keeping to a minimum the chances of actual
US-Soviet conflict. We expect this approach to
continue.
We believe that the level of Soviet naval out-
of-area activity is approaching practical limits,
given the USSR's current priorities. Over the
longer term, as newer more capable ships enter the
force, there will be a moderate but steady increase
in the number of ships available for distant opera-
tions. Any rapid increase in sustained distant
deployment probably would require a more intensive
shipbuilding effort, not only of surface combatants,
but also of logistic support ships.
Naval activity and port visits, particularly
in the Third World, probably have improved the So-
viet Union's position with some foreign political
leaders, but it has irritated others. Still others--
perhaps a majority of Third World leaders--show
little outward concern about Soviet naval deploy-
ments.
In many countries, nevertheless, especially
developed countries with a maritime tradition, naval
activity is perceived as an important element in the
international political balance. As long as this
view continues to be prominent, the Soviet Navy's
peacetime operations will have significant politi-
cal impact.
We believe that future Soviet naval develop-
ments will bear a strong resemblance to the current
trends. The Soviet Navy has been widely perceived
as equal to or even superior to the US Navy, despite
the many asymmetries in the two forces. This per-
ception has given the Soviet Navy a degree of credi-
bility which, while not always fully supported by
its combat capabilities, has made it an important
element in calculations of international political
power.
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