THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 AUGUST 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007791
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 14, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
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August 14, 1974 25X1
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category 5B( i
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
August 14, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Turkish forces began a new offensive in Cyprus at
dawn today, following the breakdown of the Geneva
talks last night. As a consequence, Athens announced
that it was withdrawing from military participation
in NATO. (Page 1)
Our assessment.as of yesterday afternoon of Turkish
military capabilities on Cyprus appears on Page 2.
On Page 4 we discuss reaction in China and Japan to
your assumption of office and the impact the change
of administration may have on General Secretary
Brezhnev's standing with his colleagues in the So-.-
viet leadership,
Syria
(Page 6)
Soviet officials, still concerned about the fate of
the Soviet helicopter crew captured by the Chinese
last March, were recently considering a new proposal
fn Ppkina fn sprnrp fhPir release.
Panama
Cuba.
(Page 9)
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BULGARIA
AL ANIA
ITALY GREEC
A !lens
Incirlik
CYPRUSJ
SYRIA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LE BAN N
LIBYA
Territory controlled
by Turkish forces
aniagusta
arnaca
massol
Akrotiri
556386 8=74
CYPRUS
j UK Sovereign base area
0, 10 20
MILES
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TURKEY-GREECE-CYPRUS
Turkish forces began a new offensive in Cyprus
at dawn today, following the breakdown of the Geneva
talks last night. As a consequence, Athens announced
that it was withdrawing from military participation
in NATO.
The Turks launched air strikes against Nicosia
airport and Greek positions south of the city. There
also was sporadic fighting all along the line sep-
arating the Turkish and Greek communities in the cap-
ital. Initial reports of ground action indicate that
the Turks are moving to relieve a Turkish Cypriot
enclave near Chatos and that there is new fighting
at the western end of the Kyrenia mountain range.
The Greek government's decision to withdraw
from military participation in NATO, while remaining
a Member of the Alliance, was apparently taken at
an early morning emergency meeting of the country's
top political and military leaders.
In New York, the UN Security Council held an
emergency session early today to discuss the break-
down of the Geneva talks ? and the renewal of fighting
in Cyprus. The meeting was called by British Foreign
Secretary Callaghan.
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TURKISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES ON CYPRUS
The Turks can, with the forces presently avail-
able to them on Cyprus, establish within three to
six days a line of control across the island to in-
clude the "one third" of its territory that they
have envisaged as an essentially Turkish area.
Fighting would go on behind this line for some time,
as pockets of Greek Cypriot resistance were cleared
up. The Turks could bring in reinforcements, but
these would not be essential for their immediate
objectives. We define these objectives as the es-
tablishment of a line from Morphou to Famagusta
through or more likely around Nicosia and including
the Nicosia airport in the Turkish zone.
Resistance by UN and/or UK forces would not
significantly affect this outcome, except possibly
in the immediate environs of Famagusta.
The Soviets would not be able to bring signifi-
cant forces to bear in the Cyprus arena. They could
alert or even move some of their forces in an ef-
fort-to bring political and psychological pressures
on Ankara.
The mainland Greeks would not be able to rein-
force the island in a Way that would affect the
outcome. The Karamanlis government would probably
survive while the Turkish operation was going on,
but if the Turkish move was not reversed through
either military or political action by the US or
NATO', _Karamanlis' chances of staying in,power would
be Very small. Greek withdrawal from NATO would be
likely in these circumstances.
If the Turks went for broader objectives (i.e.,
sought to impose military control over Cyprus as a
whole or seal off all possible entry points), they
coulcIprobably do it, against Greek Cypriot opposi-
tion, but it would probably take them several weeks,
the'operation would-be bloody, and ,they would need
reinforcements.
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The rough balance of forces on Cyprus at this
time is as follows:
Ground 32,000 Turkish troops.
45,000 Greek Cypriot National Guard
and Greek mainland officers.
4,400 United Nations.
Air. Turkish air force (600 operationally
assigned aircraft) is available.
Greek air force (400 operationally
assigned aircraft) is not available;
its fighters are at the outer limits
of their combat ranges.
Navy Turkish navy (100+ combat ships and
60 amphibious craft) is available
for 'operations with air cover.
Greek navy (60+ combat ships and 60-
odd amphibious. craft) is unable to
operate successfully around Cyprus
for lack of effective air cover.
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REACTION IN CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE USSR
The Chinese Communists have been characteris-
tically circumspect in what little they have said
publicly about your administration. Chinese media
promptly reported your speech of Monday night with
its assurance of continuity in the US commitment to
the principles of the Shanghai communique.
The Chinese news agency mentioned your assump-
tion of office twice over the weekend:
--In a short item announcing President Nixon's
resignation. (This item was broadcast on Au-
gust 9 and published the next day on page six
of the People's Daily.)
--In a two sentence account of your meeting
last Saturday with the head of the Chinese
Liaison Office in Washington.
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This is not to say that Chinese officials have
been kept in the dark with regard to events of the
past few weeks, they keep up
through a restricted Chinese publication that car- 25X1
ries international news and commentary drawn from for-
eign press sources. This is prepared for a selected
readership in the party, government, and army. In
May and June, for example--while the mainland press
continued its embargo on news of Watergate--top
officials were being kept informed through this pub-
lication.
Japanese government spokesmen have publicly
expressed confidence that US policy toward Japan
will remain unchanged. Many Japanese are concerned,
however, that under the new administration domestic
problems will be emphasized at the expense of inter-
national affairs. Many leading Japanese feel that.
in
in the last few years the US has frequently slighted
Japan's interests and has viewed the relationship in
an increasingly competitive sense. Some probably
feel that a shift to greater US attention to the
domestic scene--particularly to economic problems--
will result in both a growth in US trade protection-
ism and also pressure on Japan to assume a greater
share of its defense burden.
(continued)
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Tokyo, in typical fashion, will scrutinize every
statement of your administration for indications of
what lies ahead for US-Japanese ties. When Foreign
Minister Kimura travels to the US for the UN General
Assembly session next month, he hopes to meet with
you to get a clearer indication of the direction of
US policy. Prime Minister Tanaka has also made it
clear that he would like a meeting when he visits
Canada and Mexico this fall.
As for the Soviets, the change in administration
is likely to have some impact on Brezhnev's own stand-'
ing in the Politburo. His pre-eminence among his
colleagues, which has grown steadily since 1970, when
he first embarked on face-to-face summitry, has de-
pended a good deal on the personal relationships he
cultivated with President Nixon, President Pompidou,
and Chancellor Brandt.
Thus far, Brezhnev has survived unruffled their
successive departures from the international scene.
He has now lost his special claim to these personal
relationships, however, and his authoritative voice
in Politburo discussions of foreign affairs may be
weakened at least temporarily.
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SYRIA
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USSR-CHINA
Soviet officials, still concerned about the
fate of the Soviet helicopter crew capturedlby the
Chinese last March, were recently considering a new
proposal to Peking to secure their release.
Moscow undoubtedly is frustrated over its
failure to secure release of the crew. The Chinese
have not responded to formal protests and have re-
buffed Soviet attempts to talk to the crew. The
Peking press has been silent on the subject for
several months, and Chinese officials have said
only that the Soviets would be treated in accord-
ance with "Chinese law."
Despite their irritation, the Soviets appear
to have adopted a restrained approach since their
last protest just before the US-Soviet summit.,
appear to have foresworn any bow to
Soviet pressure on the incident. Furthermore, at
a time of political uncertainty and contention in
Peking, top leaders might be unwilling to accept
responsibility for approving a proposal.
Anti-Soviet credentials are particularly important
for Chinese leaders at this time.
. The stone wall that the Soviets have encoun-
tered in trying to extract the helicopter crew is
symptomatic of the present state of relations be-
tween China and the Soviet Union. Virtually every-
where the two are engaged, whether it be maneuvering
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
on the diplomatic front or on border rivers, they
are at loggerheads. The sensitive frontier dispute
remains unresolved, and both sides admit openly
that they expect nothing from the border talks,
which have been going on in Peking for almost five
years.
Sino-Soviet competition grew particularly in-
tense--and took on a new dimension--three years ago,
when the US moved to put itself in a better position
to profit from the rivalry between the two Communist
powers. This US policy prompted each to redouble
efforts to outdistance the other in cultivating
ties with Washington, and that competition is still
on. As for their mutual relationship, neither the
Soviets nor the Chinese expect any improvement,
even in the unlikely event of wholesale leadership
changes in Peking or Moscow. Each side seems con-
vinced the other is locked into a hostile policy
that will determine bilateral ties for a long time.
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PANAMA-CUBA
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