THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 JUNE 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015133
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 11, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
June 11, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I I652
exemption category 513( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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June 11, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The Syrians are reportedly continuing an armor and
infantry assault begun last night against a Palestinian
position near Beirut. (Page 1)
An Iraqi task force of some 13,000 troops is now in western
Iraq. Jordan is concerned that the Iraqi force may try to
enter Syria without permission. (Page 1)
The secretary general of the Arab League was in Damascus yes-
terday to lay the groundwork for the introduction of an Arab
security force into Lebanon. (Page 3)
Israeli officials have denied reports that Tel Aviv was re-
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vising its hands-off policy toward Lebanon. (Page 4)
Egypt-Syria:(
Italy: With ten days to go before the election, debate is cen-
tering on the Christian Democrats' record and the future
role of the Communist Party. (Page 4)
USSR: In the force reduction negotiations, the Soviet have ful25X1
nished some incomplete data on the strength of t2aXlIarsaw
Pact forces. (Page 5)
Turkey:
USSR:
(Page 7)
(Page 8)
Notes: Romania; Uganda; Cuba-Angola (Pages 9 and 10)
At Annex we discuss Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola.
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LEBANON: Syrian forces
are continuing an armor
and infantry assault be-
gun last night against
a Palestinian position
on the outskirts of Bei-
rut, according to press
reports. Prior to the
assault, fighting yes-
terday had been a a
relatively low level.
Iraq now has a task
force of about 13,000
men in western Iraq.
Some clashes between Syrian and
leftist forces were reported in
Sidon, but little military activity
was noted in Beirut and Tripoli.
Military authorities in Tel Aviv
have reported that a mechanized
brigade of the Syrian 7th Infantry
Division has entered Lebanon and
is moving toward Sidon. Support
vehicles of the division were seen
entering Lebanon yesterday by the
US defense attache in Syria. This
is the first firm indication that
Syria has begun to draw directly
upon its forces confronting Israel
on the Golan Heights.
The introduction of the new unit
brings the total number of regular
Syrian troops in Lebanon to some
12,000, with another 5,000 or so
in support roles in adjacent bor-
der areas.
Heavy fighting, desertions, and
poor morale are taking their toll
on Syrian-controlled Palestinian
forces in Lebanon, and Damascus
has been forced to pull some of
them back to Syria. The Syrians
will have to replace these troops
with some of their own in order
to fill the void.
An armored division, reinforced by
units from at least two other di-
visions, is in position along the
Euphrates River between the capital
and the Syrian border. It is not
clear whether the task force was
formed specifically as a contin-
gency for intervention in Lebanon,
or whether it has been scheduled
to participate in maneuvers in
the border area.
Syrian President Asad has acknowl-
edged that he does not know whether
--continued
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Jordan also is showing
increasing concern about
the possibility that the
Iraqi forces may try to
enter Syria without per-
mission, ostensibly as
part of the pan-Arab
peacekeeping force for
Lebanon.
the Iraqi build-up is intended as a
threat to Syria or as a peacekeep-
ing force for use in Lebanon. For-
eign Minister Khaddam yesterday in-
formed Arab ambassadors in Damascus
that Syria will take "suitable meas-
ures" to counter any Iraqi troop
movements.
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King Husayn told the US ambassador
in Amman Wednesday that he has been
in close contact with Asad, and
that he has sent a high-level mil-
itary delegation to Damascus to
coordinate contingency plans for
Jordanian assistance if Iraq at-
tacks Syria.
Asad told the delegation, which
included Prime Minister Rifai, that
Syria is moving its troops to coun-
ter the Iraqi threat. Both Asad
and the Jordanians apparently are
also worried that Israel will try
to take advantage of Asad's current
problems with Lebanon and Iraq.
Jordanian aircraft have begun re-
connaissance flights over western
Iraq, but, as of last night, were
unable to detect any Iraqi troop
movements.
Libyan Prime Minister Jallud con-
tinued his efforts yesterday to
work out acceptable terms for a
cease-fire in Beirut. After con-
ferring in Beirut with Palestinian
and leftist leaders, Jallud report-
edly returned to Damascus for fur-
ther discussions with Asad.
On Wednesday, Fatah officials re-
portedly rejected a Syrian proposal,
--continued
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Arab League Secretary
General Riyad also vis-
ited Damascus yesterday
to make preliminary ar-
rangements for the in-
troduction of the six-
party Arab security
force into Lebanon.
After talks with Pres-
ident Asad, Riyad an-
nounced that an Arab
League military mission
will proceed to Damascus
within the next two days
for detailed talks with
Syrian officials.
conveyed by Jallud, for a cease-
fire in place. The Palestinians
and leftists are said to be in-
sisting on an immediate Syrian
pull-back.
The mission presumably will be led
by Egyptian Chief of Staff Fahmi,
who is Riyad's assistant for mil-
itary affairs. Riyad yesterday
instructed Fahmi to begin forming
the Arab force.
Actions taken by Riyad and Fahmi
are likely to reflect the wishes
of Egyptian President Sadat, who,
to counter Syria's involvement in
Lebanon, probably will push for
the early commitment of a substan-
tial force. This will be opposed
by Damascus. Asad has agreed to
accept a symbolic force, but will
try to prevent the Arab unit from
replacing or interfering with Syr-
ian forces already in Lebanon.
Asad preempted the Arab League by
arranging before its session on
Tuesday for a Libyan-Algerian force
to proceed immediately to Syria.
According to press reports, some
Libyan and Algerian troops may have
already moved from Syria into Leb-
anon.
The conservative Arab states and
Palestine Liberation Organization
chairman Yasir Arafat apparently
decided that their best strategy
was simply to add other Arab coun-
tries to the Algerian-Libyan team.
Lebanese President Franjiyah, who
recently has been cooperating
closely with Damascus, has denounced
the Arab League resolutions, and
leaders of the major Christian mi-
litias apparently are following
his lead. President-elect Sarkis,
who is more immediately responsive
to Damascus, has said nothing.
--continued
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Israeli defense and For-
eign Ministry officials
denied reports yesterday
that the Rabin govern-
ment was revising its
hands-off policy toward
Lebanon.
EGYPT-SYRIA:/-
ITALY: Election debate
is centering on the
Christian Democrats'
record in government,
the Communist Party's
future role, and the
sharp increase in po-
litically motivated
violence.
Syrian spokesmen have insisted pub-
licly that Lebanese approval is
necessary before any joint Arab
force can be used.
According to one press report, gov-
ernment sources have indicated that
Israel could accept a "symbolic"
Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon
provided, as usual, that it does
not threaten Israel's security.
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With ten days to go until the elec-
tion, the Christian Democrats are
under attack from all sides. The
Communists are coupling their de-
mand for participation in the gov-
ernment with the charge that Italy's
problems stem from 30 years of
--continued
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USSR: For the first
time in the force re-
duction negotiations,
the Soviets have pro-
vided some data on the
strength of the Warsaw
Pact forces.
"bad government." Rather than de-
fending their record, the Christian
Democrats have responded by empha-
sizing the uncertainties that would
accompany Communist entry into the
government. They seem to have set
aside their differences in an all-
out effort to remain Italy's largest
party.
Despite the Communists' rhetorical
insistence that no effective gov-
ernment can be formed without them,
there are some signs that the party
will not press the issue immediately
unless it achieves massive gains.
for tactical reasons the Communists
would prefer to stay out of the
government at least until after
the US and West German elections.
Berlinguer reportedly is open to a
deal by which the Communists would
merely support a new government on
specific programs--an idea pushed
by the Socialists and favored by
some Christian Democrats.
Meanwhile, the assassination in
Genoa this week of the city's pub-
lic prosecutor, presumably by left-
wing extremists, ensures that po-
litical violence will remain a hot
issue. The director of Italy's
principal public opinion organiza-
tion has concluded from his re-
search that this issue now favors
the Communists, a finding consis-
tent with other evidence that some
in the middle class see the Commu-
nists as better guarantors of pub-
lic order.
Their information appears to be in-
complete. Moreover, the figures
were presented even though agree-
ment had not been reached on which
categories of forces should be
--continued
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counted and on how ground and air
force manpower in the Warsaw Pact
and NATO should be defined.
The Soviet ambassador to the nego-
tiations stated yesterday at a for-
mal plenary session that the over-
all strength of the Warsaw Pact
force in the NATO Guidelines Area,
which includes East Germany, Po-
land, and Czechslovakia, is 987,300
men. He also said that this total
included 805,000 men in the ground
forces--a figure that is 144,000
lower than the NATO estimate.
In deriving their lower figures,
the Soviets apparently have counted
the manning of Soviet units at
less than the strength level that
NATO claims they have. They also
have excluded non-combat uniformed
support personnel, which are in-
cluded in the Western figures. In
addition, they have defined ground
and air force units by function
rather than by service designation.
According to NATO estimates, the
Pact's ground forces in the NATO
Guidelines Area have about 160,000
more troops than does NATO. Al-
though the Soviets have not yet
presented their estimate of NATO
strength, it is likely that their
data will show a smaller disparity
between Warsaw Pact and NATO ground
forces than do Western figures.
BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
NATO
Force Strength
WARSAW PACT
Force Strength
(NATO estimate)
(Soviet
statement)
(NATO
estimate)
Ground Forces
Air Forces
Total Forces
791,000
193,500
984,500
805,000
182,300*
987,300
949,000
198,000
1,147,000
*This figure was not provided by the Soviets. It was derived by subtracting
their ground force figure from their overall force strength.
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TURKEY:
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USSR:
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Romanian party secre-
tary for foreign affairs
Stefan Andrei, who will
arrive in the US on
Sunday for a visit of
about ten days, has
told US diplomats that
President Ceausescu
wants him to seek your
views on "one or two
issues of major inter-
est."
NOTES
Andrei almost certainly will want
to talk about Soviet-Romanian re-
lations, including what the Roma-
nians consider to be a Soviet ide-
ological-historical attack that
questions--and thereby threatens--
the legitimacy of the Romanian na-
tion and its rights to its present
territory. Since some Romanians
fear that Moscow will try to sabo-
tage the Helsinki follow-on con-
ference scheduled for Belgrade
next year, Andrei may outline Ro-
mania's plans to press for guaran-
tees safeguarding its independence
and sovereignty.
Andrei, age 45, is the youngest
member of the party's Political
Executive Committee and is second
only to Ceausescu in the formula-
tion of Romania's delicately bal-
anced foreign policy.
--continued
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Uganda
A contingent of Cuban
troops arrived in Ha-
vana from Angola on
Wednesday, according
to a Yugoslav press re-
port. Although Havana
has not officially con-
firmed the report, it
probably is accurate.
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The troops could have come from
the convoy that arrived on the
same day in Mariel, just west of
Havana. The number of troops was
not given.
One ship in the convoy has made
several trips to Angola as a troop
carrier and can accommodate about
700 men. The convoy probably con-
sisted of only one or two other
ships, each of which could carry
from 400 to 700 men.
--continued
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CUBA-ANGOLA
The talk that has been emanating from Ha-
vana since late April about plans for a
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola
has several aims. It is intended to:
--Meet Soviet concerns.
--Check international criticism of Cuba's
military intervention.
--Deflate Angola as an excuse for direct
US retaliation against Cuba.
--Undercut the justification for any crit-
icism of Cuba at the meeting of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the Organization of Amer-
ican States.
--Smooth the way for a resolution approv-
ing Cuba's role in Angola at the non-
aligned summit in Sri Lanka in August.
--Reverse the unfavorable trend in Cuba's
bilateral relations with countries in
Western Europe, Japan, and Latin America.
Havana has deliberately left vague the nature of
the planned withdrawal in order to retain as many
options as possible while gaining maximum propa-
ganda advantage.
The Cubans can be expected to keep details of the
withdrawals as obscure as possible. President Dor-
ticos, for example, has told foreign journalists
that Havana will not permit the withdrawal to be
monitored. He said he expects Cuban statements on
the subject to be taken at face value.
At the same time, Havana appears concerned that its
position might be misrepresented and that world pub-
lic opinion might then be led to expect more than
the Cubans intend to deliver. This probably ex-
plains why Fidel Castro chose to address the issue
publicly on Sunday, once the contents of his mes-
sage to Swedish Prime Minister Palme were released
to the media.
--continued
Al
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Castro said that a withdrawal had begun in accord-
ance with a plan worked out with the Angolan govern-
ment, but he gave no specifics and strongly under-
scored the long-term nature of the program. There
was no corresponding announcement from Luanda, sug-
gesting that the Cuban force reduction was not uni-
versally popular in official circles there.
The Size of the Cuban Presence
US estimates of the Cuban presence in Angola have
stood at 13,000 to 15,000--mostly military--for
several months. They were computed without benefit
of continuous, comprehensive information during the
buildup, particularly with regard to the number of
troops arriving by ship.
Havana may have decided that substantial and con-
tinuous withdrawals at present are out of the ques-
tion, especially in light of the recent increase in
guerrilla warfare in several areas of Angola. By
inflating the figure for the Cuban presence far be-
yond the US estimates, the Cubans could claim to be
pulling men out for months without changing the
composition of their actual forces and thus reduc-
ing their capability to secure the countryside and
maintain order.
The Cubans have in fact been spreading the word
that the US estimates are too low. Early this
month, Fidel Castro gave some visiting diplomats
the impression that the true figure is about 20,000,
stating that the US estimates were about 8,000 too
low.
Troops Sent Home
Some troops have already left Angola. According to
Castro, some 100 Interior Ministry troops thrown
into battle in early November were present during
his speech on Sunday. He indicated, however, that
they had been replaced by others from the same min-
istry. This type of rotation has probably been
typical since early this year. As Castro was speak-
ing, a convoy of Cuban merchant ships, including at
least one known troop carrier, was moving toward
Cuba.
Even if the 20,000 figure is accurate, several thou-
sand Cubans could probably be shipped home without
seriously weakening President Neto's regime. The
bulk of the fighting is over, and resistance has
--continued
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been reduced to sporadic--but persistent--guerrilla
warfare. The Cubans probably believe that Angolan
units, with strong Cuban leadership and technical
support, can eventually eliminate the guerrillas.
In any event, Havana probably wants its troops with-
drawn from combat as much as possible in order to
reduce casualties--a source of some discontent at
home.
While shipping some troops home, Havana will proba-
bly try to give the impression of even greater with-
drawals by resorting to subterfuges, such as those
suggested by various diplomats in Havana. Several
hundred military personnel could be dispersed among
other African countries without attracting undue at-
tention, and there is evidence that this is already
being done.
Cuban mili-
tary advisers from Angola arrived in Equatorial
Guinea in April to help train local forces. More-
over, some of the Cuban military advisers sent to
Mozambique this year to assist the Mozambican armed
forces and to help train Mozambique-based Rhodesian
guerrillas almost certainly came from Angola.
almost all of the 30 Cuban military advisers in
Sierra Leone had come from Angola. In addition,
Cuban forces from Angola had recently re-
placed most of the local military units on Guinea-
Bissau's border with Senegal, but there is no in-
formation to confirm or support this report.
The transfer of Cubans in Angola from military to
civilian status also could distort the nature of
the withdrawal. A large portion of the Cuban mili-
tary personnel in Angola are reservists. Many of
them could be demobilized in place, continuing
their military duties as civilians. They also
could be re-mobilized on very short notice should
the situation in Angola require it.
The Czechoslovak ambassador in Havana stated in late
May that perhaps as many as 3,000 Cubans now engaged
in support tasks in Angola were demobilized military
personnel.
These devices give the Cubans the opportunity to
claim plausibly that they are adhering to their
pledge to reduce their military presence and at the
--continued
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same time keep the Angolan veterans handy in the
event they are needed again in Angola or elsewhere
in Africa. The men chosen for such reassignments,
however, probably would be military advisers and
technicians.
The Soviet Ang_le
The withdrawal gambit largely appears to have been
a product of Soviet urging. Moscow has become in-
creasingly concerned about the negative impact of
Cuban-Soviet activity in Angola and elsewhere in
southern Africa on the USSR's relations with the
US.
This reportedly was a subject of discussions when
Castro, his top foreign affairs official, Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, and his chief adviser for African
policy were in Moscow in late February and early
March for the Soviets' 25th party congress. Rodri-
guez has made three additional trips to Moscow
since then, presumably in part to iron out differ-
ences on Angola.
Cuban Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro evidently
went to Angola on April 20 to conduct a personal
review of the situation with his field commanders
and then went on to Moscow to attend the funeral
of Marshal Grechko. After meeting with Brezhnev
on May 5, Raul dropped out of sight. He may have
been in Moscow later in May when high-ranking dele-
gations from Mozambique and Angola were there.
Raul reportedly reappeared in Angola in early June
and then went to Congo and Guinea before returning
home.;
Staying On
A very large force of Cuban military advisers and
technicians will be needed indefinitely to develop
the basis for a professional military establishment
and to acquaint the Angolans with the equipment they
have inherited. At some point, the Cubans may ask
other African countries to offset with their own
troops whatever reduction the Cubans are making in
their residual force.
--continued
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Even should assistance be forthcoming from other
African countries, the Cubans have no illusions
about the ability of the Popular Movement to sur-
vive a rapid withdrawal of Cuban military personnel
from Angola. Havana has no intention of wasting
through a precipitate withdrawal the sacrifice it
has already made in Angola and will maintain a sub-
stantial military presence there for at least the
next year.
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