THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 FEBRUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993139
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 14, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
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14 Pebruary 1Y/2
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
14 February 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The diplomatic and political maneuvering regarding
the Cyprus situation is discussed on Page 1.
A recently published speech by Hanoi's number two
man appears to be a last-minute cautionary note to
China in advance of President Nixon's trip. The
Soviet Union is also singled out for the warning.
(Page 2)
The situation in northern Laos remains relatively
quiet. (Page 3)
Soviet
(Page 3)
We present at Annex a brief background to Yugo-
slavia's Croatian problem.
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CYPRUS
The Greek-dominated Cypriot National Guard is
keeping a close watch on possible hiding places for
the Czech arms imported by President Makarios.
There have-been no signs of unusual military
activity, either in Greece toward reinforcing the
Guard on Cyprus or in Turkey, which continues its
wait-and-see attitude as long as the Turkish Cyp-
riots are in no danger.
According to diplo-
matic sources, both Makarios and Athens would pre-
fer to negotiate an end to the. present imbroglio,
and there does appear to be some room for maneuver.
Athens has publicly denied that: its recommendations
to the President represented an ultimatum, although
privately Greek Ambassador Panayotakos is insisting
that the Archbishop must go. According to the Cyp-
riot-press, the ambassador is to,return to Greece
on.Wednesday with Makarios' formal reply, Which he
is discussing with his cabinet today.
Athens has been trying since 1.969 to whit-
tle down the prestige and power of Presi-
dent Makarios, and the Greeks concluded
that his acquisition of new arms gave
them the opportunity they were seeking.
Nevertheless, the Archbishop is adept at
turning an impasse to his advantage, and
the Greek Government may have underesti-
mated Makarios' popularity among the Greek
Cypriot community. Athens has the mili-
tary strength to win a showdown, but the
uneasy truce among the island's inhabit-
ants could quickly break down before a
fresh solution to the communal problem
is devised.
1
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NORTH VIETNAM
Hanoi's number two man has singled out the So-
viet Union and China for a special warning about
the "duplicity" of US diplomatic strategy. In a
speech delivered a month ago but made public only
now, National Assembly President Truong Chinh claims,
that the main objective of US policy is to be "ready
to negotiate with a number of countries, especially
the Soviet Union and China" so as to "block" and
"divide" them. He goes on to advise all Communists
to join in countering US policy on three united
fronts--Vietnam, Indochina, and the world.
Although the speech echoes much of Hanoi's
propaganda of last summer that warned of
US efforts "to split the socialist camp,"
it is the first time Hanoi has mentioned
both China and the Soviet Union in this
context. As for its timing, while Hanoi
often delays the publication of major
statements, the belated release of this
one suggests it is intended as a last-
minute cautionary note to the Chinese as
they begin talks with President Nixon
next week.
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LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA
4./opf. ?mk.
Miles 10
0 Government-held location
o Communist-held location
Highpoint
,
, ?
'
/
Bouam Lon
71
71
Nong
Pet /
uong Soui
Ban Na
Tha Tam Bleunge
Enemy
attacks ?
Irregular.
task
task forces
-
1
Ban Hintang
hou Plia Sal
Sam Thon .
\- Enemy buildup
kJ/the6";
52 ?
age
ong Tieng
Dong
552540 2-72 CIA
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NOTES
Laos: Irregular units just north of Sam Thong
were heavily shelled on the night of 12 February,
and they briefly abandoned two positions./
/East of Long
Tieng, yang Pao's 5,000 irregulars have advanced
to the high ground south of Route 4. This opera-
tion--now a week old--has met little resistance
and has neither uncovered any supply caches nor
caused any damage to North Vietnamese rear support
areas. The Communists are using Route 4 only, to a
moderate degree, and their main supply push con-
tinues to be along Route 5 on the Plaine des Jarres
and its new extension south toward Long Tieng.
USSR:
Egypt-USSR:-
Yugoslavia.: A large conference of senior of
will convene on 16717 February.to examine the
extent of popular demoralization throughout the
country following the political upheaval in Croatia
in December and January. The gathering--the first
of its kind--is billed as a look at Yugoslavia's
political and psychological preparedness for defense.
It will be the second major conference at the na-
tional level in three weeks as Belgrade continues to.
wrestle with the problem of how to ensure the sur-
vival of a unified, nonaligned Yugoslavia.once Tito
leaves the scene. (At Annex we inClude a brief back-
ground discussion of the Croatian problem.)
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YUGOSLAVIA IN TROUBLE
In 1970 Tito set in motion a precedent-shattering
decentralization of governmental power designed to
create a federal structure of strong autonomous re-
publics that would function smoothly after Tito's
unifying influence is gone. Nothing like this had
ever been tried in polyglot Yugoslavia, where eth-
nic and religious groups have always competed for
power. Nothing like this had ever been tried in a
Communist state.
The keystone to the success of the new system was
to be a small, disciplined federal Communist party
that would provide guidance from the center and
hold the Yugoslav federation together. The modali-
ties for the party's new role were to have been
worked out at a party conference late in 1971. Prep-
arations for the party conference were begun more
than a year in advance; there were few in the Yugo-
slav establishment who questioned the basic premise,
and what frictions arose centered about familiar
problems, such as creating ethnic balances so that
each nationality group could feel that its interests
would be protected.
The complacency of the federal party was shattered
last November and December. The Croatians, the
second most powerful nationality group in the coun-
try, pressed too far with demands for changes that
would, if successful, have guaranteed them virtual
independence rather than a degree of autonomy.
Among the things they wanted were permission to es-
tablish Croatian trade missions abroad and the pos-
sibility of retaining a greater share of their hard
currency earnings. The Croatians also were seeking
to avoid a repetition of the 1919-1941 period, when
domination by the majority Serbs piled up Croatian
grievances and later Zed to retributive massacres
during World War II. Tito, and most of the non-
Croatian leaders of the party, did not view Croatia's
aspirations so simplistically; they saw the machina-
tions in Zagreb last fall as a threat to the sur-
vival of the federation and brought strong pressure
on Croatian leaders.
The Croats refused to compromise. An angry Tito
publicly characterized the situation as the worst
crisis of post-war Yugoslavia. After refusing to
recant, the Croatian party leaders were purged on
Tito's orders and replaced by more tractable people,
including a party head who is of Slovenian origin.
Al
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This alleviated the problem to a certain extent,
but it also solidified the belief of Croatian na-
tionalists that they had to defend themselves against
further depredations by Belgrade.
The Yugoslays were ill-prepared for such a develop-
ment. There was considerable confusion among party
leaders while they sought to assess whether or not
the system they had so painstakingly created was
irreparably damaged. In this situation, opponents
of the federal system from the right and the left
began to float ideas for a solution, ranging from
calls for a return to the Stalinist methods of the
late 1940s and early 1950s to schemes for a loose
confederation. The party leaders met for weeks in
nearly continuous session, obviously debating some
of these propositions.
In the midst of such uncertainty about the future,
the party conference--twice postponed?finally con-
vened in late January. Tito, clearly worried about
the Zack of direction among the delegates, set the
tone for the gathering by playing down the serious-
ness of the situation and pointing out that after
all Yugoslavia had so far survived. He accused the
Western press of overdramatizing the recent events
and thus avoided needlessly antagonizing anyone.
Tito was probably also moved to take this stance in
order not to jeopardize Yugoslav efforts to gain
economic credits and investments from the West.
The conference took its cue from Tito and made a
basic, if not very spectacular, decision that the
decentralized system and all of its democratizing
reforms must be retained. The decision was clearly
helped by the strong support for this proposition
of two party presidium members, Marko Nikezic, a
Serb, and Vidoje Zarkovic, a Montenegrin. Croatia's
new leaders did not have to play a major part in
the discussion, and thus the possibility of acri-
monious debate, or even a breakdown of the confer-
ence, was avoided.
The depth of the party's disorientation, however,
became apparent when the conference failed to agree
on anything but Tito's original concept. It wrote
no blueprint for the party's future guiding role.
There was self-criticism on the part of some dele-
gates, but little change of heart, and the resolu-
tion on unity does little more than paper over dif-
ferences. Agreement to trim the party's bulky ex-
ecutive bureau and to reduce the size of basic party
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bodies constituted no more than a half-hearted at-
tempt to cut the bureaucracy. There is probably
worry in Zagreb because three Serbs and only one
Croat were put on the smaller executive bureau.
The problem of nationalism in the republics was
never directly attacked, and no new steps were taken
to prevent its recurrence in Croatia or an outbreak
in some other area, such as Kosovo, where a million
disaffected Albanians live.
There has been one major change in power relation-
ships, but this was the result of Tito's decisions
during the crisis period rather than of the party
conference. This was the assumption of a new polit-
ical role by the Yugoslav armed forces, which have
been consistently loyal to Tito. During the Croatian
troubles, Tito publicly indicated that if need be
he would use the army to defend the revolution. In
fact, the Zagreb military commander provided the
base for Tito 's move against the Croatian party
leadership, and the army is said to be still playing
a role in putting down dissidence in the republic.
Perhaps symbolic of the new status of the armed
forces, the military emerged from the party confer-
ence with the right to participate in a non-voting
capacity in the sessions of the federal party execu-
tive bureau.
If the party cannot pull itself together and create
a cohesive organization for the effective management
of the federation, the military are waiting in the
wings to play a larger role. At the moment, the
officer corps is content to serve Tito and takes
pride in the application of its power to preserve
the state. After Tito, however, it seems reasonable
that, on the basis of their past contributions in-
times of crisis, the generals might wish to share
power with political leaders. As a result of the
Croatian eruption and the party's feeble response
to its problems, the armed forces would be in a
good position, once Tito leaves the scene, to make
a bid for power.
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