THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 JANUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014997
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 7, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
January 7, 1976
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010023-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013000010023-7
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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January 7, 1976
Table of Contents
Angola: In response to strong appeals from Zairian
President Mobutu, South Africa has decided to
delay withdrawal of its troops from Angola, at
least until after the Organization of African
Unity summit. (Page 1)
Lebanon:
Israel: Prime Minister Rabin has narrowly restricted
Foreign Minister Allon's mandate for his talks
in Washington this week to a discussion of tac-
tics for the debate in the UN Security Council
on the Middle East problem. (Page 5)
Italy: The Socialist Party directorate is meeting
today and tomorrow to decide whether to bring
down the Moro government by withdrawing the
party's crucial parliamentary support. (Page 7)
Notes: Morocco-USSR; Japan-USSR; Thailand (Page 8)
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ANGOLA
In response to strong appeals from
Zairian President Mobutu, South Africa
has decided to delay the withdrawal of
its troops from Angola, at least until
after the Organization of African Unity
summit.
A South African military official
stated yesterday that South African
troops would remain until Pretoria can "determine
the outcome" of the summit. After that, the offi-
cial stated, Pretoria will withdraw unless it re-
ceives African or West European support in Angola.
He also said that South Africa plans to ask within
?the next few days for Zairian air force support for
the National Front in northern Angola.
Mobutu apparently has some hope that a future
South African pull-out can be traded off for a Cu-
ban and Soviet withdrawal. Most African nations,
however, do not equate the South African and Cuban-
Soviet roles. At least some OAU members--perhaps
enough to give the Popular Movement majority sup-
port--may regard the idea as blackmail and react
by recognizing the Popular Movement.
Although Pretoria apparently is willing to go
along with Mobutu for a few days, South African
officials are sensitive to the political damage
their assistance is doing to the National Union
and National Front to maintain their legitimacy
in the eyes of the other African nations. The
South Africans believe that, in the long run, loss
of that legitimacy could be more damaging to Pre-
toria's interests in Angola than a military with-
drawal now.
(continued)
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The presence of high-level Cuban diplomatic
missions in Africa just before the meeting of the
Organization of African Unity on January 10 indi-
cates that Havana is making a major effort on behalf
of the Popular Movement and in defense of its own
military involvement in Angola.
A delegation headed by Osmani Cienfuegos, the
Communist Party's top official concerned with Africa
and the Middle East, met President Ngouabi of Congo
on January 1. The same mission has visited Nigeria
and is likely to go on to other African countries.
Another mission, led by Cuba's UN ambassador, was
scheduled to arrive in Ethiopia on January 3. The
Nigerian visit evidently was successful; Lagos yes-
terday issued a strongly worded pro-Cuban, pro-
Soviet, and anti-US statement.
China recently has registered disappointment
with some Third World supporters of the Soviet-
backed Popular Movement in Angola, but apparently
has not attempted to bring any major diplomatic
pressure to bear on them.
Despite Peking's countinued public stance of
neutrality, most Third World countries recognize
that Chinese sympathies lie with the National Front
and National Union. China realizes that any heavy-
handed efforts on its part to affect developments
in Angola would not only antagonize individual gov-
ernments but would facilitate Moscow's efforts to
depict Peking as colluding with the US and South
Africans. A representative of the official Chinese
news agency recently said that Peking had concluded
that Angola was more vital to Western interests
than to China and that there was little it could
do to change the situation there.
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LEBANON
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ISRAEL
Prime Minister Rabin has narrowly
restricted Foreign Minister Allon's man-
date for his talks in Washington this
week to a discussion of tactics for the
debate in the UN Security Council on
the Middle East problem, according to
our embassy in Tel Aviv. Despite Allon's
desire to broach other topics, Rabin has
made it clear that he is reserving the
broader foreign policy issues for his
own visit to the US later this month.
Israel's prime concern is to forestall any ac-
tion by the council that would enhance the status
of the Palestinians as potential participants in
future peace talks. The Israelis take it for
granted that the US would veto any effort to change
the essentials of Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338, which Israel maintains are the sole basis
for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.
The Israelis are much less confident that Wash-
ington would block an attempt by the Arabs to pass
a moderately worded council resolution calling for
consideration of the rights of the Palestinians.
The Israelis contend that such a statement would
significantly modify resolutions 242 and 338, which
explicitly treat the Palestinian issue as a refugee
problem. They fear that it might open a door al-
lowing the Palestine Liberation Organization to be
brought into Arab-Israeli negotiating at some later
date. The Israelis insist the Palestinian issue
can only be dealt with in peace negotiations with
Jordan.
Anon, in his talks here, can be expected to
press hard for assurances that Washington also will
oppose any such Arab maneuver. The Israeli minis-
ter will suggest that the US support Israel's re-
cent call for a resumption of the Geneva conference
to consider the Palestinian and other issues. The
Palestine Liberation Organization, with which Tel
Aviv refuses to negotiate, is not a party to the
conference.
(continued)
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Rabin probably has some misgivings about send-
ing Allon to Washington to argue Israel's hard-line
position, particularly on the Palestinian question.
Allon considers this issue to be central in peace
negotiations with the Arabs and makes no secret of
his advocacy of a more flexible approach. In recent
weeks this attitude has openly put him at odds with
Rabin, who insists that this is not the time to al-
ter Israel's long-held position. Along with most
Israeli leaders, Rabin considers the Arabs' refusal
to recognize the existence of Israel as the root
cause of the Middle East conflict.
Allon, however, is not able to initi-
ate major foreign policy shifts. In the cabinet he
ranks below Rabin and Defense Minister Peres in in-
fluence. In the key areas of US-Israeli relations
and Arab-Israeli negotiations, Prime Minister Rabin
is in reality his own foreign minister.
Allon is clearly frustrated by his limited in-
fluence and by the Prime Minister's penchant for
personally handling the most important aspects of
Israeli foreign relations. A major but not domi-
nant national leader, he remains a team player who
is not prepared to carry his differences with Rabin
to the point of precipitating a government crisis.
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ITALY
The Socialist Party directorate is
meeting today and tomorrow to decide
whether to bring down the Moro govern-
ment by withdrawing the party's crucial
parliamentary support.
While a compromise to avoid a government col-
lapse is still possible, most evidence suggests
that the Socialists will follow through on their
threat to topple Moro. If their resolve holds, the
Socialists will have to reconcile internal differ-
ences over how best to profit from the ensuing
search for a new government.
Some--they appear to be a minority at this
stage--want to push for early elections, on the
theory that only the Christian Democrats and Commu-
nists will benefit if the legislature stays its full
term into 1977. Others seem inclined to press for
a new caretaker government--an all-Christian Demo-
cratic cabinet for example--that would be pledged
to give more weight to Socialist views. The Social-
ists are likely to insist also that any new govern-
ment consult more openly with the Communist Party
in order to limit the latter's ability to profit
electorally from its opposition status.
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NOTES
The Moroccans continue to hold a Soviet fish-
ing trawler at the port of Agadir.
A Moroccan patrol boat is moored alongside,
and armed guards reportedly have cordoned off the
area to prevent anyone from boarding. The cargo
and the crew are still on board, and the Soviet
captain has refused to allow his ship to be in-
spected until authorized by the Soviet embassy. The
Soviets thus far have made no public announcement
of the seizure, and both sides appear to be mini-
mizing the incident. The Kresta II class cruiser
that left the Mediterranean on Sunday in apparent
reaction to the seizure evidently will not become
involved. It was located early today about 400
miles southwest of Agadir.
Japan and the Soviet Union probably view For-
eign Minister Gromyko's five-day trip to Tokyo,
which begins on Friday, as a holding action, with
no real improvement in relations likely.
Gromyko's visit is one of a series of periodic
consultations with Japan and has been planned for
some time. It was apparently delayed by Soviet con-
cern that Tokyo would accept Peking's terms for sign-
ing a peace treaty with China. The Soviets now seem
satisfied that agreement on the treaty is not immi-
nent, and both Moscow and Tokyo consider it in their
interest to maintain the semblance of a dialogue.
Thai
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Top Secret
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