THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 SEPTEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466829
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 2, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
September 2, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 2, 1976
Table of Contents
Turkey-Greece: The fourth phase of operations by the Turkish re-
search ship Sismik I is likely to heighten Greek-Turkish
tensions again and could undermine-recent UN efforts to get
bilateral talks started on Aegean problems. (Page 1)
Libya-Egypt: A speech by Libyan President Qadhafi last night
seemed clearly intended to avoid giving Cairo provocation
for military or political action against him. (Page 1)
Lebanon: No statement has yet been issued on the substance of
talks between Lebanese president-elect Ilyas Sarkis and Syr-
ian President Asad in Damascus on August 21. (Page 2)
Angpla-US: President Neto's private message to Washington ex-
pressing interest in establishing normal relations probably
was stimulated by pressure within his Popular Movement to
make moves that could assist in gaining UN membership.
(Page 4)
Namibia: Leading white politicians in Namibia have accepted De-
cember 1978 as the target date for the territory's independ-
ence but are resisting the UN demand for popular elections
before then. (Page 5)
Notes: France; UK; Netherlands; Mexico (Pages 7, 8, and 9)
At Annex, we discuss the USSR's military investment in Libya.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY-GREECE: The
Turkish research ship
Sismik I left Izmir
yesterday morning on a
mission that will con-
tinue through September
25. This fourth phase
of operations is likely
to heighten Greek-Turk-
ish tensions again and
could undermine recent
UN efforts to get bi-
lateral talks started
on Aegean problems.
LIBYA-EGYPT: A speech
by Libyan President
Qadhafi last night
seemed clearly intended
to avoid giving Cairo
provocation for mili-
tary or political ac-
tion against him.
The ship will avoid Greek terri-
torial waters, according to an
announcement by the Turkish navy,
but its area of operation will
encompass substantial portions of
the Greek-claimed continental
shelf--some of it west of Greek
islands along the Turkish coast.
The area comes close at one point
to the Greek mainland itself and
includes zones where Athens and
Ankara have granted overlapping
oil concessions.
The new Turkish move, at best, is
almost certain to delay negotia-
tions tentatively set for mid-
September by the Greek and Turkish
foreign ministers.
25X1
Both governments will be alert to
the possibility of incidents
arising from the activities of the
Sismik I and from a Greek naval
exercise in the northern Aegean
scheduled to continue through
September 12.
Despite some harsh comments on
President Sadat, Qadhafi said he
bears the Egyptian President no
grudge and would not break diplo-
matic relations with Egypt. Re-
ferring to Cairo's military threats,
he asserted that, although Libya
is capable of doing so, it will
never use its military strength
against Egypt.
Qadhafi announced the release of
three Egyptians whom Libya had
recently arrested on charges of
--continued
1
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LEBANON: No statement
has been issued on the
substance of talks be-
tween Lebanese presi-
dent-elect IZyas Sarkis
and Syrian President
Asad in Damascus on
August 21. Sarkis has
been quoted as calling
Syria's role in Leba-
non "positive."
spying for Egypt. He did not men-
tion the expulsion of Egyptian
workers from Libya--a threat he
has repeatedly made.
Qadhafi's remarks on Egypt were
part of a long, self-congratula-
tory exposition on the popularity
of his revolution. His speech
seemed designed to convince Cairo
and any Egyptian-backed coup plot-
ters that his regime is too soundly
based to be toppled.
The Libyans are more concerned
about the possibility of Egyptian
action than Qadhafi's breezy dis-
missal of the danger would indi-
cate.
Qadhafi must see his present ap-
proach as one that permits him to
appear before the Libyan people
and the other Arab states as the
reasonable party to the dispute
and Sadat the unprovoked aggressor.
Damascus radio has emphasized that
the two leaders stressed the need
to continue Syria's "effort to
establish peace" in Lebanon until
political problems are solved and
normal life restored. The leftist
Beirut radio, however, said
Sarkis asked the Syrians for a
pledge to withdraw their forces
so he can begin working on a solu-
tion.
It is entirely possible that Sarkis,
while expressing appreciation for
Syria's involvement in Lebanon--
a position he is forced to adopt
--continued
2
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The leftist "central
political council"--
a loose Zeftwing coali-
tion headed by Kamal
Jumblatt--has announced
plans to establish its
own "foreign office."
The military situation
has been relatively
calm.
The airfield at Nabati-
yah in a leftist-con-
trolled area of south-
ern Lebanon has report-
edly been completed.
to retain his vital support from
Damascus--has also said a public
pledge of Syria's intended with-
drawal is a political necessity
if he is to have any chance of
governing the country.
A second meeting between Asad and
Sarkis will apparently take place
soon, although no date has been
set.
The "foreign office" is to have
branches in France, Bulgaria,
Libya, Egypt, and Cyprus and will
deal with public relations, eco-
nomic, and political affairs. The
council also announced formation
of a bureau of finance and a new
security force of 2,000 men.
The Christians claim to have ad-
vanced in the north, and the Syr-
ians continue to consolidate their
forces in the mountains east of
Beirut and near Jazzin in the
south. Clashes occurred again
yesterday in the commercial dis-
trict of Beirut.
25X1
--continued
3
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ANGOLA-US: Angolan
President Neto's pri-
vate message to Wash-
ington expressing in-
terest in establishing
normal relations prob-
ably was sparked by
growing pressure from
within his Popular Move-
ment to make moves that
could assist in gaining
UN membership.
Overhead photography of mid-August
showed that construction on the
airstrip at Nabatiyah was almost
completed. The runway will be
able to handle transports such as
the AN-12 and C-130. The Iraqis
have about ten AN-12s; Libya has
eight C-130s.
Most recent coverage of a second
airstrip at Badharan showed con-
struction still under way.
* * *
The message, delivered to the US
embassy in Stockholm on Tuesday
asserted:
--Neto personally guarantees
that the Cuban presence is not
directed against US interests.
--Angola is not a "satellite"
of the USSR, and its "alliance"
with Cuba was based on wartime
necessity. The Angolan govern-
ment is "strongly determined"
not to come under foreign influ-
ence.
--The Cubans are not in Angola
for aggressive purposes but are
there to train the Angolan army
and to provide public health fa-
cilities.
--The Angolan government has a
strong interest in joining the
UN.
--Delays in gaining membership
"create irritation" among the
people and within the Popular
Movement.
Neto, a proud man and a strong na-
tionalist, probably would in fact
like to reduce the Cuban presence
--continued
4
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NAMIBIA: Leading white
politicians in Namibia
have accepted December
1978 as the target date
for the territory's in-
dependence from South
Africa, but they are
resisting the UN demand
for popular elections
before independence.
if at the same time he can assure
his security situation. He is in
no position to force the pace of
any reduction now, however, in
view of present military and eco-
nomic conditions in Angola and the
absence of alternative sources of
assistance. A substantial continued
Cuban presence--probably on the
order of at least 10,000 troops
and advisers--appears likely for
some time to come.
* * *
South African Prime Minister Vor-
ster has not taken a public stand
on proposed steps toward independ-
ence, although he has stated that
he would not block any measure
that might be approved by a con-
sensus of all ethnic delegations
within the constitutional confer-
ence that the South Africans con-
vened last year in Windhoek, the
territorial capital. The South
African press has speculated that
Vorster will urge white settlers
in Namibia to accept at least some
proposals from the non-whites be-
fore the UN Security Council re-
sumes consideration of Namibia on
September 22.
The US embassy in Pretoria believes
Vorster may take no action until
after his meeting with Secretary
Kissinger this weekend and after
consultations with his National
Party leadership that are scheduled
for September 10.
--continued
5
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Commentary in the So-
viet media about events
in southern Africa,
particularly in Nami-
bia, has been predic-
tably negative and sug-
gests that the Soviets
are apprehensive over
current US initiatives
in the region.
1
Racial disturbances in South Africa
and Rhodesian retaliatory raids
into Mozambique have been conven-
ient subjects for Soviet propaganda.
In addition, the passing of the
August 31 deadline set by the UN
Security Council for concrete steps
toward Namibian independence has
prompted tirades against South Af-
rica and its "imperialist" support-
ers.
Moscow's propaganda sees all west-
ern peace efforts in southern Af-
rica as ploys to preserve "impe-
rialist" control of the rich na-
tural resources of the region.
6
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--continued
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French
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*
The leadership of the
British Trades Union
Congress should have
little difficulty at
the annual meeting next
week in winning approval
of either the new "so-
cial contract" govern-
ing the alliance be-
tween the TUC and the
Labor Party or in
getting the unions to
re-endorse the current
wage guidelines.
NOTES
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*
*
High unemployment, on the other
hand, will cause continuing strain
between the government and its un-
ion allies. Public sector unions,
whose members will bear the brunt
of planned government cuts in pub-
lic spending, have been lobbying
with the powerful manufacturing-
based unions to resist further at-
tempts to cut the budget.
--continued
7
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Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey,
however, is unlikely to be pres-
sured into shifting policies while
curbing inflation still has prior-
ity over a quick reduction in un-
employment.
* * *
Netherlands
*
Mexican President Eche-
verria yesterday out-
lined new government
policies to back the
decision on Tuesday to
float the peso.
*
*
He proposed strict government fis-
cal responsibility to eliminate
excess spending and cut the budget
deficit without reducing needed
investment in public facilities,
industry, and social services. To
protect consumer purchasing power
--continued
8
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Echeverria called for price con-
trols on essential goods, export
and excess profits taxes, reduc-
tion of tariffs on raw materials
and some other items, and special
tax breaks for those who will suf-
fer most from the effects of the
depreciation.
To protect the value of the peso
from excessive erosion, the na-
tional bank will intervene where
necessary, relying on foreign ex-
change reserves of $1.4 billion
and drawing rights totaling another
$1 billion with the International
Monetary Fund and other interna-
tional financial sources.
The Mexicans hope these measures
will hold the line on import
prices, domestic inflation, and
severe capital flight while bol-
stering export receipts, especially
tourist earnings.
--continued
9
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USSR-LIBYA
The Soviet Union's relations with Libya,
a country with long-standing distrust of
the USSR, entered a new phase in May
1974. The change occurred shortly after
Egyptian President Sadat stated that he
would be relying less on the USSR for
political and military support, and
would be seeking alternate sources of
assistance in the West. At its incep-
tion the Libyan connection, as far as
the Soviets were concerned, was there-
fore a device designed primarily to
put pressure on Cairo.
Soviet-Libyan arms agreements have also opened a
financial windfall for Moscow, and the USSR is tak-
ing every advantage. The Soviets are charging
Libya catalogue prices for weaponry in contrast to
the concessionary prices offered to other Arab
clients. No doubt the Libyans will be gradually
moved along to more advanced (and higher priced)
military items. More sophisticated equipment should
also increase the total number of Soviet technical
advisers in Libya as well as the number of Libyans
sent to the USSR for military training.
Moscow's Military Investment
In view of the small size of the Libyan military
establishment and the poor state of Soviet-Libyan
relations as recently as 1973, the size and scope of
Soviet military deliveries during the past two years
have been remarkable. Following a $730 million
agreement in 1974 and an apparent supplementary
agreement of unknown value negotiated during Pre-
mier Kosygin's visit in 1975, these deliveries have
included:
--More than 40 MIG-23 Floggers, a high-per-
formance aircraft that will require an in-
crease in the total number of Soviet techni-
cal advisers in Libya as well as the number
of Libyans training in the USSR.
--Six TU-22 Blinders, making Libya the second
Arab country (after Iraq) to receive this me-
dium bomber.
--continued
Al
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--Surface-to-air missile battalions, consist-
ing of 66 SA-2, 31 SA-3, and 12 SA-6 launchers.
The Libyans apparently have now received about half
of the military equipment agreed to in 1974, and in
return the Soviets have been receiving Libyan cash
or oil upon delivery. More than $200 million in
Soviet military equipment arrived in Libya in 1975;
deliveries remained high in the first half of 1976,
when, we believe, Libya received materiel valued at
more than $120 million.
Soviet - East European Advisers
About 500 Soviet military advisers and technicians
are now in Libya.
In addition to 7,000-8,000 Yugoslays active in all
areas of the Libyan economy, more than 5,000 eco-
nomic advisers from other East European countries
are there under commercial contracts.
The East European advisers are serving under barter
agreements with Libya paying for their services with
cash or oil; two years ago, in fact, Libya was the
major crude oil supplier to the East European coun-
tries because of these contractual agreements.
--continued
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Soviet Nuclear Energy Program
The Soviet Union has already begun construction of
a nuclear research center near Tripoli that will
mark the first contribution to the devel7ment of
nuclear engineering expertise in Libya.
Construction is expected to be completed by 1979.
The Soviets plan to establish a temporary port on
the nearby coast by that time to avoid bringing
necessary equipment through the crowded port of
Tripoli.
Since Libya has no capability in the nuclear engi-
neering field, a large number of Soviet technicians
will be needed. These will include nuclear scien-
tists and engineers as well as the skilled laborers
required to build the facility. The Libyans are
reportedly displeased with Soviet efforts to assure
exclusive control over the Libyan program, and ex-
pect the Soviets to drag their feet in training
Libyans in this field.
Frustrations in dealing with the Soviets probably
prompted the Libyans to renew efforts to obtain
assistance elsewhere. An agreement between France
and Libya in March to build a nuclear reactor in-
dicated that Tripoli will not accept Soviet domina-
tion over the Libyan nuclear program.
State Relations
The increased Soviet military assistance given to
Libya during the past three years has not led to
political influence there or to access to Libyan
military facilities. Qadhafi still deeply distrusts
the Soviets and watches their presence carefully.
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Soviet naval ships have not made a port call in
Libya since Qadhafi came to power seven years ago.
--continued
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CZECE.
HUNGARY
U.S
YUGOSLAVIA
ITALY
Kithera Anchora
TUNISIA
/4LGERIA
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CYPRUS
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LIBYA
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620387 8-76
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?OUREIAR REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
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The three Libyan ports at Tripoli, Tobruk, and Ben-
ghazi, in any event, could provide little in the
way of support and virtually no significant repairs.
None has facilities that could approach those the
Soviets have been denied at Al Qabbari in Alexandria.
Perhaps as a
been careful
not to give Qadhafi any genuine political support
vis-a-vis Egypt. Rather than get too closely iden-
tified with Qadhafi 's aspirations, the Soviet press
has usually referred to him merely to score points
against Sadat.
result, the Soviets until recently have
The Soviets and Worsening Libyan-Egyptian Relations
From mid-March to late August, the Soviet press
said nothing about Libya and was silent about the
deterioration of Libyan-Egyptian relations, in-
cluding Libyan charges in early August that Egyptian
armed forces were moving to the Libyan-Egyptian
border.
The silence was broken on August 29, when Pravda
took note of the "worsening of the situation" on the
border in an Observer article. Moscow uses the
Observer affixation sparingly to give an authorita-
tive stamp to a Pravda declaration. The choice of
this vehicle is a clear sign that Moscow has come
to realize that there is a real potential for hos-
tilities between Egypt and Libya in the near future.
It specifically warns of the danger of a "new mili-
tary conflict" in the Middle East.
The article weighs in on Qadhafi 's side and up-
braids Egyptian leaders for threatening Libya. Mos-
cow presumably hopes to deter Sadat from attacking
Libya.
The article may also be designed to win favor with
Qadhafi, who might well be pressuring the Soviets
for some expression of support. The Soviets have
also sent--for the second time--a delegation to
Tripoli for Libya's national day observance. The
gesture is muted, however, by the fact that the dele-
gation is headed by a minor official.
--continued
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The disposition of Soviet military forces thus far
does not suggest any contingency planning for a
further deterioration in the Libyan-Egyptian situ-
ation.
--The Soviets have not made any unusual ship
moves or reinforced their Mediterranean Squad-
ron, which currently is somewhat below its
normal strength.
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An Assessment
The Observer article stresses Moscow's concern for
avoiding war in the area that is already "one of
the hottest points on the globe." Hostilities
would almost certainly place the Soviets in a quan-
dary. There would be pressures and temptations for
Soviet involvement.
--Should hostilities break out, Libya would be
sorely undermanned, and Qadhafi would probably
appeal to the USSR for assistance.
--The Soviet position in the Middle East has
been on the skids since the October war, and
Moscow might feel tempted to recoup with some
tangible sign of support for the Libyans.
--Moscow would hope that if Sadat is thwarted
in Libya, his position at home would be seri-
ously undermined.
--continued
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There are also factors that would give Moscow pause.
--The Soviets have reason to feel uncertain
about Qadhafi's intentions and there would be
pressures to continue to keep him at arm's
length. The late Soviet defense minister
Grechko once described Qadhafi as a "madman
on top of the pile of gold."
--Any Soviet move on behalf of Libya could
help Sadat at home because the Egyptians might
rally around the flag at the first sight of
Soviet intervention.
--The move would have an adverse impact on
other countries in the Middle East where Qa-
dhafi is no hero and suspicions regarding So-
viet intentions exist.
--The Soviets would be concerned about how the
US might respond in the area, and they would
anticipate a significant political backlash
in the US to direct Soviet intervention on
behalf of Qadhafi.
On balance, we strongly doubt that Moscow's inter-
ests in Libya are great enough or its prospects
for major gains in the region sufficiently attrac-
tive, to cause the Soviets to support Qadhafi with
their own forces in the event of open war. We
also think it unlikely--although we are less cer-
tain--that limited numbers of Soviet pilots or air
defense personnel would fight on Libya's side.
There are a number of things the Soviets could do
to deter the Egyptians from attacking--and the Ob-
server article suggests that the USSR is looking
for ways to do this. Possibilities include reposi-
tioning units of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
or sending up Libyan planes with Soviet pilots. So
far there is no evidence that such contingencies
are being planned.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000200030002-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000200030002-1