THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 OCTOBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014936
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
October 24, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 24, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Heavy fighting flared again in Beirut
yesterday as efforts continued, without suc-
cess, to find and release two US officials
kidnaped on Wednesday. (Page 1)
Angola: The Popular Movement may be setting the
stage for declaring independence before Por-
tugal gives up its colony on November 11.
Another source has reported the arrival of
Cuban soldiers in Angola. (Page 3)
Notes: Syria; Morocco - Spanish Sahara; USSR;
Portugal (Pages 5 and 6)
At Annex we present an assessment of President
Sadat's position in the Arab world.
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LEBANON
Heavy fighting flared again in
Beirut yesterday as efforts continued,
without success, to find and release
two US officials kidnaped on Wednesday.
Fighting subsided last night, but small arms
fire was again reported before dawn today. An
around-the-clock curfew has been imposed in some
areas of the city. The apparent murder of two
Palestine Liberation Organization military officers
in Christian areas in and near Beirut on Wednesday
night has contributed to increased tensions. Al-
though the Palestinians were not involved in yes-
terday's fighting, more fedayeen were in evidence
manning barricades, and it is feared that less
radical leaders will come under pressure to retali-
ate for the murders.
Beirut radio announced at midday yesterday
that all roads in the city were unsafe. For the
first time in this round of the fighting, the
Beirut-Damascus road has been cut just outside
Beirut, adding a new element of nervousness among
city residents.
Both Interior Minister Shamun and Prime Min-
ister Karami announced yesterday that "strict
measures" had been devised to stop the fighting
and would be implemented by nightfall. Neither,
however, elaborated on what these measures en-
tailed. Press reports from Beirut indicate some
700 Palestinian military police have joined Leba-
nese security forces in a new effort to end the
fighting. Greater use of the army is apparently
not involved; Karami addressed the question in a
speech to parliament and seemed to dismiss the pos-
sibility of using the army as potentially too de-
structive.
Karami is coming under increasing attack for
his government's inability to handle the situation
and is himself increasingly at loggerheads with
President Franjiyah, who continues to support the
(continued)
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intransigent stand
Karami, apparently
obstructionism, is
his resignation on
by the Syrians.
of the right-wing Christians.
in frustration at Franjiyah's
reported to have begun drafting
Wednesday, but he was dissuaded
Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt is still in Da-
mascus, where he has been discussing the Lebanese
situation for the past few days. An embassy source
in Beirut reports that the Syrians are again trying
to persuade him to join the cabinet with Phalangist
leader Pierre Jumayyil. Jumblatt has consistently
refused to be associated with Jumayyil in a new
cabinet line-up.
It now appears that the two kidnaped US offi-
cials are in the hands of the radical Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine.
efforts to locate them have been to no avail. Leb-
anese security authorities say they have no firm
leads. Fatah leaders, who assisted in obtaining
the release of a kidnaped US army colonel in June,
are also alleged to have no information on their
whereabouts.
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ANGOLA
The Popular Movement for the Liber-
ation of Angola has launched a major prop-
aganda campaign against "foreign interven-
tion" in Angola. The campaign, probably
Zed by military hardliners in the Movement,
very likely is designed to set the stage
for a unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence, possibly before November 11, the
date Portugal is scheduled to turn author-
ity over to the Angolans.
Last night the Popular Movement ordered mobili-
zation of all men between the ages of 18 and 35 to
combat an "invading" force in the south said to num-
ber nearly 1,000 troops, including mercenaries and
South African regulars. According to the Popular
Movement's announcement, the invading force has ad-
vanced approximately 150 miles into southern Angola.
Popular Movement forces in that part of the terri-
tory are stretched thin.
The South African government has a small mili-
tary team in southern Angola to train troops of the
National Front. The South Africans, assigned to
provide advice and rear-echelon support, have occa-
sionally become involved in fighting.
The mobilization order and the charge of for-
eign intervention come at a time when the Popular
Movement is beginning to feel heavy pressure in the
north from military operations of the National
Front and the approaching deadline for Angolan in-
dependence. In northern Angola, the National Front,
has advanced
fighting is
to within 13 miles of Luanda, and some
now taking place there.
The approaching independence deadline takes on
added importance for the Popular Movement with each
passing day by virtue of Portugal's continued in-
sistence that it will not transfer sovereignty to
the Popular Movement alone. The Movement is equally
insistent that it is the only liberation group ca-
pable and deserving of running the territory after
independence. It is attempting to discredit its
rivals as instruments of foreign powers and not true
representatives of the Angolan people.
(continued)
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The Popular Movement's ability to carry out a
successful mobilization is questionable. The Move-
ment has always had strong popular support in
Luanda, but its support in the rural areas and even
in the towns of central and southern Angola that it
claims to control seems less certain. There, the
Popular Movement's mobilization efforts could well
bog down.
A press report yesterday from Lusaka
quotes reliable sources as stating that
1,000 Cuban "volunteers" are fighting in
Angola.
The actual number of Cuban military personnel in-
volved cannot be determined with confidence. The
number is probably no more than several hundred, and
the Cubans most likely will be used in support and
advisory roles.
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NOTES
Additional information appears to confirm that
some S rian reservists have been recalled to active
duty and tat Syrian forces are at a higher stage
of alert.
has received
information that a large call-up of reservists was
begun two weeks ago and carried out quietly. He be-
lieves that the Syrians have assumed a higher alert
posture, inasmuch as the number of soldiers in the
streets of Damascus is only about half that ordi-
narily seen.
Saudi and Syrian forces are
scheduled to hold two weeks of joint maneuvers in
the Heights area beginning November 1. Some of
the military measures recently observed on the
Golan Heights may be related to preparations for
the exercise. On the other hand, the maneuver it-
self could serve as a cover for operations against
Israel.
Moroccan King Hassan gave every indication
that he is going ahead with his planned march into
the Spanish Sahara. In a brief radio broadcast
yesterday iTT7577 to the inhabitants of the re-
gion, Hassan reviewed Morocco's claim to historic
sovereignty over the area.
The King appealed to the inhabitants of the
territory to renew their religious and political
allegiance to him and not to resist the march by
force. He did not announce a date for the entry
of the marchers into Spanish Sahara
Mauritania, which hopes to partition Span-
ish Sahara with Morocco, has publicly supported
Rabat's planned march, but opposes using force to
settle the dispute.
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The Soviets again are hinting that they might
be willing to engage in bilateral talks on naval
limitations in the Indian Ocean.
On October 16, the head of the USA Institute,
Georgy Arbatov, told Congressman Vanik that General
Secretary Brezhnev personally supports talks on the
issue. Arbatov said that Brezhnev would have en-
dorsed talks last July if the subject had come up
during the General Secretary's meeting with the con-
gressional delegation led by Senators Hubert Hum-
phrey and Hugh Scott. On October 17, some members
of the institute reminded another visiting US of
that the Soviets had taken "small private steps
before" on the issue but that the US had not re-
sponded. This is probably a reference to an ex-
change in 1971 when Moscow first broached the idea
of a joint understanding on limiting naval deploy-
ments in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets never fol-
lowed up when the US responded four months later.
Thousands of Portuguese radical leftists marched
through Lisbon last night in a Communist-sponsored
demonstration, but there were no violent or untoward
incidents.
Despite open talk of a possible coup, the gov-
ernment did not try to stop the demonstration; it
evidently is still playing for time in its struggle
to survive. The Communists, in allying themselves
with the far left, clearly have the objective of
bringing down the government by creating sheer
chaos, and by splitting the Socialists and Popular
Democrats, who are its principal bulwark. Thus far
at least, the two parties are sticking together.
The next few days may be decisive ones for Prime
Minister Azevedo. The government's offer of am-
nesty expires tomorrow, but no armed civilian
groups have turned in any weapons.
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EGYPT
President Sadat's position of lead-
ership in the Arab world is hanging in
the balance as a result of the second
Sinai disengagement agreement. His po-
sition within Egypt is sound, but there
too he is vulnerable over the longer
term.
His best and most important friend
at the moment is the US. He will use
his visit here next week to seek further
tangible expressions of that friendship
in order to buttress Egypt against iso-
lation in the Arab world and to reassure
his domestic constituents that his for-
eign policy has not bankrupted the coun-
try.
Egypt's leadership of
the Arab world has always
been basically a state of
mind. Egypt is not the
birthplace of Arab nation-
alism. Syria, Iraq, and
even Saudi Arabia can lay
better claims to this
title. Egypt lacks the
natural resources to give
it the economic importance
of Saudi Arabia and too
many political constraints
to make it, like Lebanon,
a commercial center of the
Arab world. Its people
are regarded, by them-
selves and by other Arabs,
as a breed apart.
Egyptian leadership in the Arab world has de-
pended on essentially ephemeral factors. These
factors are not working to Sadat's advantage as
they worked to Nasir's; as a result, Sadat could
lose his ability to influence and guide the other
Arabs.
Egypt has been the largest and militarily the
strongest state bordering Israel, whose existence
is the only thing that has ever unified the modern
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Arab world. It has been a basic tenet of Arab doc-
trine that there can be no war against Israel with-
out Egypt, and Egypt has been able to command the
deference of the other Arabs by exploiting their
fear of the consequences if it signed a separate
peace accord with Israel.
By signing the second Sinai agreement, Sadat
has let slip a part of this hold on the Arabs. Al-
though he does not regard the agreement as a final
peace, the other Arabs are not sure Egypt will take
a further part in the struggle for the return of
the occupied territories. Without Egypt, Arabs have
less leverage with Israel but greater freedom to
plan their moves without regard to Egypt's interests.
Nasir was able to use the tide of anti-coloni-
alism at mid-century, plus an electric personality
and a crusading zeal, to put himself at the head of
a resurgent Arab nationalism. He and Egypt seized
the leadership of the Arab political world when
other Arab states, because of internal instability
or simple default, were unable to compete.
Sadat is no Nasir. Even though Sadat's prac-
tical accomplishments exceed his predecessor's, he
is not able to inspire the Arabs as Nasir did.
Sadat must instead produce solid results and the
prospect for more, not merely for Egypt but for
all Arabs. He has not fully accomplished this.
Memories Fade
Memory has faded of the war that gained the
first return of Egyptian and Syrian territory, that
enabled the Arab oil states to flex their muscles
through the embargo, and that led to international
recognition for the Palestinians. The memory that
it was Sadat who launched these successes has also
faded.
Sadat's standing as a leader has suffered sub-
sequently because he has sought to achieve Arab goals
by gradual steps. A policy featuring moderation and
negotiation is suspect in Arab eyes because it is
both unfamiliar and uncomfortable.
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Nasir's standing depended as much on his abil-
ity to shift with popular opinion as on an ability
actually to lead and to influence. He never ap-
peared less radical than the most radical of the
Arabs. He never appeared less dedicated to the
Palestinian cause than the most dedicated Palestin-
ian.
He was the number-one Arab, not because he
produced results either for the other Arabs or for
Egypt, but because his radicalism, his emotional
speeches, and his bold strokes of policy were famil-
iar and comfortable for the Arabs.
Sadat has done little to adjust his policy or
his goals to this Arab mainstream. He has, in fact,
rejected the rhetoric and the emotionalism that have
long been the badge of the proper Arab and, with
them, he has rejected the rigidity and inflexibility
that have characterized their dealings with the non-
Arab world and their attitude toward Israel.
Moderation stood him in good stead when he was
able to demonstrate to the Arabs that compromise,
even with the Israeli enemy, accomplished more for
Egypt and even for Syria than radicalism ever had.
He has lately been unable, however, to show that
accommodation is producing further results, either
for Syria or for the Palestinians. The second Sinai
accord is regarded among other Arabs as having pro-
duced too little for Egypt to have been worth the
price.
A Residual Recognition
Sadat has not lost entirely and forever his
ability to lead the Arabs. There is enough residual
recognition of the leading role Cairo has played to
make the Arabs shun, almost as a reflex action, any
move to turn away completely from Egypt. Many Arabs
also hope that Egypt has not permanently abandoned
the Arab struggle and will in a few years be back
playing the leading role.
Jordan has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully,
to mediate Egypt's differences with Syria over the
disengagement, for no better reason than that Egypt
is the principal Arab state and must not be allowed
to isolate itself from its neighbors.
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Saudi Arabia
stands with Sadat. Less radical Pales-
tinians have not cut their ties, because they
recognize that Egypt's support is vital if they
are ever to gain anything by negotiations.
Syria, historically Egypt's main rival for pan-
Arab leadership, is feeling unfulfilled, and it is
on Syria's attitude that Sadat's rise or fall as an
Arab leader will depend in the last analysis.
Few Arab leaders, no matter what their basic
attitude toward Egypt, are pleased by the second
Sinai accord; most are sympathetic with Syria's frus-
tration over the lack of progress toward another
Golan disengagement.
As has been demonstrated time and again, few
Arabs are willing to speak out for moderation when
one of their number remains vocally dissatisfied.
The general Arab silence on the disengagement has
not to this point helped Syria, but it has also not
helped Egypt. Silence in this case does not imply
consent and, if ever forced to a choice between
support for Egypt's position or support for Syria's
and the Palestinians', few Arabs would back Egypt.
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