THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014778
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 22, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 22, 1975
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.f7
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B( I )A2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 22, 1975
Table of Contents
South Vietnam: Further political changes in Saigon
may result in Senate President Tran Van Lam
being named president of the country. Many
military officers believe the situation hope-
less. (Page 1)
Laos: Fighting continues in the Sala Phou Khoun
area in the north. (Page 4)
USSR-Egypt: Foreign Minsiter Fahmi's visit to Mos-
cow appears to have eased tensions somewhat.
(Page 5)
Portugal: The political campaign is drawing to a
close amid conflicting rumors that a power play
before Friday may result in cancellation of
the election. (Page 6)
Greece: A large crowd of leftists yesterday damaged
the US embassy in Athens. (Page 7)
Notes: Saudi Arabia; Cyprus; Peru-USSR (Pages 8 and 9)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Vice President Tran Van Huong,
who was sworn in as president immedi-
ately after Thieu's resignation yes-
terday, reportedly is also to resign
soon to make way for Senate president
Tran Van Lam.
Lam apparently intends to form a new govern-
ment, although there are as yet no indications who
will be appointed. Presumably, Lam will turn to
such staunch anti-Thieu personalities as General
Duong Van "Big" Minh, Buddhist leader Vu Van Mau,
and former senate president Nguyen Van Huyen in an
effort to encourage the communists to negotiate a
political settlement of the war.
The communists have ruled out any real com-
promise settlement, implying that nothing less than
total surrender would be acceptable. Initial com-
munist reaction to the Thieu resignation has con-
tinued this line. A Viet Cong spokesman in Paris
has been quoted as stating that before negotiations
could be considered, the US must "halt all inter-
ference in Vietnam" and that not only Thieu "but
also his whole regime must be overthrown."
At this point, the very best a new South Viet-
namese government might obtain is a negotiated sur-
render. Given the proximity of communist military
forces to Saigon--and the very real prospect of a
rapid disintegration of South Vietnamese military
will in the wake of Thieu's resignation--time may
already have run out for any such orderly transfer
of power.
Communist pressure is being main-
tained on all sides of Saigon.
Fighting is continuing a dozen or so miles
east of Bien Hoa and along Route 4 southwest of
Saigon. The roads around Tay Ninh city remain
blocked; the communists are shelling Tay Ninh and
could easily overrun the lightly defended town at
any time. In addition to the now routine artillery
fire on Bien Hoa, the communists shelled a num-
ber of other government positions.
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The South Vietnamese have reportedly decided
to move the two marine brigades south from Bien Hoa
to Vung Tau because their discipline has broken
down. Government commanders clearly want these units
well away from Saigon. This will leave the defense
of the Bien Hoa - Long Binh complex to the remnants
of the South Vietnamese 18th Division, an armored
brigade, and an airborne brigade--all of which have
just been pulled back from the Xuan Loc battlefront.
The combat effectiveness of these units is question-
able, and Bien Hoa could fall quickly.
Many South Vietnamese officers believe it is
futile to try to reorganize the defenses of Saigon.
They believe the military situation is hopeless, and
do not expect the troops deployed along the front
lines to hold for long once heavy attacks begin.
This gloomy assessment will undoubtedly soon spread
to the troops, especially as units retreating from
the Xuan Loc battlefront show up and are pressed into
the Bien Hoa defensive perimeter.
The North Vietnamese have moved several of
their three dozen gunboats south, and these could
pose a threat to evacuation by sea. Recent inter-
cepts suggest that some of these gunboats have
moved farther south, possibly as far as Binh Tuy
Province.
Information as to how the commu-
nists are administering the areas of
South Vietnam which recently have come
under their control is sketchy. The
clearest public statement of communist
policy to date was contained in a ten-
point manifesto broadcast on April 3 by
the Viet Cong's Liberation Radio. It
appealed to government civil servants
to remain at their jobs and guaranteed
that private businessmen could continue
their operations.
Limited information on the formation of "revo-
lutionary committees" in cities like Hue and Da Nang
indicates that at least a superficial effort in this
direction is under way.
The communists are trying to create the appear-
ance of non-communist participation in their new
administrations. Aside from this gesture, the new
communist administrations appear to have a distinc-
tive military cast, suggesting that some areas have
been placed under a sort of martial law.
(continued)
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The communists are wasting no time in consoli-
dating their control and dealing with any local re-
sistance. Liberation Radio broadcasts of late March
included instructions to "severely punish" anyone
who was "concocting schemes" to oppose the new ad-
ministrations.
It is impossible to estimate the scope of
purges that have taken place so far, but certain
members of the former government, such as the
police, are particularly vulnerable. It is un-
clear whether the first initial executions were
acts of local Viet Cong units or part of a systema-
tic policy. An intercept from an unidentified North
Vietnamese unit in Quang Tin Province recently or-
dered that "shooting on the spot" be restricted
and that "military tribunals" first be established,
suggesting that the North Vietnamese want to control
the reprisal process.
In some areas where the Viet Cong tradition-
ally have had a strong foothold, acts of violence
do not appear to be prevalent.
the provincial capital of
Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province, Viet Cong officials
moved into the city and established administrative
control within a day after the government left.
Notices were issued to civil servants and teachers
to report for work, promising there would be no
revenge or punishment. North Vietnamese currency
was immediately introduced, and citizens were or-
dered to exchange their old money. Many of the
cadre were familiar to
local residents and were recognized as individuals
who had left Phu Yen with the Viet Minh insurgents
in 1954.
There is as yet little evidence on the longer
term question of whether Hanoi will opt for a re"
latively.quick reunification of the north and south
or will choose instead to establish a communist-
controlled transitional regime in the south, Os-
tensibly within the context of the Paris Accords-.
To date the communists have simply labeled
their new administrations "revolutionary committees,"
and the mix of North Vietnamese and southern com-
munist control and participation is not clear.
Hanoi may not have made final decisions on the pre-
cise complexion of a successor regime in Saigon.
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[Northern [Laos
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Regional commander General Vang Pao's
counterattack to recapture positions lost
last week east of Sala Phou Khoun has been
turned back by stiff resistance from what
are described as "several Pathet Lao com-
panies." The abortive counterattack by
one Royal Lao army infantry battalion was
supported by a dozen air strikes.
Two additional positions manned by non-commu-
nist troops at the junction of routes 7 and 13
near Sala Phou Khoun reportedly fell to. the Pathet
Lao on Sunday.
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is apparently
becoming more concerned about these developments.
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USSR-EGYPT
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's
visit to Moscow appears to have eased
tensions somewhat, but not much progress
appears to have been made on troublesome
bilateral problems or on reconvening the
Geneva conference.
Following a meeting with. General Secretary
Brezhnev yesterday, Fahmi waxed enthusiastic about
progress in Soviet-Egyptian relations. The commu-
nique 'winding up the visit was more restrained, how-
ever, describing the talks as "friendly" and "busi-
nesslike." It failed to show progress on outstand-
ing issues such as debt rescheduling and military
aid. Foreign Minister Gromyko pointedly indicated
in a speech given during Fahmi's visit that Moscow
still views Cairo's independent policies as the'ma-
jor obstacle to: improved ties.
On Geneva itself, Moscow and Cairo agreed that
careful and serious preparations must precede re-
convening the conference. Fahmi said the Soviets
thought such preparations could be completed by June.
The Soviets made clear that they do not favor an
Egyptian suggestion that the conference be expanded
to include France, the UK, and at least one non-
aligned country.
Moscow and Cairo seemed deliberately to leave
the question of Palestinian representation ambigu-
ous. While they called for PLO participation "with
the same rights as other participants," they did
not specify when the Palestinians should attend nor
did they appear to close the door to PLO participa-
tion as part of another delegation.
During the visit, Fahmi told newsmen that Egypt
now rejects the step-by-step approach to negotiations
He was responding to a question about recent Israeli
suggestions that disengagement negotiations might be
revived under US auspices. It is not clear, however,
whether he was rejecting the concept of a disengage-
ment or simply another publicized round of with-
drawal talks./
The Soviets, meanwhile, will continue prepara-
tions for Geneva during the visit to Moscow tomorrow
of Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, Soviet Deputy.
Defense Minister Kulikov left for Damascus yesterday.
He may be seeking to: reassure the Syrians of Moscow's
military support in order to. encourage their attend-
ance at Geneva.
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PORTUGAL
The political campaign draws to a
close tomorrow amid conflicting rumors
that a power play before Friday may re-
sult in cancellation of the elections.
The impending release of a preliminary report
of Admiral Coutinho's investigation of the abortive
March 11 coup has contributed to pre-electoral ten-
sions. The report is likely to be most damaging to
the moderate political parties, especially if they
have no opportunity to rebut charges before the
election.
Twelve legal parties, meanwhile, have stepped
up political activity in the final days of the cam-
paign. Political violence, which has been infre-
quent, broke out yesterday between left-wing ex-
tremists and members of the center-right Social
Democratic Center in northern Portugal. Over 25
people were injured; several were wounded when in-
ternal security, troops fired to disperse the crowd.
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GREECE
A large crowd of leftists--estimated
at 1003000 to 1503000--damaged the US em-
bassy in Athens yesterday in protest of
US support for the previous military re-
gime. The demonstrators were eventually
driven off by riot police.
The incident marked the first major test in
crowd control for a weak government, Prime Minis-
ter Karamanlis must avert the kind of chaos in the
streets that set the stage for the 1967 military
"restoration of order"; he knows the military have
been complaining of his "softness" toward demon-
strators. The Prime Minister, however, cannot go
too far; harsh measures would be likely to cause
counter-demonstrations by the left, possibly lead-
ing to the fall of the government.
Last night's rally, initiated by youth organ-
izations, communists, Maoists, and other radical
leftists, was to commemorate the "black anniversary"
of the coup that brought the junta to power in 1967.
The demonstration began peacefully, led by the So-
cialist mayor of Athens. At the US embassy, most of
the demonstrators merely shouted and threw paint
and firecrackers, but about 500 of them--identified
by a senior police officer at the scene as mostly
Maoists--broke through police lines and caused con-
siderable damage.
Embassy personnel were evacuated and none was
injured. Some 15 policemen were hospitalized and
about 25 demonstrators were hurt, according to po-
lice estimates.
Early this morning, groups of demonstrators
occupied other buildings in the city. Requests by
the police for permission to dislodge the rioters
have been denied by the Athens city. prosecutor.
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NOTES
Saudi Arabian Crown Prince and Deputy Prime
Minister Fahd has assumed control of all signifi-
cant government business.
Glafkos Clerides will continue as negotiator
for the Greek Cypriot side in the intercommunal
talks, thereby making it possible for them to re-
sume as scheduled in Vienna next Monday.
Clerides apparently decided to stay on after
President Makarios reaffirmed Clerides' negotiat-
ing mandate in the upcoming talks. Clerides noted
in a statement last Saturday that in Vienna he
would be discussing the Turkish Cypriot plan for
a bi-zonal federation as well as the Greek Cypriot
proposals for a multi-regional federation. Maka-
rios told Ambassador Crawford yesterday that he
wanted the Turkish delegation in Vienna to give
specifics on what Ankara is prepared to do in such
fields as refugee return, territory, and the pow-
ers of a central government.
(continued)
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Peru has purchased 30 MI-8 helicopters from
the USSR, after negotiations with the US ended in-
conclusively.
Delivery of the Soviet aircraft is scheduled
to begin in July. Pilot training for the MI-8s is
likely to present problems for Peru. Some Peruvian
personnel have begun MI-8 pilot training in the
USSR/
As a result of the helicopter purchase, the small
contingent of Soviet personnel now in Peru will
probably expand. Heretofore, the USSR has sold
land armaments to Peru, chiefly T-55 tanks and other
ground equipment.
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Top Secret
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