THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 FEBRUARY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993733
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 3, 1973

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010029-8
The President's Daily Brief
3 February 1973
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010029-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010029-8
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category 5B( I ),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010029-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 February 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Despite a general lull in military activity in South
Vietnam, there are tenuous signs that the Communists
may undertake new military action in some areas just
prior to the arrival of international observer teams.
(Page 1)
Government and Pathet Lao negotiators continued their
discussions of arrangements for a cease-fire and
formation of a new coalition government yesterday at
the second session of their private talks. (Page 2)
Soviet officials recently have taken the unusual
step of openly acknowledging China's developing stra-
tegic nuclear capability against the USSR. (Page 3)
The Soviet Union's top agricultural administrator,
who was demoted yesterday from the post of First
Deputy Premier, is an obvious scapegoat for the coun-
try's continuing harvest difficulties. ?Soviet winter
grain crop losses may equal or even exceed those of
last year. (Page 4)
Pakistan believes it can do nothing toward breaking
the impasse with India until there is progress on
the repatriation of the 90,000 prisoners of war held
there. (Page 5)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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1'36
NORTH
VIETNArvI
108
Demilitarized Zone
OUANG TRI
THUA THIEN
OUANG NAM
MR I
THAILAND
OUA"NGIN.
KONTUM '
, ,PLEIKU
Tonle
Sap
CAMBODIA
DARLAC
NOOK QUANG
DUG
ll,' EN
PHUOC DLIC
HOA
S"\O
.-P
NINH
8,, LONG THUAN
TAY LONG LAM DONG
NINH
BINH
DUONG
LONG
KHANH
BINH
TN U ANX
CHAU
DOC
KILN
PHONG
AN
GIANG
'('EN
TUONG
HAU
MGM!
KILN
GIANG
PHONG
DUNK
CHUONG
THIEN
VINH
LONG
CON G
KIEN HOA,
VINH \
BINH
XUYENs,
Gulf of
Thailand
BAC LIEU
AN
XUYEN
?
104
MR 4
106
PHUOC
TUY7MR 3
Capital Special Zone
tin
MR 2
South
China
Sea
15/0
?
16-
14-
10--
108 MILES 1110
('` .
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
,There is a general lull in military activity
throughout most of the country for the first time
since the cease-fire went into effect. Sporadic
fighting persists in some areas, most of it caused
by the government's continued efforts to clear roads
and drive North Vietnamese from hamlets occupied
just before the cease-fire.
Despite the marked reduction in military activ-
ity, there are tenuous signs that the Communists
may undertake new military action in some areas just
prior to the arrival of international ?observer teams.
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The Communists may wish to make one more
effort to take additional territory. This
could explain why the bulk of North Viet-
namese main force units, although well-
positioned, were not committed in the last
round of attacks before the cease-fire.
At least two instances have been reported of
friendly meetings of South and North Vietnamese main
force units during flag raising ceremonies in Kontum
Province. Apparently no shots were fired and, in
both cases, the two sides agreed on a division of
territorial control.
In the delta province of Bac Lieu, the Viet
Cong are reported to have requested a cease-fire
from the local South Vietnamese artillery commander,
and the latter stopped the firing.
Peking has given a very warm reception to ne-
gotiator Le Duc Tho and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy
Trinh and, in the process, further underscored its
strong support for the Vietnam agreement. Mao him-
self received the Vietnamese visitors in a "cordial"
atmosphere on 1 February. The following day, the
Chinese turned out about half the Politburo and more
than 10,000 persons at a rally in Peking to celebrate
the accords.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Government and Pathet Lao negotiators continued
their discussions of arrangements for a cease-fire
and formation of a new coalition government yester-
day at the second session of their private talks.
On the military front, communications intelli-
gence confirms that the North Vietnamese have aban-
doned their siege of Bouam Long, the government
stronghold north of the Plaine des Jarres, appar-
ently in large part because of B-52 strikes. Major
combat elements that had participated in the fight-
ing have moved back toward the Plaine. At the same
time, other intercepted messages indicate that North
Vietnamese units are completing preparations for an
effort to recapture Muong Phalane in the central
panhandle.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CHINA
On two occasioris recently, Soviet officials
have openly acknowledged China's developing strate-
gic nuclear capability against the USSR. In Decem-
ber an official of the Soviet UN delegation, in a
talk with US officials, raised the issue of China's
relationship to SALT and the need to take China
into account in agreements on future strategic force
levels. He noted that the USSR had a special prob-
lem: Chinese nuclear weapons systems that could
strike the USSR but not the US, and thus would not
be considered strategic in US-Soviet terms. The
official concluded that the "splendid superiority"
needed to retain a nearly complete Soviet pre-
emptive or disarming capability against China was
rapidly going or gone already.
The same basic points were made by a public
lecturer in Leningrad on 21 January. The lecturer
asserted that China has developed a "second-strike"
capability against the USSR and that by relocating
"ICBMs" in silos farther away from the Soviet border,
Peking has eliminated the threat of "surgical" air
or land attacks on its missiles.
These open acknowledgments of Chinese
capabilities against the USSR are unusual.
We have seen no sudden change in Chinese
strategic strike capabilities that would
alarm the Soviets.
Moscow encouraged rumors of a possible
"surgical" strike following the fighting
along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969
in order to apply political pressure on
Peking, but whether the Soviets considered
it a practical policy option is unknown.
In light of continued Chinese charges
of Soviet aggressiveness at the UN and
elsewhere, Moscow may believe that the
time has come to lay the issue to rest.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Lack of Snow Endangers Soviet Winter Grain
LN D
SWED
Leningrad
area
Kazan'
POLAND
Kiev.
ROMANIA
Rostov
0
co co ?
? - ?
1-1.YRE:Y
NAUTICAL MILES
200
1RAN
554078 2-73 CIA
Snow Depth
r--1 0-2 inches
FTH 2-4 inches
[ [ Over 4 inches
9e_ r, -9
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
Dmitry Polyansky, demoted yesterday from
USSR First Deputy Premier to Minister of
Agriculture, is an obvious scapegoat for
the country's continuing harvest diffi-
culties. He has been the Soviet Union's
top agricultural administrator since 1962.
It is like/y, however, that the broader
scale of Kremlin politics is equally im-
portant in causing his fall.
Following Khrushchev's ouster, Polyansky
was an important member of the Ukrainian
"clique" surrounding Brezhnev. As Brezh-
nev has moved in the past two years into
a position of greater dominance in the
leadership, he has espoused the twin pro-
grams of detente abroad and consumer in-
terests at home--moves that opened a gap
between him and his relatively conserva-
tive Ukrainian allies. Polyansky's demo-
tion is the second blow to this Ukrainian
group in the Politburo since last May.
Observations of a US Embassy agricultural
officer suggest that the winter grain crop
losses will equal or even exceed those of
last year, when only 23 million hectares'
were harvested, compared to a normal aver-
age of 31 million.
The officer, who recently traveled by train
through some of the major winter grain areas, reports
that snow cover was no more than two inches over the
entire route. Fellow passengers told him that there
would normally be over 20 inches of snow at this
time of the year. Soviet weather maps indicate that
the same general weather Conditions?little snow
combined with extreme cold?prevail?throughout. most
of the major winter grain areas.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Aziz. Ahmed, secretary-general of the Pakistani
Foreign Ministry, has reiterated that Pakistan be-
lieves it can do nothing toward breaking the im-
passe with India until there is progress on the re-
patriation of the 90,000 prisoners of war held
there. Neither can therelpe recognition of Bangla-
desh until the prisoners are returned, Ahmed told
the US charge. He chiefly blamed India and Bangla-
desh for the impasse but also blamed third countries,
including the US', for not using their leverage in
Dacca and New Delhi.
Bhutto has continued to speak publicly
of the need for eventual recognition of
Bangladesh, but has stated no action can
be taken at least until after elections
in.early March.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT
6
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Top Secret
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