THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014756
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 27, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
March 27, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B(
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
March 27, 1975
Table of Contents.,
South Vietnam: Panic has taken over at Da Nang;
the situation at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang con-
tinues to deteriorate. (Page 1)
Cambodia: The Khmer communists have again moved
artillery within range of Pochentong Airport.
(Page 3)
USSR: The Soviet media still have not mentioned
the Glomar Explorer story. (Page 4)
Saudi Arabia: The change in leadership will slow
developments on the international oil scene
for at least the next month, but probably will
make little difference over the longer term.
(Page 7)
West Germany: Willy Brandt is paying his first
visit to Washington since he resigned as chan-
cellor in the wake of a spy scandal last May.
(Page 8)
Portugal: Prime Minister Goncalves, speaking at
the installation of the new cabinet yesterday,
left no doubt that the government will con-
tinue to expand its control over private in-
dustry. (Page 10)
Middle East: The determination of Egypt and Syria
to move peace negotiations to Geneva will
force an early consideration of the Palestin-
ian problem. (Page 11)
Note: USSR (Page 13)
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NORTik\
VIET7
Demilitarized Zone
Y>?
dTHI
? ft'
*Da Nang
MR 1
THAILAND
Qui Nhon
CAM BOD\J.
Are/ro
MR 2
Nha Trang
.PHNOM PENH
Tay Nin\
Gulf of
Thailand
Capitol Special Zone
South
China
Sed
SOUTH VIETNAM
1?0
MILES
557558 3-75
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Panic has taken over at Da Nang;
the situation at the coastal enclaves of
Qui Nhon and Nha Trang also continues
to deteriorate.
All semblance of public order at Da Nang has
disappeared. The airport has been closed because
uncontrollable mobs are on the runways. Officials
in the headquarters of the government's Military
Region I command and the mayor's office have begun
to burn documents and evacuate their offices. Sen-
ior military officers have left their posts and are
trying in any way possible to evacuate with their
families.
Yesterday, some 2,500 South Vietnamese Marines
arrived in Da Nang from Hue and were immediately
put in positions along the northern perimeter. The
Marine Division and units of the 3rd Infantry Divi-
sion are the only units in the area considered bat-
tleworthy. Most of the region's other regular com-
bat units, including the 1st and 2nd divisions, are
in disarray. As news spreads to the defense lines
of the disintegration in Da Nang, all these units
are likely to disband, leaving the city defenseless.
The North Vietnamese have enough strength near
Da Nang to attack within a matter of hours. Two
independent North Vietnamese regiments and the
304th Division are to the west. The 324B and the
325th divisions are in southern Thua Thien Province
and could move against the city by the end of the
week. With the earlier collapse of government
units south of the city, the North Vietnamese 2nd
Division also could be free to move north against
Da Nang.
Given the situation at Da Nang, the communists
will quickly realize that not all these forces are
needed for an assault on the city. Several will
then be free to move farther south to attack gov-
ernment forces defending the remaining coastal
cities of Military Region 2.
The North Vietnamese 3rd Division began to
drive toward Qui Nhon early yesterday with a series
of attacks against the two regiments of the South
Vietnamese 22nd Division which are defending the
city's western approach. By day's end, both regi-
ments were cut off. These units have seen fairly
steady action along Route 19 and are probably tired.
(continued)
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Binh Dinh's regional and popular forces are being
rushed down from the outer districts to help de-
fend the city, but this amounts to abandoning much
of the nation's second most heavily populated prov-
ince to the communists.
The situation at Nha Trang is similar. Commu-
nist forces moving out of the mountains are now in
a position to bypass the airborne units tasked with
blocking the communist advance. Nha Trang's defense
now depends on territorial forces, the remnants of
a regiment that was forced out of the westernmost
district earlier this week, and 23rd Division strag-
glers from the highlands. Security problems are
compounded by large numbers of refugees.
Press reports today of an attempted coup are
incorrect. The government has arrested ten indi-
viduals associated with opposition press and polit-
ical factions, but?none are of national prominence
or posed a threat to the Thieu government. The
press reports were based-on unfounded rumors.
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
Ouciong
5
Prek
51II
0
(1)
,Prek Tamerk
Muk Kampul?z;
Tuol Leaps
PHNOM
PENH
? Chrouy Changyvar
Naval Base,
15
DA*,
Prek T naOt
,
Banam
Nealieuong
0 Miles 10
557550 3-75
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CAMBODIA
The Khmer communists have quickly
capitalized on the reoccupation of Tuol
Leap by again moving artillery within
range of Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport.
Several 105-mme howitzer rounds landed
in the vicinity of the airfield yester-
day, but did not interrupt US supply air-
lift operations. Cambodian army efforts
to retake Tuol Leap have made only limited
progress.
The insurgents have also extended their control
over a stretch of the east bank of the Mekong north-
east of Phnom Penh, forcing two government battal-
ions to abandon positions opposite the Chrouy
Changwar naval base. Farther north on the Mekong,
the Cambodian navy evacuated 600 troops and 250
families from isolated riverside positions at Prek
Tamerk and Muk Kampul.
Along the lower Mekong southeast of Phnom Penh,
continued heavy insurgent shelling yesterday knocked
out one of the 105-mm. howitzers defending the gov-
ernment's garrison at Neak Luong. Communist ground
attacks were also reported northeast of the town.
Neak Luong's 4,400 defenders, along with its large
civilian and refugee population, continue to be sup-
plied entirely by airdrop.
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USSR
The Soviet media, foreign or do-
mestic, still have not mentioned the
Glomar Explorer story, even though it
has been broadcast in Russian to the
USSR by the Voice of America and the
BBC.
Thus far there appears to have been no con-
certed Soviet effort to question Americans on
the Glomar Explorer story, and in the few instances
that have been reported we can discern no pattern
that would provide a clue as to the ultimate Soviet
reaction.
--The Soviets have made no attempts to probe
the story at the "working levels" of the De-
partment of State.
Charge ?Vorontsov had urged Moscow to make a
strong protest to the White House. The timing,
however, suggests that the official was not
acting on the basis of high-level instructions
from Moscow.
--Last Thursday, the Soviet navy attache, at-
tending a social function, asked a US navy
officer whether the newspaper accounts were
true; whether it was something the CIA had
done; and whether the Pentagon was working on
an official denial. The last question was put
in a plaintive, almost beseeching tone.
--On Friday, A. N. Shchukin, a Soviet SALT
delegate, briefly mentioned the Glomar Explorer
in Geneva by way of supporting Soviet arguments
regarding the capability of "national technical
means of verification."
--On Monday, the chief press officer at the
Soviet embassy told a UPI reporter of Soviet
"distress that we were not able to inform the
(continued)
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next of kin," and referred to "certain decen-
cies in international law and behavior." He
seemed to imply that the Soviets were weighing
a request for the memorabilia of the crew and
films of the burial.
--The UPI man was also told by an official of
the Soviet writers' union that Soviet?officials
are "very sensitive" about the US failure to
offer to return the bodies of the crew.
There has been no evidence of any unusual ac-
tivity or new line from the Soviet leadership.
--Party chief Brezhnev left Budapest by train
on the evening of March 19, the day after the
story broke, and arrived in Moscow 36 hours
later, following stopovers in Lvov and Kiev.
--Premier Kosygin, addressing a luncheon honor-
ing French Prime Minister Chirac, made a posi-
tive reference to US-Soviet agreements on pre-
vention of nuclear war and limitation of stra-
tegic weapons. Brezhnev had a three-hour ses-
sion with Chirac on Monday, but the accounts
from the French press corps suggest that the
meeting was given over to routine business.
The episode does not appear to have affected
bilateral relations.
--Soviet Foreign Ministry officials continue
to show interest in planning joint observances
of V-E day.
--The visit to Moscow early next month of a US
commercial delegation headed by Secretary
Simon appears to be on track.
--The Soviets turned down a request for a
visit by the current National War College
class, but they have said no to similar re-
quests in the past.
Thus far, we are aware of only two possible
Soviet military reactions to the Glomar Explorer
story.
--On March 21, two TU-95 reconnaissance air-
craft conducted an unusual mission in the
vicinity of the lost submarine, which could,
however, have been in support of a Yankee-
class submarine patrol change of station.
(continued)
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--Over the weekend, an ocean-going tug, con-
figured for intelligence collection, was trans-
iting north of the Hawaiian Islands after mon-
itoring a US-allied naval exercise that ended
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could either have been headed home or toward
the vicinity where the submarine was lost.
--Other recent movements of Soviet intelli-
gence collectors and oceanographic ships in
the Pacific appear normal. Two Soviet fishery
research ships are due shortly in Hawaii for
a routine port call. Contrary to press specu-
lation, their arrival is not related to the
submarine story.
We assume the Soviets were taken b sur rise
when the story of the submarine recovery effort
broke. The Soviet leadership will have many ques-
E=g for the navy and the intelligence services
?about the validity of the press stories. It will
take some time--probably more than the week that
has passed--to sort out the answers, and we doubt
the Soviets will ever be fully satisfied that they
know the whole truth.
With the. .assage of time the likelihood of a
strong Soviet reaction is diminishing. W atever
their visceral feelings, the Soviet leaders have
felt no compulsion to rush before the world with
protests or denials. So far Soviet officials are
conducting themselves as though they either have
no instructions, or the instructions are to pursue
"business as usual." The "no-comment" policy of
the US has undoubtedly helped Moscow avoid public
commentary.
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SAUDI ARABIA
The change in leadership in Saudi
Arabia will slow developments on the
international oil scene for at Least
the next month, but probably will make
little difference over the longer term.
Saudi decisions on important oil policy matters
are likely to be postponed until after the 40-day
mourning period for the dead King. These matters
include the Saudi positions on the producer-consumer
conference, the pricing of oil in currencies other
than the dollar, and the indexing of oil prices to
offset inflation.
Decisions by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries on these and other matters are
also likely to be delayed. The cartel rarely takes
a position independent of the views of its largest
producer.
Saudi Arabia under King Khalid will remain a
strong supporter of OPEC but may not be as influ-
ential a member as previously. With the loss of
Faysal's prestige as a political and religious
leader in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia's influence
will derive largely from its oil production and
financial resources. At least initially, the new
Saudi leadership will probably be somewhat reluc-
tant to take on the OPEC majority as Faysal did,
and Saudi Arabia's moderating influence on OPEC
policies consequently may be somewhat diminished.
Saudi oil policy has been determined in recent
years by the supreme petroleum council which has
been chaired by Prince Fahd, now the Crown Prince.
Since Fahd is expected to be the active element in
Khalid's administration and since the composition
of the council has not changed, Saudi oil policies
promise to continue much as before.
The death of King Faysal probably will reduce
the influence of Oil Minister Yamani and may bring
about his dismissal.
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WEST GERMANY
Willy Brandt, chairman of the ruling
Social Democratic Party, is paying his
first visit to Washington since he re-
signed as chancellor in the wake of a
spy scandal last May. Brandt won the
1971 Nobel Peace Prize and Zed his party
to electoral victory in November 1972.
During the months immediately prior to
his departure from government, however,
public support for his party had de-
clined and his own leadership had been
increasingly ineffectual. The resigna-
tion was a deep shock for Brandt, and
only recently have there been indica-
tions that he has succeeded in finding
new outlets for his personal and politi-
cal ambitions. His greatest interest
continues to be foreign policy.
Last year, many West German politicians be-
lieved it only a-matter of time before Brandt would
relinquish party leadership. Such speculation has
recently declined. Moreover, there have been signs
of closer cooperation between him and Chancellor
Schmidt as the party prepares for difficult-state-
elections this spring and for federal elections
next year.
Brandt still commands great respect for his
work in improving Bonn's relations with Eastern
Europe and for his role in the international social
democratic movement. He has strong convictions
about the importance of social democracy as a means
of achieving social justice, unifying Western Eu-
rope, and as a force to combat communism in Europe.
As a result, the West German Social Democrats have
actively supported moderate socialist parties else-
where in the world.
Of special concern to Brandt now are recent
developments in Portugal. Under Brandt's leader-
ship, the Social Democrats have contributed very
substantial assistance--both technical and finan-
cial--to Mario Soares' Portuguese Socialist Party.
Brandt has personally tried to persuade other West
European leaders to support democratic forces in
(continued)
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Portugal.
Brandt
attempted
to convey to the Soviet leadership his concern about
the aggressive behavior of the Portuguese Communist
Party. Brandt indicated, however, that he had not
been encouraged by the Soviet response.
Chancellor Schmidt has
also tried to get the Soviets to use what influence
they have to restrain the Portuguese Communists.
Whether or not the Soviets could be brought
to take steps to exert such a moderating influence
is an open question. It is equally difficult to
tell whether, if they did try, they could succeed
at this point in getting the Portuguese Communists
to modify their tactics in any significant way.
-,the situation in the Middle East and in the
Mediterranean;_
--developments in the European Community;
--problems of the world ? food shortage; and
--the supply of energy and raw materials.
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PORTUGAL
Portuguese Prime Minister Goncalves,
speaking at the installation of the new
cabinet yesterday, left no doubt that
the government will continue to expand
its control over private industry.
The government will concentrate on consoli-
dating its takeover of banks and insurance com-
panies, but Goncalves indicated that other sectors
of the economy will also be nationalized.
Each of the four parties in the coalition cab-
inet--the Socialists, Communists, Democratic Move-
ment, and center-left Popular Democrats--received
two cabinet posts. Each is represented by a minis-
ter without portfolio and one other post. Of the
remaining five civilian ministers, three are de-
scribed as moderate technocrats and two as sympa-
thetic to the Communists or Democratic Movement.
These two hold positions of considerable signifi-
cance to the Communists--the ministries of economic
coordination and agriculture.
The military, which has eight posts, was ap-
parently willing to give up its majority in the
cabinet because the new all-military Revolutionary-
Council has assumed the legislative powers formerly
held by the cabinet. The cabinet remains responsi-
ble for day-to-day administration and could regain
some of its influence in the future.
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MIDDLE EAST
The current determination of Egypt
and Syria to move peace negotiations to
Geneva will force the Arabs, Israelis,
and major powers to focus on the ques-
tion of Palestinian participation in the
talks. The Egyptians and Syrians have
in the past threatened that they will
not go back to Geneva without the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization; the Is-
raelis have long maintained that they
will not negotiate with the PLO.
Israel has expressed a willingness to return
to Geneva, but has shown no sign that it will deal
with a PLO delegation. As an alternative to ex-
plicit PLO participation, Cairo and Damascus may
propose that the Arabs form a single, joint dele-
gation that would include representatives of the
PLO. They would hope that this would provide a way
around Israel's objections. Israel, the Arabs may
point out, did not object to the inclusion of sev-
eral Palestinians in the Jordanian delegation at
the first session of the Geneva talks in December
1973.
The Israelis have, in fact, said that they
would not check too closely the credentials of the
Arab delegates at Geneva. Tel Aviv may be ready
to accept the presence of PLO members who were in-
tegrated into the delegation of one of the Arab
states or into a single Arab delegation.
Both the Israelis and the Arabs may in the end
come to view a joint Arab-PLO delegation as the only
way to forestall a total collapse of Middle East ne-
gotiations. Such a step would buy time for all par-
ties, and would put off--perhaps indefinitely--what
even the Arabs consider the undesirable and probably
impossible task of distinguishing the Palestinian
and Jordanian roles in negotiations.
Jordan would probably participate in such a
delegation if urged to do so by Egypt and Syria.
For the moment, however, King Husayn is staying on
the sidelines in the hope that the Arab states will
be forced to concede Jordan a major role in nego-
tiations with Israel.
(continued)
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Leaders of the PLO, for their part,. would ac-
cept an invitation to participate in.a.joint-dele-
gation, even though it would alienate 'radical feda-
yeen. The Palestinians promptly approved President-
Asad's recent offer of closer Syrian-Palestinian
cooperation, Their action suggests that they were
sufficiently disillusioned by Egypt's apparent read-
iness to proceed without them that they were willing
to sacrifice a measure of their autonomy in return
for a tangible demonstration of Syrian support.
PLO leaders look on the proposed joint command--and
would look on a joint?delegation--as insurance that
they will be included in any future moves toward a
negotiated peace or in any preparations for renewed
hostilities.
Despite their willingness to cooperate closely
with Damascus, the Palestinians remain suspicious
of Syria's motives. They are therefore pleased that
step-by-step negotiations have collapsed, as this
allows.them to repair their strained relations'with
Egypt and look'more'closely at the Syrian offer.
PLO leaders praised President_Sadat's refusal to
make greater concessions to Israel'during the recent
round of indirect_talks, and upon the collapse of
the talks, sent a high-ranking official to Cairo.
Thus far, Moscow is letting the Arab nations
take the lead in calling for a resumption of the
Middle East peace conference in Geneva. The So-
viets have withheld direct, authoritative comment
on the breakdown of Secretary Kissinger's nego-
tiating efforts, although they see the collapse as
supporting their position that Geneva is the only
venue for achieving a settlement. They support
Foreign Minister Fahmi's call for a return to Ge-
neva, and their propaganda broadcasts to the Arab
world are aimed at keeping events moving in that
direction.
Not surprisingly, Soviet propaganda has placed
the blame for the negotiating failure squarely on
Israel. The Soviets have been relatively easy on
the US, although they have made the point with the
Arabs that Washington's support for Tel Aviv lies
behind Israel's intransigence.
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NOTE
The Soviets evidently are preparing for more
high-yie12 nuclear weapons tests in the western
Arctic this year than in the past.
A threshold test ban treaty is scheduled to go
into effect on March 31, 1976. Because this will
limit test yields to 150 kilotons, Moscow is under
pressure to complete its high-yield testing program.
The Soviets may be planning at least four high-yield
tests for their last Arctic test series. Weather
conditions make it likely that all tests would take
place between early summer and late fall.
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