THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF (MORNING) 21 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976573
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 21, 1969

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The President's Daily, Brief
21 January 1969
Top
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32
CYPRUS
Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities
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ARABIA
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I, MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST'
French Foreign Minister Debre has asked a US Embassy
officer in Paris for US supportS of the French proposal
that UN Security Council representatives of the1 US, USSR,
France and the UK meet in New York before the end of the
month to discuss the Middle East crisis. Debre said
France believes the situation is rapidly growing more
dangerous and that a settlement will become harder to
achieve as time passes.
The French, Debre explained, insist there is no
question of trying to impose a solution; they see a New
York meeting as a means of impressing on Israel and the
Arabs the, necessity of a peaceful settlement. Debre also
stressed that the French will not hold out for "any par-
ticular formula or context for such a meeting"--an ob-
vious reference to the Soviet peace plan.
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1-1(J1 1 rIE t-Kr311Jr1N (JIN 1_, I
On 19 January Cairo's semi-official newspaper,
Al Ahram, ran the full text of the US reply, calling it
"politically mean and immoral beyond imagination." This
is probably another of Nasir's celebrated tantrums; he
is quite capable of lashing out in ill-considered retal-
iation. The favorable reception of the Israeli press to
the US reply will serve to confirm Nasir in his o\wn opin-
ion.
At annex we take a look at some of the ingredients
that make the-Middle East so explosive at this time.
EUROPE
There is nothing of significance to report.
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FUllS. 1 riE ikE311JEIN 1 (JINL, I
SOVIET AFFAIRS
'Czechoslovakia is on the brink of another crisis
following yesterday's incident in which a second youth
set himself on fire. President Svoboda's announcement
of the act during a nationally broadcast speech will
have a major impact, and will almost certainly lead to
larger and possibly violent anti-Soviet manifestations
as well as to strikes in factories and schools.
Student leaders were dissatisfied with the gov-
ernment's reply to the demands of the student who died
Sunday, and thousands of young people marched in the
streets of Prague yesterday in honor of the dead youth.
They harassed Soviet military patrols, but there was no
violence. Now, however, non-violence can no longer be
assumed by the authorities or the Soviet troops.
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So far, Czechoslovak leaders have tried to avoid'
further anti-Soviet incidents by counseling prudence
and cooperation with the authorities. Police and troops
for example., were notably absent during demonstrations
over the weekend. Now,however, we expect to see num-
erous preventive measures.
The Dubcek.leadership nevertheless, has but a
very limited range of options with which to counter
growing popular disaffection. They are hemmed in on',
one side by Soviet demands for"normalization" of-the
situation, by which Moscow means forcible repression
of the dissidents. On the other hand, the passions
aroused among the people-are so high that any attempt
to, dampen them by means.more'violent than persuasion'
risks a bloodbath and this would deepen the alien-
ation of ?the population. Worst of all,, perhaps, the
country's leaders have-not been able up to now to agree
on a decisive course to follow. This is obvious to all
and has encouraged the continuation of public resist-.
ante to Soviet domination..
Representatives of the Soviet, foreign ministry,, in
:ah,upusual,press conference on 20 January, issued one,
of-MoScow's, clearest statements in recent months that_
itis willing to hold bilateral talks with the US ,on -
limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Despite a spokesman's denial, the meeting with the
press was clearly timed as an invitation to the new US
administration to make the next move.
Most of the major points of yesterday's statement
have been staples of the Soviet position on disarmament
for years. It repeats the essential elements of Moscow's
nine-point program made public last July and subsequently
presented to the United Nations General Assembly. These
points--some of them old chestnuts--are:
--banning the use of nuclear weapons,
--banning the production and reducing the stocks of
nuclear weapons,
--subsequent liquidation of nuclear weapons,
--banning of underground nuclear and thermonuclear
tests,
--banning of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons beyond the confines of national frontiers,
--limiting the zones of operation of nuclear mis-
sile-carrying submarines,
--banning of chemical and bacteriological weapons
--liquidation of foreign military bases,
--setting up non-nuclear zones in various parts of
the world, and,
--strengthening provisions for the use of the world's
seabeds and ocean floors exclusively for peaceful purposes.
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PUK "Hh l'KhS1D1IN1 UNLY
The statement included a pro-forma propaganda at-
tack on the strengthening of NATO and specifically ac-
cused the US, the United Kingdom and West Germany of
"whipping up a cold war. atmosphere."
During a subsequent question period,, the Soviet
spokesmen called Bonn's plans to elect the next Federal
President in West Berlin during March as "anew provoca-
tion, which can only "complicate international relations."
They made no threats of retaliation, however, and ended
this portion of their interview with an appeal to Bonn
to sign the non-proliferation treaty.
VIETNAM
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192 194
BURMA
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PUK 11-1h YKL311JLIN 1 UAL
* * *
Communist units in South Vietnam have sharply in-
creased the level of military action over the last four
days. Thus far, however, the enemy has not committed
his large units.
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LAOS: Current Situation
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The current round of activity is doubtless intended
as a demonstration of Communist military presence and.
capability on the eve of the Inauguration, and also as a
show of strength as the new round of substantive talks
gets under wayin Paris..
It is not yet clear how far the current Communist
military effort will be pushed. Numerous recently cap-
\ /
tured prisoners and documents
indicate that the Communists plan to launch a series of
attacks throughout III Corps.)
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
The Communists are preparing for the next round of
their annual dry season offensive and for the moment
the military situation is relatively quiet.
Only light skirmishingand patrol activity has- been
reported over the past several days near the Bolovens.
Plateau in. the south, where the heaviest fighting of the
two-month old Communist offensive took place earlier. As
many as three North Vietnamese battalions, are still dug in
around Ban. Thateng? but the enemy has made. no effort; to
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
bring additional pressure on the base's weary defenders.
Heavy air strikes and government guerrilla operations are
helping to keep the Communists at bay, and the North Viet-
namese themselves may not be willing to run the risk of
another costly all-out attack.
In the north, small numbers of Communist troops have
been probing outlying government positions that defend the
key guerrilla base at Na Khang. The friendly guerrillas
have been trying to clear the enemy from recently captured
positions near Na Khang; these positions have been used to
place mortar fire on the base's airstrip. Another govern-
ment spoiling operation has blunted a Communist push against
government positions between Na Khang and the Plaine des
Jarres.
PERU
The Velasco government has placed an embargo on the
remaining assets of the US-owned International Petroleum
Company and seems ready to expropriate them.
Pressure for further action has grown out of a dis-
pute over the price the company is to pay for oil products
it has drawn from the expropriated refinery at Talara.
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run. I riic r.tc.icaumaiN I NI 1_,
There is an indication that Peru might seek to in-
ject the Soviet Union into the controversy. .A Soviet
economic delegation is to arrive in Lima later this month
to review a general offer of credits for industrial pro-
jects which Moscow extended last year./
In any event the new expropriations`will resurface
potential difficulties in Peruvian-US relations. Under
amendments to the US Foreign Assistance Act and the Sugar
Act Peru will lose US economic assistance to the tune of
20-25 million dollars and its substantial sugar quota un-
less steps are taken to provide prompt and adequate com-
pensation for nationalized property. Peru must meet this
11:
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requirement by 9 April when the grace period of. six months
expires. If it fails to do so, and economic sanctions are
applied, relations will be severely strained perhaps to
the breaking point.
COMMUNIST CHINA
We are beginning to suspect that major, unpublicized
shifts are taking place among Chinese leaders , and:that
these may have the effect of weakening Mao Tse-tung's
political position. The inner circle of leaders around
Mao have failed to show up in public together since Octo-
ber, and the capital,is full of rumors about ferment
within this group.
? One of the more credible is that several of Mao's
associates, including defense minister and heir apparent
Lin Piao made speeches recently admitting that mistakes
had been made in the Cultural Revolution. The intent of
these speeches presumably was to lay the groundwork for
a departure from "revolutionary"
Mao has been pushing.
general secretary of the party Teng
domestic policies which'
former 50X1
Hslao-ping has had
his party standing partially restored. Teng was removed
from a position of authority in the summer of 1966, at
the outset of Mao's campaign against the leaders of the
party apparatus.
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rum /PLC (JIN L,
Harsh Maoist policies continue to be pushed in the
countryside, and this could foster further divisive ten-
dencies. The regime appears again to be tampering with
rural institu.Eions in an attempt to make them more egali-
tarian, and is engaged in a crash effort to transfer large
numbers of urban dwellers to rural areas to share work and
hardship with the peasants. These measures are provoking
considerable public dissatisfaction.
13
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FUR 111E PRESIDEN1 ONLY
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The rapid growth of irrational Arab terrorism has
become the most aggravating problem in the Arab-Israeli
impasse. Terrorist actions are expanding in both fre-
quency and scope. Rivalries between the several terror-
ist-organizations and the irresponsibility of their-lead-
ership compound the problem. The growing public popular-
ity of the terrorist movement has left Arab political
leaders, such as Nasir and King Husayn, on the sidelines.
helplessly watching their own influence and power erode.
Meanwhile, the terrorists' popularity has forced all
Arab leaders into greater cooperation with the terror-
ists;
Lebanon which up to now had managed to remain-un-
involved is the latest victim of this expanding disrup-
tive farce. Caught between militants, mostly Muslim,
Arab Nationalist elements, and the treditionally,pro-
Western Christian sector, the country's political lead-
ers haveloecome'increasingly paralyzed while awaiting
whattheybelieve to be an inevitable Israeli strike.
Such an attack could only-increasetheir ineffective-
ness and could result in the lops of territory in south-
ern Lebanon.,
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'kfrt, I 111 E. r NE31E/Ed NI I JJ N L 1
In Israel too,,emotionalism seems to be taking over
from reason. A "siege mentality" has set in which has
brought'with it a growing belligerency, toward the Arabs
and the outside world. The traditional sense of'isola-
tion has grown enormously and the combination of these
factors has resulted in a willingness'to go it alone.
Compounding the situation is a growing suspicion that
Israel has lost its favored position in the Western'
World, and especially in. the. US.
The French arms embargo has brought about a contemp-
tuous anger toward France, Israel's old ally and arms
supplier. At the same time Israel sees itself threat-
ened by a Soviet-US "peace" deal. Israel fears that the
Soviet Union aims at getting it to relinquish the Arab
territory, it now holds without .a firm and d?rable.,peace
treaty with the Arabs.
?Israelcoptinues to have faith
that:its present-tactics will bx.ing.the Arabs,to. .heeL;
-
Moscow probably has several motivations in propos-
ing its peace plan. It wishes to minimize the possibil-
ity of another outbreak of war whidh could well create
a crisis between it and the US. It may also wish to
lessen the threat that Moscow's Arab client regimes
might be toppled as a consequence of the continued stale-
mate and the rise of terrorist influence. Of course
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the USSR would also benefit if the Suez Canal were re-
opened. What Moscow may not realize is that it may be
too late to cut down the terrorist menace to the Arab
regimes and that, even if Nasir and Husayn were to make
peace, they are not likely to be able to make it stick
with the terrorists: Many elements in the several Arab
armies sympathize with terrorism. The general Western
and US view is that, while the plan cannot be accepted
in toto, it may provide a basis on which to build.
Jarring's mission, long nearly moribund, might get
a new lease on life because of the Soviet peace propos-
als. With the active support of the Soviet Union in the
peace-making process', Jarring may feel sufficiently en-
couraged to continue his conversations with the parties.
Thus Moscow's plan may serve to slow temporarily the
rapid deterioration of the situation in the Middle East,
but the prospects are slim that it can be anything'but
a 'palliative, and it may end in hardened positions all
around.. There will be no letup in terrorism, since the
terrorists have: no intention of making peace with Ierael
and the Israelis will stick firmly to their reprisal for-
mula,. Thus; a somewhat expanded irregular military ac-
tion probably will develop.
The chance of another war may increase in the months
ahead. If experience is any guide, there will be a se-
ries of military alerts and alarms on either or both sides
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triggered by rumor, fragmentary information or border
incidents, and each of these enhances the possibilities
for major clashes. For example, for the past two weeks
the Arabs have managed to convince themselves wrongly--
probably with Soviet help--that the Israelis are mob-
ilized and about to launch an attack.
Unless the Soviets intervened, any all-out War in
the predictable future would be lost by the Arabs. The
dispersal of aircraft shelters by Egypt would probably
make an Israeli victory more costly and the war would
last much longer, than in June 1967. This would open
the possibility of an expansion of the conflict.
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