THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 AUGUST 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993917
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 30, 1973

Declassified in Parr-1 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RD-P79T00936A011700030013-1
The President's Daily Brief
30 August 1973
45
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 511E1),(2),(31
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
30 August 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Cambodia, insurgent forces yesterday moved against
the government defense line south of Phnom Penh and
continued heavy pressure on the provincial capital
of Kompong Cham. (Page 1)
The declaration of union issued yesterday by Presi-
dents Qadhafi and Sadat pays lip service to the
Libyan principle of full merger but actually gives
Egypt the gradual approach to union that it has
sought. (Page 2)
The brevity of the Tenth Party Congress held in Pe-
king from August 24 to 28 suggests that essential
tasks were accomplished with relative ease but that
the leadership preferred to avoid a full discussion
of controversial issues. (Page 3)
The Soviets are launching a major anti-Chinese cam-
paign and have stimulated a similar movement by
their East European allies. (Page 5)
Chancellor Brandt's emissary, State Secretary Grabert,
was in Moscow this week, presumably to discuss dif-
ficulties that have developed in Soviet - West German
relations in recent months. (Page 7)
Chile's cabinet reshuffle on Tuesday and the meet-
ing of army generals on the same day appear to have
had little impact on the slow-motion crisis there.
(Page 8)
Argentina is granting long-term credits to selected
Latin American countries as a means of furthering
both political and economic goals. (Page 9)
Notes on Kuwait and Canada appear on Page 10.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
urgent attack
554558 8-73 CIA
Statuteyiles
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
?CAMBODIA
Khmer insurgent forces yesterday moved against
the government defense line south of Phnom Penh by
cutting Route 201. A government counterattack, how-
ever, has forced a partial insurgent withdrawal.
Although one mile of road was still in Communist
hands late in the day, a subsequent unconfirmed re-
port claimed the government had regained control of
the road. So far there has been little indication
of the size of the insurgent force involved in the
attack on the southern front. The Communist attack
plan outlined in intercepted messages last week
called for operations in this sector, and a recent
message mentioned the Prek Ho bridge on Route 2 as
a primary objective.
Elsewhere, Routes 4 and 5 remain cut some 30
miles from Phnom Penh. A recent message from the
Khmer Communist Central Committee urges insurgent
units to keep these highways closed "through Sep-
tember and October" so that insurgent forces can
"attack Phnom Penh again." Forty-five miles north-
east of Phnom Penh, the insurgents are keeping
heavy pressure on the provincial capital of Kompong
Cham. Several positions north of the city have
fallen in the past few days, and insurgents have
daily shelled and probed the perimeter to the west
and south. The airstrip just northwest of Kompong
Cham is within easy range of Communist artillery,
and the Cambodian Air Force has begun to airdrop
ammunition and supplies for the city.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LIBYA-EGYPT
The declaration of union issued yesterday
by Presidents Qadhafi and Sadat, while
paying Zip service to the Libyan principle
of full merger, provides for little more
than another round of planning and a few
token steps toward unification. From last-
minute negotiations, Sadat won the gradual
approach to merger that he has sought, and
he can continue his efforts to gain access
to Libya's wealth without relinquishing,
initially at least, any of Egypt's autonomy.
A constituent assembly, composed of 50 delegates
from each country, will be selected on September 1 to
draft a new constitution, nominate a president, and
arrange for a constitutional referendum to be held in
both nations. No specific deadline has been set for
completion of these preparatory measures. The only
gesture toward actual integration is an agreement to
use an Egyptian-Libyan dinar as the unit of account-
ing between the two countries.
Sadat remains free for the time being to
conduct Egypt's affairs on his own terms.
Major policy differences with Libya pose
few problems for the short term, and Sadat
presumably hopes that in time he will be
better able to counter Libyan efforts to
influence Egyptian policy.
Qadhafi must feel the sting of this set-
back in his campaign for complete union.
He has already warned that his participa-
tion in the merger and his leadership of
Libya depend on the direction taken by
the unified state.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA
The Tenth Party Congress held in Peking from
August 24 to August 28 was unusually short.
Its brevity suggests that essential tasks
were accomplished with relative ease, but
that the leadership found it desirable to
avoid a full discussion of controversial
policy issues that were vigorously debated
in the media prior to the congress.
Mao presided; Chou En-lai gave the political
report, a role awarded in the past to the second-
ranking party leader. The congress elected a new,
larger. Central Committee that includes a number of
rehabilitated officials, and adopted a revised party
constitution. It formally expelled Lin Piao from
the party and touched off an attack on him, for the
first time by name, in the media.
This on-going campaign against Lin and his
followers was described as a primary task,
leaving open the possibility of further
purges or demotions. No names are yet
avai-Zable, but the new Politburo, to be
formally "elected" by the new Central
Committee, will apparently be a mix of
moderate officials, radical ideologues,
military men, and elder statesmen.
Preliminary accounts of the proceedings
indicate a meteoric rise in party status
for Wang Hung-wen, a young Shanghai offi-
cial who was aligned with the radical fac-
tion during the Cultural Revolution, but
who is probably more acceptable to mod-
erate leaders than are Madame Mao and
some others. Another significant promo-
tion is that of Chang Chun-chiao, a for-
mer leftist who apparently has also been
moderating his views; he may be perform-
ing the duties of party secretary general.
Judging from the communique, the congress rati-
fied the basic premises and directions of China's
post - Cultural Revolution foreign policy. The
Soviet Union was clearly labeled China's chief enemy,
both as the most dangerous threat to Chinese secu-
rity and as Peking's foremost ideological foe. The
congress called on the Chinese populace to be on
guard against a surprise Soviet attack.
(continued)
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The congress also reaffirmed Peking's strong
interest in playing a leadership role among third
world countries, reiterating its opposition to at-
tempts by the US and the USSR to dominate interna-
tional politics. It called on Communist, Socialist,
and Third World countries as well as states chafing
at big-power "bullying" to join China in a broad,
united front against "imperialism, colonialism,
neocolonialism, and in particular against the hege-
monism of the two superpowers."
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CHINA
--the Soviet Politburo communique on the Crimea
meeting of August 3 cited the need for a "col-
lective analysis" of current issues, marking
high-level interest in a new conference;
--a Pravda article on August 7 by "I. Aleksandrov"
(a pseudonym associated in the past with major
policy pronouncements on China) expressed Mos-
cow's concern over communist unity and the need
for broader policy coordination by communist
states;
--Brezhnev, speaking on August 15 at a public
rally at Alma-Ata, gave a gloomy assessment of
Soviet relations with China; he echoed
Aleksandrov and cited Peking's "subversive ac-
tivity against the socialist countries" as the
cause for current Sino-Soviet tensions;
--finally, a second Aleksandrov article in
Pravda on August 26 invoked the three most re-
cent communist conferences (1957, 1960, and
1969) and accused the Chinese leadership of in-
citing "individual communist parties...to as-
sume a 'neutral' position with respect to the
principal disagreements between the Maoist and
the international communist movement."
In addition to Moscow's own efforts against the
Chinese, the Soviets have been orchestrating a simi-
lar movement by their staunchest allies in Eastern
Europe.
(continued)
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Despite these indications of a preliminary
campaign to call another international
meeting, it does not appear that the So-
viet leaders have really faced up to the
serious problems such a conference would
create for themselves.
Even the question whether to hold a con-
ference would be divisive, given the in-
evitable opposition of the Romanians and
the Yugoslays, various West European Com-
munists, and the North Vietnamese, and
the reluctance of many others to stand up
and be counted.
If history is a guide, any preliminary
soundings with regard to an international
meeting would be accompanied by letters
to the Italian and French parties, for
example, explaining the need for a con-
ference. Until evidence such as this ap-
pears--and it would come promptly through
penetrations in these parties--the current
propaganda campaign must be considered
more a threat than a decision by the Krem-
lin to call for another meeting.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR - WEST GERMANY
Chancellor Brandt's emissary, State Secretary
Grabert, was in Moscow this week, presumably to dis-
cuss difficulties that have developed in Soviet -
West German relations in recent months.
--In negotiations to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hun-
gary, Bonn has argued that its prospective em-
bassies should represent West Berlin institu-
tions as well as its citizens. The three East
European countries, undoubtedly at Soviet in-
sistence, have refused to accommodate Bonn on
the issue.
The Soviet Union believes West Germany is
trying to expand ties with West Berlin
beyond the limits permitted by the Quadri-
partite Agreement. The Soviets have,
therefore, insisted on a narrow interpre-
tation of its terms.
--Moscow takes the position that foreign and
national forces in Central Europe should be
reduced at the same time and in the same pro-
portion. The Soviets seem to assume that Bonn
holds an opposite view, and they apparently
fear that reductions applying only to US and
Soviet forces would leave the West Germans
disproportionately strong.
--Moscow holds Bonn responsible for much of the
trouble it has had at CSCE preparatory talks
on the subject of "freer movement," a ?topic
which is likely to remain a major source of
East-West discord at the CSCE second stage,
which begins next month. The Soviets maintain
that West German pressure on the issue is di-
rected at developing closer ties with East
Germany.
--Finally, Moscow is disappointed that detente
has not generated more economic cooperation
between the USSR and West Germany. Brezhnev
requested lower interest rates on German cred-
its in May
A West German draft proposal
for subsidizing export credits to foreign coun-
tries, which is likely to be approved within
the next two weeks, however, would remove a
serious obstacle to the conclusion of indus-
trial cooperation projects.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
The cabinet reshuffle on Tuesday and the meet-
ing of army generals on the same day have evidently
had little impact on the situation. The slow-motion
crisis continues and President Allende has seen fit
to cancel his trip to Algiers for the nonaligned
conference next week.
The President's hand has nonetheless been
at least temporarily strengthened. The
three military services and the national
police are again all represented in his
cabinet. Indecisiveness among high army
generals?their meeting apparently ended
in a decision to wait and see--seems to
have precluded for now a concerted mili-
tary effort to force Allende to modify
his policies.
The new army chief, General Pinochet, is giving
first priority to overcoming disunity in his service.
He is also trying to overcome long standing animosity
among all the military services.
Extremist groups of both the right and the left
have suffered reverses in recent days. The leader
of the rightist Fatherland and Freedom group has been
arrested and is said to have confessed his group's
responsibility for recent widespread terrorism.
Leaders of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left
are said to have decided to act more cautiously after
seizure of some of their personnel and arms caches
by naval units.
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ARGENTINA
Argentina is granting long-term credits to
selected Latin American countries as a means of
furthering both political and economic goals. The
credits--$10 million to Peru, $100 million to Chile,
and $200 million to Cuba--are intended to challenge
US-Brazilian influence in South America as well as
to promote the export of Argentina's manufactured
products.
These arrangements would strengthen Argen-
tine ties with the Andean Group and would
promote Peron's "third position" in foreign
policy. The credits to Cuba have the ad-
ditional advantage, for both countries, of
challenging OAS members that still favor
sanctions against Havana.
From an economic standpoint, this aggres-
sive credit policy will indeed stimulate
nontraditional exports since the three
countries involved would not purchase
large amounts of Argentine manufactures
without these generous credit terms. On
the other hand, Argentina can maintain
these markets only by continuing to grant
large credits--a policy that could even-
tually cause difficulties in view of the
poor payment record of the three countries.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Kuwait: The government has asked Gulf Oil and
British Petroleum, who own the Kuwait Oil Company,
to give up their concession rights and enter into
an agreement similar to that existing in Iran--
100-percent ownership by the government. The com-
panies would be compensated and would continue to
operate the oilfields and market the oil as con-
tractors. The 100-percent feature would not neces-
sarily be a financial improvement for Kuwait--that
would depend on the amount of compensation and the
price at which the companies buy oil from the gov-
ernment--but its political attractiveness is likely
to lead Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi to seek
renegotiation of their own agreements with Western
oil companies.
Canada: The special session of the House of
Commons called today to deal with the national rail-
road strike will force the minority Trudeau govern-
ment to contend with debates on inflation and spi-
raling food prices. Representatives of the New
Democratic Party--the government's informal coali-
tion partner--are thinking about forcing an elec-
tion over the price of food
I The leader of the Conservative opposition
has announced he will seek a vote of confidence,
but the administration should be able to weather
it if the NDP stays in line.
10
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP9T009-36A011700030013-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700030013-1