THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 MAY 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007963
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 22, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
May 22, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category 5001,121.(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
May.22, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Israeli aircraft yesterday hit fedayeen positions
several times in southern Lebanon and near Mount Her-
mon, and Tel Aviv apparently intends to continue this
policy.
India?
/ (Page 2)
The tone of the communique marking the end of the
visit of Libyan Prime Minister Jallud to Moscow, and
its failure to mention specific new agreements ex-
cept for a trade pact, suggest that Jallud's negotia-
tions were only partially successful. (Page 3)
The North Vietnamese are strengthening their air de-
fenses in the central part of South Vietnam. (Page 4)
The King of Thailand will probably decide within the
next few days whether to accept the resignation of
Prime Minister Sanya and his government. (Page 5)
Poland. (Page 6)
/Northern Ireland
(Page 6)
At Annex is presented an initial assessment of the
impact India's entry into the nuclear club is likely
to have on key countries.
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Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon
Beirut
Mediterranean
asb ya?
Al Kiswah
S-y r a
Israeli Line
Maalot ??????-?
Lake
Tiberias
Syrian Line
967 Cease-
Fire Line
Shaykh
Miskin
555893 5-74 CIA
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MIDDLE EAST
Israeli aircraft yesterday again hit fedayeen
positions several times' in southern Lebanon and
around Hasbaiya near Mount Hermon. An Israeli mili-
tary spokesman said these actions were part of a
"new phase" in Israel's war against Arab guerrillas
after the attack at Maalot last week, a statement
which probably means that the Israelis intend to
continue punitive strikes against fedayeen bases
and facilities inside Lebanon.
the Is-
raelis also bombed targets near Mahrunah. A press
dispatch from Beirut claimed that Lebanese troops
engaged an Israeli patrol in southeastern Lebanon,
and that Israeli artillery shelled Lebanese positions
in the area shortly afterwards.
Fighting on the Golan front
at the reduced level of the past
sporadic exchanges of mortar and
reported.
continued
few days.
artillery
yesterday
Only
fire were
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INDIA
An initial assessment of the impact India's entry
into the nuclear club is likely to have on key coun-?
tries is presented at.Annex.
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? _
USSR-LIBYA
The tone of the communique marking the end of
the visit of Libyan Prime Minister Jallud to Moscow
and its failure to mention specific new agreements ?
except for a trade pact suggest that Jallud's nego-
tiation e were only partially successful.
?Both sides set aside ideological differences to
emphasize their common opposition to "imperialist
'advances" in the Middle East. They undoubtedly hope
that the visit will promote the isolation of their
mutual antagonist--Egypt's President Sadat. Never-
theless, the characterization of the talks as "frank"
and the absence of specifics on the Middle East sug-
gest that the USSR and Libya continue to differ on
political tactics in the region.,
Jallud undoubtedly discussed military purchases
during his meetings with Kosygin and a two-hour ses-
sion with Defense Minister Grechko, but there was no
mention of military sales in the communique?
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese are strengthening their air
defenses in the central part of South Vietnam. In re-
cent weeks, increasingly effective Communist fire
has downed a number of South Vietnamese aircraft.
If the losses continue to mount, Saigon could be
forced to restrict its air operations over heavily
defended Communist territory, thus giving the Commu-
nists a significant local firepower advantage.
In northern MR 3, South Vietnamese aircraft
frequently encounter fairly heavy antiaircraft and
SA-7 surface-to-air missile fire. The small, shoul-
der-launched SA-7 has been particularly effective
despite its limited range. In the Tay Ninh area,
?the Communists have downed at least six aircraft
with SA-7s since January, including an EC-47 hit on
May 13.
South Vietnamese aircraft operating in MR 3 may
soon be facing an even more effective Communist air
defense. According to intercepts
a North Vietnamese AAA regiment is moving through
eastern Cambodia apparently en route to the COSVN
area. This unit has fire-control radar, and the
South Vietnamese do not have the capability to
counter such equipment.
In the western highlands of MR 2, the Commu-
nists over the past few months have doubled their
air defenses by bringing,in two AAA regiments from
southern Laos. To minimize losses, South Vietnam-
ese pilots have adopted the tactic of dropping their
bombs from higher, safer altitudes, resulting in
less accurate bombing.
Since the end of 1973 Hanoi has reduced its
air defenses in MR 1, but it still has an imposing
force in the region--an air defense division, 16
AAA regiments, and a SA-2 surface-to-air missile
regiment. Most of this, however, is concentrated
in the two northern provinces of MR 1, an area the
government rarely overflies.
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THAILAND
The King will probably decide within the next
few days whether to accept the resignation of Prime
Minister Sanya and his government. Sanya tendered
his resignation yesterday against the advice of his
cabinet and presumably of the King as well, and the
monarch may hope to persuade him to remain in office
until elections can be held in the fall.
However the current cabinet crisis is resolved,
it will set back the orderly transition from mili-
tary rule to democratic government. Many Thai skep-
tics--especially within the military--will view the
present paralysis of the government as characteristic
of civilian rule.
There is no obvious candidate to replace Sanya.
His resignation, however, may be merely a prelude to
a cabinet reshuffle. In recent weeks there has been
growing impatience with the government's indecisive-
ness on economic and administrative problems,
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NOTES
USSR?Poland:
Northern Ireland:
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_ _ _ _ _
POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM INDIA'S NUCLEAR TEST
Many countries have just begun to sort out the
implications of India's nuclear test for them. It
is nonetheless possible at this early stage to point
to some of the factors they are likely to weigh in
reaching considered judgments as to how they should
react.
Initial reaction in India to the nuclear explo-
sion on May 18 has been euphoric. Except for pre-
dictable criticism from one communist faction, the
event has evoked widespread enthusiasm. This en-
thusiasm, however, is likely to dissipate before
long because of the hardships imposed by growing in-
flation and food shortages. India's economic prob-
lems may even get worse if, because of the test, the
country runs into trouble securing new help from
abroad. New Delhi hopes to receive more than $1
billion in additional aid this year to meet the soar-
ing costs of imported petroleum, grain, and ferti-
,lizer. The Indians will probably also ask for re-
scheduling of existing debts.
Pakistan
The slow movement in recent months toward im-
proved Indo-Pakistani relations may be interrupted
as a result of the test. Prospects for an early
resumption of trade and diplomatic relations are
poorer than they were. Islamabad has said it will
ask the permanent members of the UN Security Coun-
cil to provide Pakistan with a "nuclear umbrella,"
but the Pakistanis are likely to concentrate on.
getting support and reassurance from China and the
US. While the Pakistanis will probably not go so
far as to seek a formal defense treaty with China,
they will certainly press Peking to reiterate as
strongly as possible China's support of Pakistan's
territorial integrity. President Bhutto no doubt
would like the CENTO countries to issue a joint
condemnation of the Indian test, but his government
will not place much reliance on CENTO itself to pro-
tect Pakistan's security.
USSR
Moscow's desire to maintain close relations with
New Delhi will color the way it handles India's deci-
sion to join the nuclear club, but the Soviets too
will worry about the implications.
(continued)
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On the surface, it would appear that India's
move is a net plus for the USSR. Moscow and New
Delhi are close and the move will enhance India's
position vis-a-vis China. Soviet leaders, however,
share the concern that as more nations acquire the
capacity to develop nuclear weapons, there is a
greater danger these weapons may some day be used.
They lobbied hard, though unsuccessfully, to get
India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and kept
on trying to dissuade India from going nuclear.
The Soviets therefore are probably also con-
cerned that, with India's entry into the nuclear
club, a close relationship with the USSR may become
less useful in Indian eyes. That relationship owes
much to India's fear of China; with a nuclear explo-
sion behind them, the Indians may come to feel some-
what better able to stand up to Peking.
The Soviet press will put the best possible face
on India's move. Behind the scenes, however, the So-
viets will seek reassurance that New Delhi meant what
it said when it announced that India would not develop
nuclear weapons.
China
Peking will presumably conclude that India has
become a more important security problem than before
the explosion. An India hostile to China, close to
the USSR, and eventually with some kind of nuclear
weapons delivery capability could in the long run
complicate Peking's strategic situation. The Indian
nuclear test thus may add some urgency to China's
already evident desire to normalize relations on the
subcontinent and improve Peking's position there.
Chinese instincts in favor of a US naval pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean and warmer US-Indian ties
are likely to be strengthened too. At the same time,
Peking almost certainly would hope that the US pres-
ence would continue to serve as a restraint on India
and the USSR and as an assurance to Pakistan against
a nuclear India.
Japan
Tokyo has openly criticized India's test and will
probably deliver an official protest shortly. The
Japanese are concerned that other countries, particu-
larly Israel, will be tempted to go nuclear. Many
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japanese believe Moscow encouraged India's move in
order to challenge China. The Japanese also are
openly skeptical of the "peaceful" thrust of India's
nuclear program. The Indian test will strengthen
opponents of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Japan.
Israel
Israel's nuclear intentions are shaped by its
concept of security in the Middle East, and Tel Aviv
will not be influenced much by India's test. The
test does, of course, make it psychologically easier
for Israel--or indeed any government with the poten-
tial--to avow or show that it has a nuclear capabil-
ity.
Iran
Although the Shah is unlikely to allow the.In-
dian test to affect newly improved relations with
New Delhi, he may be miffed at being upstaged by
India. Even before the Indian test, the Shah had
expressed interest in cOoperating'with the US to
develop major nuclear, energy facilities in Iran.
So far, Iran has shown no interest in developing
weapons-related technology. Unlike India, Iran has
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Canada
Last summer, Canada informed India that Ottawa
would no longer provide technology, heavy water,
fuel, or any equipment designed for use in power
reactors that are not coveted by safeguard arrange-
ments.' Ottawa took this action because New Delhi
has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Canada is still committed to assist in the con-
struction of a second nuclear power plant in Rajast-
han, which is scheduled to go into service in late
1976. Both Canadian-built reactors use natural ura-
nium and are under safeguard arrangements that pre-
clude their use in a weapons program. Despite Cana-
dian criticism of India's nuclear test, Ottawa has
given no sign that it will terminate existing agree-
ments.
Latin America
In Brazil, the Indian test is likely to spur
nuclear research and development. To many Brazilians,
India has demonstrated that a developing country can
achieve at least this attribute of great power status,
and comment in the Brazilian press is tinged with ad-.
miration. The reaction in Argentina will probably be
similar. Neither government has signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
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