THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014779
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 23, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 23, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 58115(25(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 23, 1975
'Table of?Contents ?
Vietnam: South Vietnamese officials are in unanimous
agreement that President Thieu's decision to re-
sign was a good one. The new government today
called for negotiations with the communists,
but the proposal was rejected immediately.
(Page 1)
Cambodia: The Khmer communists, have called for na-
tional unity, but have not mentioned reconcil-
iation with supporters of the former governmento?
(Page 4)
China: Strains in Peking's relations with Hanoi
have become more evident in recent weeks.
(Page 6)
OPEC: Holdings of US assets by OPEC countries jumped
from $2.7 billion at the end of 1973 to an es-
timated $14.5 billion at the end of 1974.
(Page 8)
Notes: Iraq-Syria; Producer-Consumer Talks; North
Korea - South Korea; Honduras (Pages 9 and 10)
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VIETNAM
There is near unanimous agreement
among senior South Vietnamese civilian
and military officials that President
Thieu's decision to resign was a good
one and that a new government should
be formed immediately to attempt to
arrange negotiations with the commu-
nists. Nguyen Ba Can
would resign and
assist in any way possible to form a
new cabinet. Beyond this, however,
there are few specifics on what form
the new government will take or who
will serve in it.
General "Big" Minh, probably the leading can-
didate to head a new cabinet, is calling for a new
government, which would include staunch anti-Thieu
members of the Catholic and Buddhist opposition
groups. Former vice president Ky wants to lead a
new government, which would include General Vien,
the chairman of the Joint General Staff, and former
prime minister Khiem.
There is also some
maneuvering in the Senate to replace Tran Van Lam
with Buddhist leader Vu Van Mau to allow Mau to
become president when Huong resigns.
The South Vietnamese foreign ministry today
called for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations
without preconditions for a political settlement.
The communists immediately rejected the pro-
posal, however, and their reaction to Thieu's re-
signation provides no encouragement for the prospects
of meaningful negotiations. The Viet Cong's Pro-
visional Revolutionary Government dismissed Thieu's
departure as a "clumsy and deceptive trick." Hanoi's
radio and party daily, Nhan Dan, focused on the
continuation of American support for the new govern-
ment and stated that the US in effect had replaced
one loser with another. The North Vietnamese com-
mentaries also gave considerable attention to the
withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam. They
stated that all Americans could be evacuated "in a
very short time, even in one day, without any dif-
ficulty or obstacle." They went on to condemn
strongly US expressions of concern about communist
reprisals and warned against any US effort to evacu-
ate large numbers of South Vietnamese. US naval
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
vessels moving toward South Vietnamese waters, it
was stated, are far more than would be needed simply
to evacuate Americans.
In short, the communists are continuing to de-
mand a totally new South Vietnamese government and
a quick and total US withdrawal as the price for a
negotiated surrender. At least in their public com-
mentary, there is no hint of give in their position,
but there is the clear implication that time is
quickly running out.
The level of communist shellings and ground
attacks has fallen off sharply as both sides appear
to be getting ready for the next round. The only
significant military action yesterday was the re-
opening of Route 22 south of Tay Ninh city, which
allowed the remainder of the South Vietnamese 25th
Division to withdraw from Tay Ninh city to govern-
ment lines nearer Saigon.
A South Vietnamese estimate of communist inten-
tions and capabilities as of April 22 indicates that
the current lull in military activity is only to
permit the communists time to prepare their forces
and coordinate plans to launch simultaneous attacks
on Saigon and Bien Hoa. The estimate of the ability
of the government forces to resist the final thrust
toward the capital city is bleak.
if the attack is well coordinated, the
government's defenses could crumble in a matter of
hours.
The estimate views Saigon's remaining forces
as battle-weary and understrength and unlikely to
make a determined stand. Many South Vietnamese pi-
lots are believed ready to fly out of the country,
and the military planners are not counting heavily
on their support in a final battle. It is also ex-
pected that most of the territorial forces, police,
and many of the regular soldiers will desert to
look after their families.
Reports of communist plans to move on Saigon
include a coordinated attack of artillery, armor,
sappers, and infantry against the city's Tan Son
Nhut airbase.
the plan calls for a three-
pronged attack against the base from the north,
west, and southwest. The attacking force could in-
clude the North Vietnamese 9th Division, which has
moved into position for an assault on Saigon from
the west.
(continued)
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The communists also are moving on Saigon from
the east in strength, following the abandonment of
Xuan Loc by government forces. The communist plans
apparently call for thrusts toward Vung Tau as well
as direct moves at Bien Hoa and Saigon. The conso-
lidation of forces and the steady overrunning of
government field positions to the southwest of Sai-
gon suggest the communists are about ready to move
at least three divisions up the Route 4 corridor--
the southwestern approach to Saigon.
The North Vietnamese are also moving their
air defense units closer to Saigon.
communists have moved an antiaircraft
fire control radar to within eight miles of Tan Son
Nhut airbase. Several transport aircraft were fired
upon yesterday near Tan Son Nhut but none were
damaged.
The North Vietnamese may soon reopen additional
airfields in central South Vietnam. Communist ground
units were ordered in an April 21 message not to
fire on "our aircraft" which will be active at a
number of southern airfields. The message did not
specify the types of aircraft, but helicopters and
transports probably will be the first to use the
southern bases. Such aircraft have been flying into
Phu Bai and Da Nang airfields on a daily basis for
the past two weeks or so.
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CAMBODIA
In recorded statements carried by
Phnom Penh radio yesterday, Defense Min-
ister and Deputy Prime Minister Khieu
Samphan and Information Minister Hu Nimm
congratulated insurgent forces for "final
victory.. .in the people's war" and thanked
foreign allies for their support. The two
leaders called for "national unity" to
build an "independent, neutral, nonaligned,
and prosperous" Cambodia, but omitted any
specific mention of reconciliation with,
or amnesty for, those who fought or served
on the side of the former government.
There are indications that the communists are
moving ruthlessly against former government of
and Cambodian army officers in at least some
parts of the country.
There is no evidence so far that the commu-
nists are carrying out mass reprisals against the
civilian population. A number of messages, in
fact, have warned occupation forces against actions
that would alienate the civilians. Nonetheless,
communist forces in Battambang city--and presumably
in other recently "liberated" urban centers--are
segregating the population according to "class,"
a move which probably portends at least a period
of indoctrination and "re-education."
(continued)
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There is still no firm evidence as to the fate
of senior figures captured by the communists in
Phnom Penh, but most westerners in the capital are
safe. Six UN staff members got word out yesterday
that they were in the French embassy compound--the
only foreign installation still operating in the
capital. Twenty-six foreign journalists, including
five US newsmen, are also there. The mood in Phnom
Penh, however, appears to be far from hospitable.
,Prince Sihanouk still shows no sign of pre-
paring to leave Peking.
Most
of the Prince's information is apparently coming
from press services in Peking.
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CHINA
Strains in Peking's relations with
Hanoi have become more evident in recent
weeks.
The rapid South Vietnamese military collapse,
coupled with the Cambodian insurgents' victory, ap-
pears to have forced the Chinese to come to grips
with problems they probably would have preferred
to postpone. The Chinese seem to fear that Hanoi
may extend its hegemony over Cambodia and Laos as
well as South Vietnam. Peking also is wary of the
possibility that Moscow will expand its influence
in the area.
Speeches by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and
Defense Minister Yeh Chieng-ying at separate func-
tions in Peking over the weekend reflect the high
level of Chinese concern over Hanoi's intentions.
Both referred to the importance of the Paris Agree-
ment--a theme the North Vietnamese recently have
been downplaying--and Teng pledged Chinese support
to the South Vietnamese communists in their efforts
to "defend their national rights."
Moreover, throughout the ceremonies surround-
ing the visit of North Korean President Kim Il-song
and the celebrations of the insurgent victory in
Cambodia, there was a notable absence of any refer-
ence to Hanoi's role in recent Indochina develop-
ments. While the oversight is probably in part
related to the fiction that only South Vietnamese
are engaged in the fighting there, it is neverthe-
less striking that the Chinese failed to mention
Hanoi during ceremonies that were intended to demon-
strate Asian "revolutionary unity."
It is clear that Peking is concerned that Hanoi
will now move promptly to unify Vietnam. Given
Chinese concern that the North Vietnamese regime has
tilted in the direction of Moscow, Peking probably
hopes that reunification will be postponed until
well in the future. The Chinese almost certainly
recognize, however, that they can do little to
thwart Hanoi on the reunification issue.
(continued)
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Chinese leaders also appear to be working ear-
nestly to maximize Peking's influence over the new
Cambodia government, as well as to limit both North
Vietnamese and Soviet influence. By playing up the
importance of their long-time ally Prince Sihanouk,
the Chinese are clearly indicating that they hope
the Prince will play an important role in the new
government. The relationship appears to be recipro-
cal at this juncture. Sihanouk's Prime Minister
Sarin Chhak has emphasized the importance--both past
and future--of Chinese assistance to Cambodia, re-
ferring specifically to a recent statement attrib-
uted to Mao that the Chinese would stand by the Cam-
bodian people "in the struggles ahead." The impli-
cation is that these "struggles" may involve the
Vietnamese and perhaps the Soviets.
The Chinese have
about their influence
probably believe they
some of the Cambodian
Vietnamese hostility.
long appeared to have doubts
with the Khmer communists, but
are in position to exploit
rebel leaders' latent anti-
The Chinese certainly be-
lieve that some Khmer communists are oriented pri-
marily toward Hanoi.
Both Teng and Yeh decried Soviet actions with
regard to Cambodia. Yeh pointed out that Moscow
had maintained diplomatic ties with the "Lon Nol
clique" after Sihanouk's ouster and that it had
changed its tune only at the last moment. Despite
this, the Chinese are concerned, perhaps somewhat
irrationally, that recent developments in Indochina
will work to Moscow's advantage.
The North Vietnamese themselves seem to antic-
ipate increasing difficulties in their relations
with Peking, at least so far as Cambodia is con-
cerned.
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OPEC
Holdings of US assets by OPEC coun-
tries jumped from $2.7 billion at the end
of 1973 to an estimated $14.5 billion at
the end of 1974. Last December, US hold-
ings made up 20 percent of OPEC foreign
assets, compared with 13 percent a year
earlier.
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Kuwait, and
Iran accounted for 85 percent ?of OPEC's US assets
as of December 1974. The composition of their US
assets differed substantially:
Saudi Arabia held about 50 percent in govern-
ment securities, half of which were medium and
long term.
Venezuela kept more than 90 percent in bank
deposits, mostly time deposits.
Nigeria placed about .95 percent in short-..term
government securities.
Kuwait held almost 45 percent in the form of
eTITITTIes, real estate loans, and corporate.
bonds.
Iran placed 90 percent in short-term assets,
divided about equally between government se-
curities and bank deposits.
Among OPEC members, Indonesia and Venezuela
had the largest share of their assets in the US, 67
percent and 41 percent respectively. Holdings by
Algeria, Ecuador, and Qatar were negligible.
The flow of OPEC investment almost certainly
will decline during most of 1975, as demand for oil
remains weak and the oil-producing countries con-
tinue to boost imports. OPEC's available surplus
for 1975 as a whole will approximate $55 billion,
compared with $58 billion in 1974. The US should
attract a substantial portion of these funds in
spite of the recent decline in US interest rates
relative to rates in Europe and the drop in the
value of the dollar. Barring a serious deteriora-
tion* in Arab-US political relations, OPEC states
probably will invest another $10 billion in the US
in 1975, raising their US holdings to $25 billion.
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The Arab for-
eign ministers, who
met in Cairo Mon-
day, agreed to form
a technical commit-
tee to investigate
Iraq's charge that
,yria is withhold-
sng water from the
Euphrates River.
Syria acknowl-
edges that it took
this step in March
to retaliate for
Baghdad's apparent
involvement in a
recent attempt to
overthrow President
NOTES
Asad.
the Syrian action is affecting
2 to 3 million people in the river valley.
both Syria and Iraq are mov-
ing military units to the border area. While the
Syrians are said to fear Iraq will try to sabotage
the Euphrates Dam,
the Iraqis might try to seize the
oil and gas fields in northeastern Syria.
The West European states, although disappointed
at the breakdown of the producer/consumer talks in
Paris last week, believe the oil-consuming nations
could not have made further concessions to the
Algerian-Zed coalition of oil-producing and develop-
ing states.
Some of the West European states--West Germany
in particular--maintain that Algeria had intended
from the start to bring about a collapse of the
talks and was more interested in bolstering its
claim to leadership of the Third World than in se-
rious negotiations. The British and Dutch feel
that the failure of the French-sponsored meeting
will strengthen the International Energy Agency.
France has indicated that it will continue to work
with the agency.
(continued)
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The North Koreans are taking steps to strengthen
their naval forces near South Korean waters and are
increasing their naval exercises and training. We
have no evidence that Pyongyang is planning aggres-
sive moves against the South, but North Korea's navy
is now better prepared to respond to any further in-
cidents near the disputed islands off the west coast.
With 18 guided-missile boats and eight torpedo
attack submarines, the navy is the North's only mil-
itary service with a clear superiority over its
Southern counterpart. Seoul's navy currently lacks
both missile boats and submarines, and no South Ko-
rean ship can match the firepower of the 20 to 25-
nautical-mile-range Styx missiles carried by North-
ern missile boats.
Honduran Chief of State Lopez, buffeted by the
impact of a major scandal and the determined oppo-
sition of a group of reform-minded lieutenant colo-
nels, was ousted yesterday by the Superior Defense
Council.
His replacement, armed forces commander Juan
Alberto Melgar, is likely to play only a temporary
figurehead role because of his past close associa-
tion with Lopez and because the ascendant lieuten-
ant colonels have not yet agreed on a member of
their own group to replace him. These officers re-
sent the image of their country as a corrupt and
backward "Banana Republic" and are determined to
promote economic development and agrarian reform.
They can be expected to maintain Honduras' close
ties with the US.
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