THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 JULY 1970

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005977593
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 29, 1970
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Declassified in Part'- S'anitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T60936A008500270001-4 The President's Daily Brief 29 July 1970 27 50X1 o et Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 July 1970 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS The current situation in Cambodia is discussed on Page 1. A Pathet Lao delegation is expected to arrive in Vientiane on Friday for talks with Souvanna Phouma, but there are no signs that the Communist negotiating position has softened. (Page 2) Jordan( the UAR muzzled fedayeen broadcasting facilities. (Page 3) Soviet- I (Page 4) The warming trend in Chinese -North Korean relations, has not resolved all their differences. (Page 5) In Panama, General Torrijos appears to be backing out of his promise to extend a US military base agree- ment. (Page 6) Last week 13 European countries agreed in principle to form a unified space organization. (Page 6) The upcoming presidential elections in Lebanon are discussed at annex. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Cambodia: Current Situation 0 Communist-controlled location 1 '....7A41 Communist-controlled 99434 7-70 CIA 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T06936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CAMBODIA Government forces were driven from their posi- tions at Kirirom yesterday and headed south toward Route 4.. The retreat probably is only temporary, however, and new government efforts to,retake.the- reSort town are likely...to be. launched soon. The government also has pulled out. of.its-com- mand.post at-ThMar Keo, northwest of.Kompong.Speu city. Most.of the villagers living in the sparsely populated area around the.post.reportedly are:Cam- bodian- Communists.or-sympathizers Yesterday a government, spokesman announced' that CaMbodian troops, with the help.of South Vietnamese' infantrymen,-recaptured the cement factory. at. Chakrei Ting, in the southern coastal province of Kampot4 Earlier reports indicated that the government bat- talion defending the plant' withdrew'southward' toward Kampot city on 27 July, after being overwhelmed by atlarge enemy force.. In the only other significant military action,. the Communists. ambushed a 14-truck, government-convoy yesterday on_Route 7,_north of Kompong Cham city. South Vietnamese units movingalong Route 7 have en- gaged-the enemy. 20 miles-southeast of Kompong.Cham city and claim to haveltilled 19 eneMy troops 50X1 50X1 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY LAOS a Communist delegation led by Souk Vongsak will arrive? in Vien- tiane on 31 July for talks with Souvanna Phouma. Souk was a minister, in the Vientiane coalition gov- ernment until 1964. There are no indications that Souk will offer any fundamental change in the Pathet Lao negotiating position. Indeed, Pathet. Lao spokesmen in a number of capitals dur- ing the past week have been taking a rather negative position in referring to the pros- pects for talks. The Laotian Communist de legate in Hanoi characterized Souk's trip to see Souvanna as only a "good will ges- ture" and dismissed the idea that there has been any change in the Pathet Lao to- ward a settlement. Soviet press accounts of interviews with Pathet Lao officials in Paris and Vientiane have reiterated the usual line that no meaningful talks can begin until all US bombing in Laos has stopped. These suggestions of inflexibility in the Communist attitude maybe.only an effort to stake out a position from which the bargaining can begin. On the other hand, Hanoi may have no intention of arranging for genuine negotiations at this time and may only be seeking to stage some extended discussions which will serve to restrict Vientiane's freedom of action. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 56X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY JORDAN-UAR-FEDAYEEN Egypt also has moved to curb the Palestine guerrillas. Yesterday Cairo police closed the of- fices of both the Voice of Palestine and the Voice of Fatah, probably in reaction to fedayeen criticism of Nasir's acceptance of the US peace proposals and to a fedayeen demonstration in Amman Monday in which Nasir was called a coward. Similar demonstrations occurred again yesterday. The crackdown reflects Nasir's sensitivity to Arab criticism of his acceptance of the US peace initiative. The fedayeen facili- ties are used primarily for broadcasting anti-Israeli propaganda but they have on occasion been used for attacking Arab regimes con- sidered to be anti-fedayeen. Although a government spokesman indicated that the closure is only temporary, he gave no idea of when the fedayeen would be allowed to resume broadcasting. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY USS R FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 4 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY COMMUNIST CHINA - NORTH KOREA Despite improved relations between China and North Korea, continuing differences between the two were evident in their observance of the 17th anni- versary of the Korean War armistice on Monday. The Chinese barely touched on bilateral matters and focused more on broad topics of more immediate con- cern to Peking. The Chinese used the occasion to criticize US "peace frauds" in Indochina and to con- demn the US for flouting the Geneva agreements. Pe- king also continued to emphasize the need for an Asian-wide "union" against the US, Japan, and, in- directly, the USSR. The North Koreans, on the other hand, stuck to matters close to home. The head of a high-ranking military delegation visiting Peking, for example, compared the present situation on the Korean penin- sula to that existing on the eve of the Korean War. Chinese official statements appeared to play down the possibility, of an imminent crisis in Korea and stuck to the standard, vague pledges of support for North Korea if the US "reimposes" war. Peking's restraint on Korean issues re- flects its policy of discouraging North Korean military "adventures," while Pyongyang's failure to condemn the So- viets is a clear indication that North Korea intends to maintain an independent position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Even though Pyongyang has not received any ma- jor military deliveries from the USSR in over a year, it does not want to ruin its chances of extracting aid from both Moscow and Peking. The Korean military delegation now in Pe- king probably is asking for military hard- ware (such as tanks., patrol craft, and jet aircraft) no longer being received from the Soviets and the bargaining promises to be difficult. Peking may furnish some mili- tary aid but only in return for North Korea's support for China's Asian "united front" scheme and more cooperation in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Even with such back- ing, however, the Chinese will limit arms aid to Korea because of their own mounting domestic defense needs. 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTES Panama: General Torrijos may default on his oral commitment to General Westmoreland to extend the Rio Hato base agreement, which expires on 23 August. Rio Hato is used as a training area and air base and is the only US military installation in Panama except for the Canal Zone itself. Tor- rijos, using a thinly veiled threat of anti-US stu- dent agitation, recently told Ambassador Sayre that it would be politically impossible to extend the agreement without "something to show for it." Western Europe: Space' ministers of 13 European countries agreed in principle last week to form a "European NASA" to replace three multilateral Euro- pean space organizations. They also decided to send a delegation headed by Theo Lefevre, the Belgian science minister, to Washington to discuss European participation in US space programs. The meeting was a bench mark in the development of a genuine Euro- pean approach to space but some familiar problems remain. France reserved its position on the insti- tutional arrangements for the new organization, and France, Germany, and Belgium refuse to make financial commitments beyond 1971. Bolivia;/ FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY LEBANON Fuad Shihab, who was president from 1958- 64, is the best bet to be named president in the election which will probably occur within the next week or so. Shihab, who has not yet formally announced his candi- dacy, has the public support of the Parlia- mentary Democratic Front, a loose, ,mainly Muslim grouping that has a narrow majority in the 99-member Chamber of Deputies that elects the president. Former president Chamoun and right-wing Phalange Party Zeader. JumayyiZ are also potential contenders, but their chances would depend on making deals with individual Democratic Front members to cross over in the secret ballot. They, must also agree themselves on which one should be the beneficiary of support from the Zarge Maronite Christian group in the chamber that strongly opposes Shihab for his alleged pro-Muslim tendencies. The basic issue in the election is Lebanese policy toward other Arab countries. Shihab, like the other contenders, is a Maronite Christian, the eastern-rite Catholic group to which most Lebanese Christians belong. According to the National Covenant of 1943 which apportioned political power between the Muslims and Christians, the next pres- ident must be a Christian. Shihab's sup- porters are generally pro-Nasir, however, and urge closer ties between Lebanon and its Arab neighbors. The opposition wants to maintain Lebanon's traditional detach- ment from the infighting of Arab politics. Shihab is more willing than either Chamoun or Jumayyil to accept increased Lebanese involvement in the Arab world, but he is, basically a moderate. He would try to con- tain pressure from militants who want the government to cooperate closely with the fedayeen or to take an active pro-Nasir Zine on Arab matters. Although Shihab would be faced with competing pressures, and might waver as he balanced them, he is a former army commander in chief and still has heavy influence in the army (continued) A-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Pa1-71 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY The fedayeen problem has been kept out of the election thus far. The potential can- didates are aware that it is explosive and as the next president each would be faced with the same problem as outgoing President Hilu: maintaining enough control over the commandos to prevent Lebanon from becoming another Jordan. A-2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T009-36A008500270001-4 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500270001-4