THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 NOVEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993620
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 11, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
11 November 1972
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 50(11,121.13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 November 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Vietnam
(Sage 1)
In Laos, yang Pao is preparing new offensive opera-
tions toward the southern tip of the Plaine des
Jarres. (Page 2)
(Page 3)
(Page 4)
Chancellor Brandt is skillfully exploiting the
inter-German treaty in the election campaign.
(Page 5)
At Annex, we examine the inter-German treaty in
relation to Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik and
analyze what the agreement does for each side.
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VI ETNAM
1
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553809 11-72 CIA ?
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LAOS
General yang Pao is preparing another attempt
to advance north toward the Plaine des Jarres.
Several understrength irregular battalions, about
1,300 troops, are being airlifted to Khang Kho to
join the 500-800 irregulars holding the govern-
ment's only remaining high ground position in the
hills about four miles south of the Plaine. They
will attempt to secure the area in preparation
for offensive operations toward the Plaine.
An intercept of 9 November shows that Commu-
nist units have been alerted to the possibility
of another government advance.
The North Vietnamese still have major
elements of three infantry regiments in
the area, in addition to armor and ar-
tillery units. They should be able to
repel Vang Pao's troops. Nevertheless,
the push will hamper any Communist con-
centration against the government's de-
fense lines between the Plaine and Long
Tieng.
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USSR
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USSR
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WEST GERMANY
Chancellor Brandt is skillfully exploiting
the inter-German treaty in the current election
campaign. The publicity attending each of the
stages involved in concluding the treaty has
served to keep Brandt in the limelight and to
focus public attention on Ostpolitik, his strong
point, rather than on domestic issues such as
inflation, where he is vulnerable.
Opposition leader Barzel's public comments
on the treaty have been cautious, but he is worried
about its effect on the elections. Yesterday,
Barzel complained bitterly to Ambassador Hillen-
brand about the Four Power declaration on the
treaty, characterizing the declaration as inter-
ference in the German electoral campaign. He
sharply criticized the treaty itself and said it
was unacceptable as it now stands. Barzel said
he would accordingly make a comprehensive state- ,
ment on the subject before the elections, although
he did not intend to criticize the allies in that
statement.
Despite the treaty, the election is far
from in the bag for Brandt. A late Oc-
tober poll?taken before the treaty but
after the announcement of a further rise
in the cost-of-living index in September--
showed new slippage for the government
parties. Although the coalition Social
Democrats and Free Democrats together
remained slightly ahead of the opposi-
tion, the Free Democrats hovered just
above the minimum five percent needed
for parliamentary representation.
Aside from the treaty's immediate impact
on the election, it is a development of
major importance for West Germany and
its role in Europe in the era of detente.
These aspects are discussed at Annex.
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NOTES
Chile:
Cuba-Caribbean:
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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY
The inter-German treaty initialed in Bonn on 8
November is a compromise. Although the negotiators
were unable to resolve sharply opposed views on the
fundamentals of relations between the two states,
the treaty establishes a basis on which East and
West Germany can take up formal relations with each
other for the first time. Beyond this, the pact
complements the West German treaties with the Soviet
Union and Poland of 1970 in satisfying Eastern con-
ditions for more normal relations, and is thus a
principal element in Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik.
The treaty is part and parcel of Brandt's innovative
effort over the past decade to ease East-West ten-
sions and lift the mortgages of the war--all with
the greater goal--in Brandt's view--of promoting
conditions in Central Europe conducive to eventual
German reunification. Although an inter-German
treaty was not a prerequisite for holding a Confer-
ence on European Security or beginning MBFR talks,
it nevertheless serves to generate new momentum in
this area.
For Pankow, the treaty opens the way to the
long-elusive Western acceptance of its legitimacy,
which in turn will lead to general international
recognition, membership in the UN and other inter-
national organizations, and participation in in-
ternational accords and conventions. For Moscow
the treaty, along with the earlier Soviet and Polish
treaties, provides a kind of confirmation of postwar
Central European "political realities."
The treaty will quickly open the way to com-
pleting Ostpolitik's structural framework. Bonn
and Prague will soon renew their efforts to find
a compromise on the issue of the Munich Agreement
of 1938--the major roadblock to conclusion of a
treaty of reconciliation. Bonn will then move to
establish diplomatic relations with Hungary and
Bulgaria. The ensuing fleshing out of Ostpolitik
will see a gradual expansion of West German eco-
nomic and political activity throughout Eastern
Europe.
(continued)
Al
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The treaty undermines some fundamental preten-
sions of both states--East Germany as the nucleus
of a Communist Germany, and West Germany as the only
legitimate German government--but leaves others un-
touched. The statement that the two continue to
disagree on issues of principle, "including the na-
tional question," allows Bonn to maintain that there
is still a common German nationhood. It also permits
Pankow to assert that common nationhood disappeared
with the creation of two German states. Pankow re-
fused to include in the treaty itself references to
the absence of a World War II peace treaty and to
continuing Four Power rights and responsibilities
in Germany and Berlin, on grounds they would impugn
East Germany's sovereignty. Pankow did, however,
agree to exchange letters acknowledging that the
treaty does not affect Allied rights and respon-
sibilities, :and Bonn can point to the new Four Power
declaration affirming these rights as safeguarding
its position. The agreement to exchange "permanent
representatives" is a compromise designed to meet
Pankow's desire to establish diplomatic relations
and Bonn's insistence on not recognizing East Ger-
many as a foreign country.
Brandt never expected the treaty to "bring
down the Berlin Wall." He does, however, hope to
inaugurate an era of easing tensions and abating
hostilities in inter-German relations, and to im-
prove the conditions of people in both countries.
Thus, for him, almost as important as the .treaty
itself are the ancillary agreements that have been
or soon will be reached with East Germany. As
arranged during the negotiations, the East Germans
will open a number of new border crossing points,
permit children to join parents who fled to West
Germany, and allow West Germans residing near the
frontier to visit adjacent areas in East Germany.
For the first time Bonn and Pankow will accept and
accredit each other's press correspondents.
Recognition of East Germany
Several countries including many NATO allies,
are eager to recognize East Germany for what they
see as both political and economic advantage. Bonn
is seeking reaffirmation by NATO that recognition
should await treaty ratification, but Denmark and
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Norway claim to be under domestic pressure and may
disregard any NATO strictures.
the British are urging that
the US, British, and French missions in Berlin begin
consultations to coordinate their approaches to
Pankow. The neutrals--Sweden, Finland, Austria,
and Switzerland--may move as soon as late November
or early December, regardless of Bonn's views.
The international recognition and UN membership
that the inter-German treaty will bring in its train
should give an unprecedented boost, at least in the
short term, to the self-confidence of the East German
regime. At home, however, it will have to maintain
its guard against any erosion of its control stemming
from increased contacts with West Germany. Interest
in travel to the West has revived since the conclu-
sion of the Berlin agreements, and there has been a
marked increase in refugees.
Internationally, Pankow can be expected to
follow the Soviet lead closely, for East Germany
remains the linchpin of Moscow's European security
system. Nevertheless, it is possible that CSCE and
MBFR will evolve in such a way as to weaken the
East German - Soviet interdependency and to promote
assertiveness in Pankow.. There is evidence, even
aside from Ulbricht's dismissal, that Ostpolitik
has caused some strain in Pankow's relations with
Moscow.. Soviet diplomats inkrolved in the Four
Power negotiations on the Berlin Agreement in 1971'
and in. the talks this year concerning UN membership
of both German states have testified to East German
sensitivity and stubbornness on issues affecting
Pankow's conception of its sovereignty.
With Ostpolitik, of which this treaty is a
major component, West Germany has served notice
that it has come of age in international affairs.
The essence of the new spirit in Bonn is that West
German governments henceforth will be more asser-
tive of what they perceive to be their national
self-interest. Although West Germany's orientation
will remain essentially Western, leaders in Bonn
will increasingly be dealing with the Soviets,
Chinese, and Eastern Europeans, and these states
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will have a greater presence in West Germany than
heretofore. Should Barzel replace Brandt, however,
he would be politically more limited in the pursuit
of Ostpolitik.
In any event, the inter-German treaty does not
necessarily signal the end of all the old cold-war
tensions. There are still many differences and much
mutual distrust that will not be quickly overcome.
Moreover, the treaty is something of a gamble for
Bonn. Pankow's gains--international recognition
and UN-membership--cannot be withdrawn, but West
Germany's are largely intangible. Bonn's concrete
gains lie largely outside the treaty in the areas
of practical improvements granted by Pankow. These
presumably are still subject to restriction when and
if it should suit Soviet and East German interests.
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