THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 MAY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014806
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 24, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
May 24, 1975
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Th0-17-Se?Cf..a..X1
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1).(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
May 24, 1975
Table of Contents
Laos-Thailand: Students and Pathet Lao troops con-
tinue to occupy several AID facilities in and
around Vientiane. Large numbers of Meo tribes-
men are reportedly insistent about following
their former leader, General yang Pao, to Thai-
land. (Page 1)
Lebanon: President Franjiyah's appointment of a
military cabinet yesterday is aimed at re-
versing the deterioration in security condi-
tions. (Page 3)
Portugal: The Socialist and Communist parties yes-
terday began separate talks with the ruling
military council on efforts to save the polit-
ical coalition from collapse. (Page 5)
Notes: Thailand - China - North Vietnam; Portugal;
China (Pages 7 and 8)
Annex:
the Arabs may be
preparing for a resumption of hostil-
ities against Israel.
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T),EA'i A RCA TION
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"Pridominantlx commyinist-controlled area,
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LAOS-THAILAND
Students and Pathet Lao troops con-
tinue to occupy several AID facilities
in and around Vientiane, and communist
members of the city's joint military se-
curity force are still "guarding" the
main entrance to a large American resi-
dential compound. The North Vietnamese
reportedly are planning to fZy some 70
foreign journalists from Saigon to Vien-
tiane today, apparently to get maximum
propaganda mileage from the withdrawal
of American dependents and other non-
essential personnel from Laos.
Some 150 to 200 demonstrators--many reportedly
Lao employees of USAID--briefly blocked off the US
embassy in Vientiane today. The occupation of the
main AID compound by communist-inspired demonstra-
tors has kept many local employees from drawing
their pay and this apparently prompted the action
at the embassy. At last report about 50 demonstra-
tors remained outside the embassy.
At the insistence of the Lao communists, the
coalition government's peace-keeping commission
recently agreed that both sides could station com-
bat troops, tanks, and antiaircraft artillery in-
Vientiane to safeguard the capital's "neutrality."
For the non-communist Royal Lao Army, the agreement
has no meaning since it is now a leaderless and in-
effective force. For the communists, the agreement
provides a convenient cover to occupy the city.
Some 6,000 Meo are moving from the Ban Nam Thao
area westward toward Sayaboury Province in an effort
to join General yang Pao in northern Thailand. An-
other-5,000 Meo already in Sayaboury are also head-
ing for the Thai border. According to unconfirmed
reports, up to 50,000 additional Meo, who are armed
and led by former guerrilla officers, have assembled
at Ban Xon, a base formerly held by yang Pao south-
west of the Plaine des Jarres. They have announced
that unless yang Pao returns to northern Laos, they-
too will leave for Thailand.
(continued)
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yang Pao has tried to discourage the migration,
but now believes that he is powerless to stop the
exodus.
The coalition government in Vientiane is also
anxious to stop the Meo from leaving, fearing that
their presence along the Thai-Lao border would rep-
resent a security threat to Laos. Phoumi Vongvichit,
the communist deputy prime minister and foreign
minister, has asked the Thai government to expel
yang Pao's forces as well as a group of rightist
politicians and generals which, he claims, has set
up a Lao government-in-exile-in Bangkok.
The presence of prominent self-exiled Lao right-
ists in Thailand is an embarrassment to Bangkok,
but we have no evidence to support Phoumi's allega-
tion that a shadow regime has been formed in the
Thai capital. The Thai would almost certainly not
countenance such a move.
Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Praman announced yesterday that Bangkok has a "def-
inite" policy of not allowing Lao refugees to remain
in Thailand and that those "temporarily" in the
north will be sent back when the situation in Laos
"returns to normal." Thai Prime Minister Khukrit
also told reporters in Bangkok yesterday that Thai-
land intends to maintain good relations with the
Lao coalition, even if the communists gain complete
control.
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LEBANON
President Pranjiyah's appointment yes-
terday of a predominantly military cabinet
was a dramatic attempt to end civil unrest
in the country. He likely concluded that
no combination of civilian politicians
could deal effectively with the deterio-
rating security situation. Tensions have
been rising steadily both between Chris-
tians and Muslims and within each group.
Radical fedayeen are pushing hard to pro-
voke a major clash that would bring about
the destruction of the delicate political
and religious compromises on which the Leb-
anese government is based.
The new prime minister, 76-year-old Brigadier
General Nur al-Din Rifai, is known for his authori-
tarian views Six of the eight mem-
bers of his government are army officers who ap-
parently will retain their military posts.
Franjiyah's action will be applauded by right-
wing groups, including the large Phalanges Party,
which for four days has been engaged in armed
clashes with radical fedayeen in a Beirut suburb.
The conservative Christian parties have repeatedly
called for more forceful action by the government
and the armed forces in restricting the activities
of Palestinian commandos in Lebanon.
Lebanese leftists and the fedayeen will see the
new government as a threat to the continued pres-
ence of fedayeen forces in Lebanon. They will be
especially upset with the appointment of the army
commander in chief as defense minister. The left-
ists have called for his replacement since the out-
break of fighting between the army and the fedayeen
in Sidon last February.
A tenuous cease-fire last night has suspended
the fighting between radical fedayeen and the right-
ist Christian Phalanges Party. PLO Chairman Arafat
has attempted to restrain the more rad-
ical fedayeen, and has used Fatah forces in the
refugee camps to help ensure observance of the
cease-fire.
(continued)
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If the cease-fire collapses and the new govern-
ment employs regular army troops in an attempt to
force a halt to the fighting, even moderate feda-
yeen leaders will join the fighting.
Arafat has endorsed
contingency plans to commit Fatah and Saiqa forces
to the fighting if the Lebanese army or the Phalan-
gists attack the refugee camps.
Both the Phalangists and the fedayeen have armed
themselves heavily in recent weeks. The Phalangists
import arms directly from Europe and receive more--
secretly--from the Lebanese army. The fedayeen
bring in arms directly from Syria, indirectly from
Eastern Europe. Radical fedayeen groups reportedly
have distributed arms to Lebanese leftists and ban-
dits.
Agents of Iraq and Libya apparently have dis-
tributed considerable amounts of money and weapons
to these same people in the hope that they can pro-
voke a major clash between the fedayeen and the
army.
Such a clash, in the extreme case, could prompt
either Christian or Muslim political groups to seek
full control of the government and to withdraw their
support for the unwritten political and religious
compromise--the 1943 National Covenant--on which
the Lebanese government rests. Such a power strug-
gle, in turn, could lead to still more prolonged
fighting that would increase the chances that out-
side states, especially Syria, might intervene.
Damascus would not allow the fedayeen to be de-
feated militarily or to be driven out of Lebanon
as they were from Jordan in 1971.
Any fundamental change in the delicately bal-
anced governing system would be likely to bring to
power a leftist, Muslim-dominated regime more sym-
pathetic to the Palestinians.
The greatest potential danger to the major in-
ternational powers of such fundamental changes in
Lebanon is that Tel Aviv might interpret Syrian
intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs as an
unacceptable threat to Israel's security and re-
spond in a way that would lead to general hostili-
ties in the Middle East. The Israelis have long
been sensitive to any sign that Syria is moving
troops or military equipment into Lebanon. They
would feel equally threatened by the rise of a pro-
Syrian regime in Beirut.
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PORTUGAL
Leaders of the Portuguese Commu-
nist and Socialist parties yesterday be-
gan separate talks with members of the
ruling Revolutionary Council in an ef-
fort to save the political coalition
from collapse.
Socialist leader Soares emerged after four
hours with military leaders saying that only the
future will show whether the meeting had been a suc-
cess. The Council then began its session with the
Communists. The Socialists are due to meet with
the Council again next week. The Movement's general
assembly may also consider the interparty conflict
on Monday.
A settlement depends to a large extent on the
Socialists, who have made the closing of their news-
paper a test of the military's intentions toward
representative government. The Socialists believe
that if they do not challenge the government on
this issue, their position will deteriorate to the
benefit of the Communists. The Socialist challenge
is supported by the Popular Democrats and some par-
ties of the extreme left.
The Communists have warned that if the Social-
ists break up the government coalition there will
be no need for the constituent assembly, now sched-
uled to convene on June 2. The Communist Party's
most immediate need, however, is to maintain its
influence with the Armed Forces Movement, and it
will probably heed the Movement's wishes and nego-
tiate with the Socialists. At the same time, Com-
munist leader Cunhal is preparing for a possible
ban on political party activity.
A moderate military officer has told the US
embassy in Lisbon that the Movement is divided over
the issue of political parties but that slightly
more than half the members of the Revolutionary
Council favor a multiparty solution. According to
the officer, many Movement members resent the Com-
munists' power play in taking over the newspaper.
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NOTES
Thai Prime Minister Khukrit reportedly wants
to formalize Thailand's relationship with China
before establishing relations with North Vietnam,
apparently hoping thus to gain Peking's help in
restricting North Vietnamese influence in Southeast
Asia.
Senior Thai government officials, however, are
concerned that Foreign Minister Chatchai, if pre-
sented with the opportunity during the current round
of talks with the North Vietnamese, may upset this
timetable and make a commitment that Bangkok would
have trouble backing out of without offending Hanoi.
Chatchai is not under Khukrit's firm control and
may indeed be capable of committing the government
without prior cabinet-level review.
Portugal is concerned about the activities of
separatists in the Azores, some of whom plan to an-
nounce in the US a government-in-exile.
A reliable source has told the US embassy in
Lisbon of the planned announcement, which apparently
is authorized by the Azorean Liberation Front. An-
other source claiming to be a member of a separatist
group in the Azores told the US consul there that
the group's primary goal is to force Lisbon to hold
a referendum on Azorean independence. Portugal has
demonstrated its concern about the growth of separa-
tist activity on the islands by setting up patrols
and roadblocks this week in the capital of the main
island. Portuguese ships have been unloading mili-
tary supplies, including trucks and jeeps, suggest-
ing that more security forces may be arriving soon.
(continued)
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'China will send a group of technicians to the
US in June to visit several major manufacturers of
telecommunications equipment.
This is the latest in a series of contacts Pe-
king has made with US companies in this field. It
has invited a group of US manufacturers, primarily
representing telecommunications firms, to visit
China in July. The Chinese are mainly interested
in learning how to operate and maintain high-capacity
systems such as those for microwave radio relay,
coaxial cables, and communications satellites. They
probably will require large-scale imports of equip-
ment.
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ANNEX
THE QUESTION OF WAR OR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
A number of recent developments
has made the prospect of war in the
Middle East seem to recede. It is none-
theless possible that Egypt and Syria--
and perhaps Jordan as well?are putting
up an elaborate smokescreen of osten-
sible disagreements and distractions in
order to hide preparations for a re-
sumption of hostilities. What follows
is an examination of the evidence that
serious Arab planning for renewed war-
fare may be under way.
Egypt's decision to reopen the Suez Canal on
June 5, its extension of the UN mandate in the Sinai
Peninsula until late July, and President Sadat's
expressions of sustained faith in US willingness
and ability to continue mediatory efforts added to a
feeling that the Egyptians have not yet despaired of
negotiations.
Syria's decision to extend the UN mandate on
the Golan Heights for a full six months, its will-
ingness to be distracted to problems involving Iraq
on its eastern border, and reports of persistent
Syrian-Egyptian disagreements have reinforced the
belief that Syria is not ready to open a one-front
war and not able to persuade the Egyptians to fight
on a second front.
All of this tends to.detract.from the possibil-
ity that the Arabs are proceeding with plans
for a resumption of hostilities. Such planning,
would not be inconsistent with a con-
tinued desire to pursue negotiations, but it would
be a token of greater readiness on the part of the
Arabs for joint military action than we have hereto-
fore given them credit.
(continued)
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after the
breakdown in March of Egyptian-Israeli
ment talks, President Sadat ordered preparations
made for a resumption of warfare between
24, but later postponed executing the plan
disengage-
May 20 and
in antic-
ipation of a new US diplomatic initiative.
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The war
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would be fought on three fronts--the Sinai, Syria,
and Jordan--and Iraqi and Saudi Arabian troops would
allegedly join in. In the Sinai, the objective was
to seize and hold the line of the Gidi and Mitla
passes and to consolidate positions in the valley
just east of the passes.
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war plannina was
Coordination of this joint
re ortedly begun
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during trips to several
Arab countries, and
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Sadat followed up with President.Asad
at
a meeting
in Saudi Arabia
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to postpone
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the planned hostilities because of what
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assumed was a new indication that
the US
would un-
dertake a diplomatic initiative.
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It was at this time that plans for your meet-
ing with Sadat at Salzburg on June I were put into
final shape, and Sadat may have decided to await the
outcome of that meeting before going through with
any offensive plans. Sadat 25X1
is convinced that military, action must be
at some point if diplomatic efforts fail.
undertaken
The War Option
It is not difficult to build a case for Egyp-
tian willingness to resume hostilities, despite com-
pelling reasons--of which the Egyptians themselves
are not unaware--why military action would be dis-
tinctly disadvantageous.
(continued)
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--The Egyptians seem to have written off the
hope that the Israelis intend, or can be easily
pressured, to make the territorial concessions
Egypt considers necessary for further progress
toward a final settlement.
--The Egyptians are concerned that the US will
slacken its efforts to achieve a solution--
either because of unwillingness to press Israel
before the 1976 presidential election or because
of an inability to resist US Congressional sup-
port for Israel. They will be disheartened by
the letter sent to you this week by 76 US Senators
urging continued aid to Israel.
--The Egyptians are visibly worried that the
US has been engaged for two months in a policy
reassessment that has as yet reached no con-
clusion, and they fear that the delay may signify
no change in the US attitude toward Israel.
Sadat has made it clear in repeated public
statements since March that he will ask at Salzburg
for the answer to a question that goes to the heart
of the US attitude, as the Egyptians interpret it,
toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. He will ask whether
the US commitment to Israel involves protection for
Israel within its 1967 borders or within the occupied
Arab territories.
Sadat has given no indication that he will be
satisfied to leave Salzburg without an answer to
this question. While he has said he will go to
Geneva in any case, he has also said that if Geneva
fails, war will be the Arabs' only recourse.
With little hope for success at Geneva, he may
have come to equate repeated postponement of the
conference with foreordained failure and taken this
as a signal to review Egypt's war option.
Egypt and Syria
In this situation, it is entirely possible that
Egypt and Syria have no serious disagreement and
that they have indeed been involved in secret joint
military planning for the last two months.
(continued)
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The reports of continued disagreement between
Sadat and Asad that emerged from Damascus after
Sadat's visit there last weekend could be attributed
not to differences over negotiating strategy, as has
been assumed, but to differences over the timing of
planned military action.
Asad's cool reception of Sadat may have been
simply because he wanted to stick with the original
deadline of May 20-24 rather than go along with
a decision to wait until after the Salzburg meeting.
A.Role for Jordan
To a much greater extent than was true in 1973,
or even a few months ago, Jordan's role must now
be taken into account in any discussion of military
planning among the Arabs. Jordan's recent rein-
forcement of military units facing Israel, its in?
-
creased cooperation with Syria over the last two
months, and King Husayn's series of militant
speeches to Jordanian troops last month all indi-
cate that Jordan expects to be involved in any
future round of hostilities.
Husayn has frequently expressed concern that,
in the event of war, Israel would use northern
Jordan to attack Syria. To the extent they offer
us explanations at all, Jordan
justified their recent moves as defensive precau-
tions against just such a contingency.
(continued)
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It is conceivable, however, that Jordan has
been involved in offensive planning with Syria and
Egypt, as was not the case in 1973, and that Sadat
and Husayn discussed military strategy during Sadat's
visit to Amman last weekend. It is more likely, in
the worst case context, that Husayn is being roped
in again under the guise of defensive contingency
planning.
Asad's last statement raises again the puzzling
case of the one-sided Syrian-Iraqi dispute
Syria has cut the
Euphrates water flow to Iraq, refused all terms for
mediation of that problem, pushed the quarrel to the
point of a break in relations, and ostentatiously
moved large military forces toward Iraq, but per-
mitted Iraqi trucks to transit Syria for the deliv-
ery of Soviet military goods consigned to Baghdad
through Syrian ports.
One can wonder whether Syria's pursuit of the
quarrel has not been an elaborate deception to build
an assumption that Syria would not launch an offen-
sive in the west while dealing with an enemy to the
east.
? Fixing One Point
It is not, however, necessary to credit the
Arabs with complex deception schemes in order to
conclude that they are preparing contingency offen-
sive plans.
(continued)
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Sadat planned and then postponed an offensive after
disengagement talks broke down is consistent with
other indications that he ordered the military to
be ready for action if necessary on a given date
and subsequently decided against a move for polit-
ical reasons.
A postponement would demonstrate, in fact, that
Sadat is not anxious to use the military option and
welcome diplomatic initiatives as a means of delay-
ing a decision to fight and, more important, as a
means of achieving progress in negotiations. The
problem lies in fixing the point at which Sadat
gives up hope in the diplomatic track and stops
postponing his decision to go to war.
Although it is still uncertain when in 1273 the
Egyptians and Syrians set October 6 as the kickoff
date, there are many indications that the war was
set originally for April, was postponed while the
UN Security Council debated the Middle East.ques--
tion, was reset for June, and was put off again
while the UN debate continued and the US-Soviet
summit convened in Washington. But Sadat did ul-
timately despair of diplomacy and gave the go-ahead
for war.'
It is, in short, entirely possible that Sadat
and his war minister have plans to reopen hostili-
ties if the diplomatic option fails and that they
have coordinated military strategy with the Syrians.
Sadat will be looking for hopeful signs at
Salzburg. If he receives no satisfaction there, he
would not necessarily open hostilities immediately,
but the possibility cannot be ruled out that he
would move soon after his return.
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