THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 DECEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993014
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 6, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
6 December 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
6 December 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in the Indo-Pakistani war are reported
on Page 1.
President Pak's new emergency measures in South
Korea are designed to serve political ends rather
than any genuine new threat from North Korea.
(Page 3)
A contingent of Libyan commandos has arrived in 50X1
Syria. (Page 4)
Jordan 1 50X1
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At Annex, we comment on the regime of Brazilian
President Medici and on its new mark of self-
confidence, reflected in Medici's decision to visit
the US.
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Cooch Erehar
hak
DI V-
INDIA
rRA G R
.13)inaj Shillongo
Farakk:
Sh shernager
EA T AKISTAN
Pabna
,gartala
elonia
?1
anzaPholi
Reserve-) r
Qhittago
BAY OF BENGAL
552222 12-71 CIA
4???=:( Indian attack
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
Indian forces continue to advance in East Pak-
istan. They are making major thrusts in the two
northwestern districts of Dinajpur and Rangpur,
where they outnumber Pakistani troops two-to-one,
and claim the capture of Kamalpur in neighboring
Mymensingh District. The Indians say they are mak-
ing progress in the Sylhet and Jessore areas and
that on the east they have cut road and rail net-
works south of Comilla. Indian capture of the town
of Akhaura will
give them a base for a drive on Dacca from the east.
Heavier ground fighting is beginning to develop
on the western front where Pakistani forces have
launched offensives at three points into India's
Punjab Province northwest of New Delhi, as well as
into Kashmir.
The Indians, who admit these drives have cost
them some territory, claim they are making some ad-
vances farther south into Pakistan's Sind Province.
They still deny that they have launched any major
invasion of West Pakistan.
The Indians continue to bomb and strafe targets
in both East and West Pakistan. Fuel storage tanks
in the Dacca and Chittagong areas of the East and
near the port of Karachi in the West are being hit
hard. In contrast to previous Indo-Pakistani con-
flicts, the navies of both countries have also been
active. Pakistan has admitted the loss of at least
one destroyer in a naval battle yesterday off the
Karachi coast.
The numerical superiority of India's fleet
should give it a decided advantage in any
further combat.
Prime Minister Gandhi today announced the long-
anticipated recognition of Bancila Desh as an inde-
pendent nation.
(continued)
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India is continuing to receive full public
support from the Soviets, and Moscow is
holding itself aloof from any attempts to
end the hostilities. Soviet officials
are adhering to the line that Pakistani
repression of the Bengalis is to blame
for the situation and that the conflict
can only be resolved through aA9olitical
settZement in East Pakistan. In an appar-
ent reference to China, a TASS statement
yesterday warned all governments to re-
frain from steps that might involve them
in the conflict and aggravate the situa-
tion. An official in Premier Kosygin's
party in Denmark also stated that the sit-
uation was different from 1965 and im-
plied that the Soviets would not act as
mediators as they did then at Tashkent.
Peking has condemned Indian and Soviet
actions in the crisis and Chinese offi-
cials have held the USSR responsible for
instigating India's "aggressive" policy.
All Chinese statements reaffirm their
"firm support" for IsZamabad, but give
no specifics on the actual nature of Chi-
nese assistance and no indication that
China intends to become involved directly.
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SOUTH KOREA
President Pak is initiating a series of moves
that will increase his personal power. In a state-
ment to the nation last night, Pak declared a "state
of national emergency" lust short of martial law.
he will also call
tor legislation giving him powers to strengthen the
defenses of Seoul and to place more restrictions on
the press. Some major personnel changes may also
follow. He will not, however, move against the Na-
tional Assembly or seek the use of troops. The an-
nounced purpose of Pak's action is to "awaken" the
populace to the growing threat of attack from North
Korea.
These moves are the culmination of a two-
month-long government campaign in which
the threat from the North has been given
extensive play in the press as well as in
official statements and documents. Since
there is no evidence suggesting an attack
is imminent, the motivation for Pak's new
measures seems clearly political and two
of Pak's closest advisers have admitted
as much to Ambassador Habib. In fact, CIA
Director Yi Hu-rak told' Habib on Thursday
that the US should regard Pak's coming
moves as "concrete evidence of future Ko-
rean self-reliance," given the US inten-
tion ultimately to withdraw its own forces.
Concern over US intentions as well as over
the state of the economy undoubtedly is a
factor in Pak's desire for a tighter grip
on affairs. This desire has probably been
reinforced by his success in quashing stu-
dent disorders and recent factionalism
within his own party through decisive ac-
tion. These seem to us insufficient rea-
sons, however, for Pak to take a major po-
litical step that risks serious domestic
and international criticism. It maybe,
therefore, that the new measures represent
the start of a longer-range' plan to curb
the political intrigues already unleashed
by Pak's pledge to retire in 1975 and to
prepare a case for prolonging his tenure
in office.
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ARAB STATES - FEDAYEEN
A contingent of Libyan "commandos" numbering
about 300 arrived in Syria recently for the announced
purpose of reinforcing the Palestinian guerrillas.
If the contingent joins fedayeen forces
near the Jordanian border, it could add
to the instability in that area and com-
plicate the anticipated reopening of the
border to commercial traffic. Libyan
Prime Minister Qadhafi has long sought
to station troops in Syria, but Damascus
had been reluctant to go along. Qadhafi
most likely brought the Syrians around by
promising them increased financial support.
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ORDAN
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NOTES
Cambodia: Prime Minister Lon Nol has ordered
a comprehensive investigation of the Chenla II cam-
paign, which was ended officially on Saturday, in
order to determine "what went wrong." Several gov-
ernment units located about 15 miles west of Phnom
Penh were attacked by the Communists during the
weekend, leading to sharp fighting around some posi-
tions. The South Vietnamese forces operating in
eastern Cambodia report an increase in the number
of small clashes in recent days, but their dry sea-
son campaign has yet to encounter any substantial
enemy resistance.
West Germany - East Germany: Initialing of the
inter-German and inter-Berlin agreements, which had
been anticipated on Saturday, is not now expected
before 7 December at the earliest. The delay was
caused by the West Berlin Senat, in part to permit
its negotiator to clear up .a few technical problems
that remain in the draft inter-Berlin agreement.
Libya
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BRAZIL
President Emilio Medici's visit to Washington,
more than anything else, is a mark of his confidence
that Brazil has been brought out of the chaos of the
early 1960s and is now stable, prosperous, and moving
toward a better future. He
and his government are flat-
tered by the US invitation
and consider it as recogni-
tion of Brazil's important
international status. Until
now, Medici has felt that
domestic problems were too
pressing for him to stray
far from home, and he has
participated in summit
talks only with his imme-
diate neighbors.
The strength and sta-
bility of Medici's govern-
ment derive from a military
oligarchy that brooks no
serious opposition. The
government has also adopted
some programs that have earned broad popular support.
Medici himself is a former troop commander as well as
the former director of the national intelligence serv-
ice, and was selected for the presidency by his mili-
tary colleagues because of his excellent record and
his avoidance of identification with any faction in
the armed forces. As was the case with his two mili-
tary-backed predecessors, presidential powers have
been substantially expanded under his rule. Indi-
vidual rights have been restricted or even abrogated,
the federal government has amassed new powers at the
expense of the states, and the legislative and judi-
cial branches have been brought to heel by the exec-
utive. Within the executive branch, only a few
trusted advisers, most of them active or retired
military officers, have daily access to Medici.
They are coming with him to Washington.
Emilio Medici
A return to direct presidential elections and
broad public participation in political life in
Brazil is a distant prospect. Medici has maintained
that political liberalization is possible only to
the extent that it contributes to achieving his
principal economic, social, and security objectives.
He has said that he hopes to see "democracy" firmly
installed by the end of his term in March 1974, but
insists that Brazil has never known real democracy,
and when it does come, it will be a uniquely Brazil-
ian "democracy" molded to the country's special needs.
(continued)
Al
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A political realist Medici has given selected
civilians .a voice-inJiis administration and has-given
Congressan opportunity to discuss--and at times
criticize--programs submitted by the executive branch.
Two political parties--the pro-government National
Renewal_Alliance.anctthe opposition Brazilian Demo-
craticMovement7-are operating because the adminis-
tration wants-them-to, but neither has strong public
appeal nor internal unity. Politicians occasionally
call for greater participation,-but they are fully
aware that they are operating "on probation" and
that if-they exceed their bounds, Medici will not
hesitate to deny them any.role?in determining the
nation's course.
The only institution in Brazil that is largely
immune from government reprisal is the Roman Catho-
lic-Church. Its effectiveness as a national con-
science is limited, however, because of its size and
diversity. The clergy are more prone to speak out
on issues that directly affect them than on broad
social themes. Today, more, churchmen favor more of-
the government's programs and are reluctant to risk
alienating it.
Medici's rule, however, is not simply a matter
of a more or less benevolent dictatorship. His con-
siderable successes have led to widespread.tacit ac-
ceptance of his policies, and some active support.
By the time he came to power in October- 1969, infla-
tion was already on-the wane, and under him it has
been brought to a rate that is acceptable by Brazil-
ian standards. This has- had a,major share in pro-,
moting impressive economic growth, as have Medici's
new steps to open up the western frontier regions
and his. drive to modernize the economy.
Medici also has-succeeded in curbing, by dras-
tic measures, the- wave of urban terrorism that hads
security .forces and many. foreigners deeply concerned.
Shortly before his inauguration, the terrorists
added the abduction of US Ambassador Elbrick to
their long list of "victories" that included air-
craft hijackings, murders, bombingsfjDank robberies,
and thefts of weapons, The ruthless repression of:
suspected terrorists continues, even though they
are now-only a Minor embarrassment.and-no threat to
government stability. Medici has learned to live
with the worldwide opprobrium that has resulted from
torture and murder-of certain prisoners, and he, ap-
parently believes that in this case the end is ac-
cepted by the majority of-the populace as justifica-
tion for the means, .
(continued)
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Medici is skilled in fostering nationalism and
has gained considerable -support, for his administra-
tion. Popular pride in Brazil's accomplishments and
potential is growing. The public strongly approves
Medici's expansion. of Brazil's territorial waters
claim from 12 to 200 miles. Although close friend-
ship and cooperation-with the US is a cornerstone
of .his foreign-policy, Medici's readiness to pursue
Brazil's economic interests-even though it might-re-
sult in friction with the economically advanced
powers has also received a warm response:
Medici has inaugurated a number of social and
economic, projects intended to better the lot of the
majority of Brazil's 93 million-people, most-of whom
have seen little change in their lives under the
military-backed-governments since 1964. For- example,
major programs to expand literacy-, modernize agri-
culture, and-to create a nationwide transportation-
system have. generated public support. This is in
part due to Medici's capable public relations-staff,
which stresses-his commitment-to bettering the lot
of the masses-of "silent Brazilians." There are,
of course, still. major areas of poverty, much of
the country remains underdeveloped, and some dras-
tic social reforms are needed, but perhaps for the
first time in-a- generation, many Brazilians have
hope.
Medici also is not averse to throwing Brazil's
considerable weight around in order to forestall
the growth of leftist political strength in neigh-
boring countries.
Brazil remains firmly against the readmission
of Cuba to the Organization of American States, and
will remain opposed to the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between Cuba and Latin American na-
tions.
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