THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 JULY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993411
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 15, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
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Exempt Croix general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
15 July 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
South Vietnamese forces still are meeting strong
enemy resistance near Quang Tri City. President
Thieu is urging his commanders in the area to
launch new attacks before the Communists gain enough
strength to turn back the government offensive.
(Page 1)
(Page 2)
Vietnam
China
On Page 3 we assess a shift in the North Vietnamese
line at the Paris peace talks and Hanoi's intensi-
fied propaganda on alleged US bombing of dikes in
North Vietnam.
India
(Page 5)
At Annex, we discuss Philippine President Marcos'
attempts to retain power beyond 1973 and Philippine
attitudes on US interests in the islands.
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108
Demilitarized Zone
ang Tri
kue
THUWHIEN
- Outpost Checkmate
OUANG NAM
angMR 1
THAILAND
QUANG TIN
OUP NO
NGAI
KONTUNI
BINH
DINH
PLEIKU
CAMBODIA
PHU
YEN
OAR LAG
KHANH
HOA
illekonn
GUANO
DUG
'ao
TUYEN
PHUOC
em. LONG
LONG
NINH
THUAN
?
LAM OONG
BINH
DUONG
CHAU
DOC
KIEN
MEN TUONG
PHONG
HAU
NGHI
BIEN
HOA
LONG
KHANH
BINH
'UT
BINH
TN WIN
PHUOC
TUY
AN
GIANG
?10
KIEN
GIANG
PH ON"
DINH
CHUONG
THIEN
VINH
LONG
VINH
BINH
Gulf of
Thailand
104
553346 7-72
?
AN
XUYEN
MR 4
ir
R3
Capital Special Zone
118
ANH
110
16-
14-
MR 2
South
China
Sea
12-
10-
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
100
1110
? ????
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VIETNAM
Strong enemy resistance to the South Vietnamese
push toward Quang Tri City continues. Airborne units
have been engaged in street fighting on the southern
edge of town.
Thieu believes there are signs that the
enemy in Quang Tri may soon be strongly reinforced
from North Vietnam, and he hopes to strike before
the Communists can muster enough military strength
to turn back the government offensive. Thieu stressed
that his troops should not give too much attention to
the reoccupation of Quang Tri City, apparently in the
belief that the losses in an all-out assault on the
city would be prohibitive.
Farther south in MR 1, heavy attacks against
allied positions near Hue continue, and government
forces have abandoned outpost Checkmate for the
third time in two weeks. Armed clashes have in-
creased in Quang Nam Province. In addition to the
rocket attack of 13 July on Da Nang, a nearby refu-
gee camp and government positions in
Nam's districts were shelled.
the enemy plans widespread attacks in
to relieve pressure on Communist forces
in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces.
the province
five of Quang
In the Mekong Delta, enemy forces continue har-
assing actions in Dinh Tuong.Province. My Tho was
shelled early yesterday, and an ammunition depot
less than a mile south of town was blown.up. Sev-
eral sharp engagements were initiated by government
forces elsewhere in the delta.
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CHINA-VIETNAM
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NORTH VIETNAM
There was a definite shift in emphasis in the
Communists' line at the Paris peace talks on 13 July
and at their post-meeting press conferences. The
Communists attempted to create the impression that
they do not demand that the US become involved in
settling the political future of South Vietnam, and
that they will discuss this issue directly with the
South Vietnamese following the withdrawal of US
forces and the termination of US "political and mil-
itary" support for the Saigon government.
The shift does not constitute a real con-
cession on the Communists' part but seems
designed essentially to outflank the US
insistence that it cannot negotiate the
political future in South Vietnam because
this would infringe on the rights of the
South Vietnamese people.
The Communists have generally maintained
that the US must formally agree--at least
in principle?to the imposition of a co-
alition government, and in fact talked at
the session of 13 July about the need for
a "parallel settlement" of political and
military questions before a cease-fire
could take place. Nevertheless, it has
long been evident that the Communists
would undertake to establish such a coali-
tion themselves?with or without US agree-
ment--if the nature of the US military
withdrawal and termination of support to
President Thieu allowed it. In Hanoi's
view, the Saigon government would not last
long without US arms and political backing.
Hanoi is intensifying its propaganda allega-
tions that the US bombing is causing serious damage
to the dikes in North Vietnam, which may lead to a
catastrophic loss of life later this summer. A For-
eign Ministry statement of 11 July, for example,
asserted that the US had deliberately struck the
dikes in order to weaken these systems so as to
cause floods in North Vietnam with incalculable
consequences. Other articles claim that dikes in
at least five provinces have been damaged.
(continued)
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Hanoi has had the support of some friendly
foreign newsmen. A Frenchman stationed in Hanoi
has visited dikes that have been damaged and claims
in his reporting that the damage was deliberate
because there were no military targets nearby.
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The North Vietnamese dike system is very
elaborate; in some places the dikes tower
as much as 50 feet above the surrounding
land in order to protect the relatively
flat terrain from the runoff of the heavy
rains that amount to upwards of 11 inches
per month- in July sandAugust. Water in
the artificially constricted rivers in
the Hanoi area has at times reached
levels nearly 40 feet higher than the
surrounding land. The depth and speed
of the water creates tremendous pressure
on the dike walls. A weakened dike can
easily break and quickly lead to a major
flood, causing serious damage to crops and
loss of life, as happened last year when
there was no bombing.
Hanoi is undoubtedly genuinely concerned
about the effects US bombing could have
on the country's dike system. North Viet-
nam's rainy season will reach its peak
next month, and weaknesses in the dikes
caused by last year's flooding have not
been fully repaired. The fervor of
Hanoi's propaganda concerning the dike
damage, however, is certainly also de-
signed to engender world sympathy for the
North Vietnamese and to provoke an outcry
against the US both at home and abroad.
Hanoi seems to be trying to make the US
responsible in advance for any breaks
that might occur in the dike system as
a result of its failure to shore up the
walls
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INDIA
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France:
NOTE
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PHILIPPINE POLITICS AND US INTERESTS
President Ferdinand Marcos has initiated a se-
ries of moves to try to retain political power after
December 1973 when his second-and constitutionally
his last--term expires. He is exploring three op-
tions: changing the constitution, ruling through a
proxy, or declaring martial law. At the same time,
he has tried to divert public attention from the
palace's intrigues and the administration's short-
comings by making headlines in the area of foreign
affairs, particularly by urging basic changes in
US-Philippine relations.
Staying in Power
The main arena for Marcos' maneuvering is the
Constitutional Convention, elected in 1970 to draft
a "Filipino" constitution to replace the "American"
document adopted in 1946. In session for a year al-
ready, the convention has had difficulty reaching
substantive decisions, largely because the delegates
would not commit themselves until Marcos made his
own desires known. The logjam finally broke on 7
July when the convention accepted a draft resolution
calling for adoption of a parliamentary form of gov-
ernment. Such a system would circumvent the two-
term limit and enable Marcos to become prime minis-
ter without having to risk his fading popularity in
a nationwide election, as he would under a presiden-
tial system.
Marcos still must hold together his delegate
strength in the convention for two more ballots be-
fore the draft constitution is finally passed, how-
ever, and the final document must then pass a na-
tional referendum. If the electorate interprets a
"yes" vote as a vote for continued rule by Marcos,
the referendum could easily fail. Thus, if Marcos
is too heavy-handed in getting the convention to
pass a constitution to his taste, he increases the
chances that the voters will reject it.
If his efforts to change the constitution fail,
Marcos has indicated he will try to rule through a
proxy--such as his wife Imelda, an ambitious woman
who enjoys a small independent political base of her
own. Marcos has some doubts about how much influ-
ence he could wield over his wife, but the two usu-
ally act alike politically, and they normally work
effectively as a team. Another possible proxy is
Vice-President Ferdinand Lopez
(continued)
Al
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Marcos has also been trying to mend fences in
his own party. In order either to become prime min-
ister or to rule by proxy, he would need strong
party support, especially from the powerful politi-
cal machine of the Lopez family. In May, Marcos
?sought reconciliation with the Lopez family. after
18 months of bitter feuding. The feud had not only
estranged Marcos from his vice-president, but also
had subjected the President to the wrath of the fam-
ily's extensive media chain.
If everything else fails, Marcos has a third
option: rule by martial law. Although he does not
seem to have a detailed plan in mind, Marcos appar-
ently believes he could postpone elections scheduled
for November 1973 by suspending the constitution and
then continuing to rule through some quasi-legal for-
mula. Marcos appears to be preparing the groundwork
should this seem necessary. Over the past months,
he has been appointing his own men to top military
positions, and he apparently intends to retire the
entire present high command by mid-1973, replacing
them with generals considered amenable to martial
law. He has been publicizing the threat posed by
Communist insurgents in the countryside, in part to
provide a rationale for martial law.
It seems doubtful, however, that Marcos will go
this far. The Filipinos are accustomed to active
participation in government and would be vocal in
their dissent. And the army is neither large nor
efficient enough to govern successfully in the face
of a hostile populace. In addition, despite the
command changes, the President may not be able to
count on the army's support in a crisis.
Whatever Marcos decides to do, he needs more
popular support. The setbacks he experienced in
elections to the Senate last November clearly re-
flected widespread public disillusionment with his
leadership. In recent months, domestic economic
problems have further damaged the government's
standing. Like other Philippine politicians before
him, Marcos has found that talking tough to the
Americans is good politics. Thus last month, with
a bribery scandal threatening to destroy his credi-
bility, Marcos grabbed the headlines by calling for
a renegotiation of all US-Philippine military and
economic agreements.
The US issue
Marcos can exploit the "US issue" effectively
because many political and business leaders believe
the Philippines should get a better deal from the
US.
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In addition to wanting more money for the use
of the bases, Filipino leaders believe that the
bases are not contributing significantly to their
country's security and that they are not necessarily
good evidence of the US commitment to defend the is-
lands. Many Filipinos view recent US contacts with
Peking and Moscow as foreshadowing an intention to
withdraw from Asia. In these circumstances, some
argue that the Philippines must adopt a more inde-
pendent foreign policy, while others favor a firmer
US commitment to the country's defense.
Marcos is also beginning to focus public atten-
tion on US-Philippine economic relations. The under-
pinning for those relations, the Laurel-Langley Agree-
ment of 1956, expires in 1974. Philippine business-
men would like to retain preferential treatment in
US markets; the sugar barons in particular are loath
to lose their guaranteed quota of the US market.
On the other side, an article in the Philippine
constitution providing for special rights for US
investors also expires in 1974. This, together with
Laurel-Langley, allows US interests to invest, ex-
ploit natural resources, and operate public utili-
ties in the Philippines. Some delegates to the con-
stitutional convention have proposed a clause limit-
ing foreign ownership of Philippine firms to 40 per-
cent. Many Filipino investors believe that such a
provision would enable them to buy into profitable
US-owned business at cut-rate prices. A more imme-
diate problem for US businessmen, however, is the
question whether American vested rights already ac-
quired expire in 1974, or whether the lapse of the
article merely precludes future acquisitions.
The economic issues provide fewer political
opportunities for Marcos because they arouse the
populace less than the US military presence. At
the same time, however, because they impinge on the
vital interests of the Filipino elite, Marcos has
somewhat less latitude than he enjoys in negotiating
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the military matters. Marcos apparently still be-
lieves that he can manipulate popular sentiment
a4ainst the US bases, while in fact leaving the re-
lationship with the US virtually unchanged. He took
this line recently when he assured Ambassador Byroade
that, public statements notwithstanding, he had no
present intention of pressing for fundamental changes
in US base and security agreements with the Philip-
pines.
With his time running out, however, Marcos is
going to find himself under increasing pressure to
deliver on his public promises. He must improve
his popular ?standing or he will find it difficult
to extend his rule under any device.
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