THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014739
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 7, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
March 7, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category. 58(1)122.(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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March 7, 1975
Table of Contents ,
Portugal: The US embassy in Lisbon believes stabi-
lizing elements have come into play that are
beginning to provide a sense of direction to
moderate forces. (Page 1)
Israel-Egypt-PLO: Israel seems anxious not to let
the fedayeen raid on Tel Aviv cloud the atmo-
sphere for negotiations with Egypt. (Page 3)
Cambodia: Fairly heavy shelling failed to halt the
US airlift. Several diplomatic missions are
preparing to evacuate their personnel from
Phnom Penh. (Page 4)
Iraq-Iran: The Shah of Iran and Iraqi strongman
Saddam Husayn signed an agreement yesterday
that ostensibly resolves the conflict between
their countries. (Page 5)
Thailand: Seni Pramot and his proposed coalition
cabinet presumably will remain in a caretaker
capacity until a new government can be formed.
(Page 6)
Middle East: Increased congestion at Middle East-
ern ports is hampering delivery of imports.
(Page 7)
Notes: OPEC; Peru; China (Pages 8 and 9)
Annex: Communist Military and Economic Aid to
North Vietnam, 1970-1974
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PORTUGAL
The US embassy in Lisbon believes
that stabilizing political elements have
come into play in Portugal in recent
weeks. They are beginning to provide
a sense of direction and hope to the
formerly inchoate and disjointed moder-
ate forces. Military moderates are re-
acting to international criticism and
to excesses both within and outside the
government; leaders of the Armed Forces
Movement are increasingly aware that
they are dealing with complicated is-
sues and that there are no simple solu-
tions; non-communist political parties
are emerging as an independent force.
Encouraging as these factors are, how-
ever, they are still only stirrings
compared to the well-directed and vigor-
ous communist offensive.
The turning point in the strengthening of the
moderate forces was the fight over the unitary labor
law which divided the socialists from the communists
and finally brought about President Costa Gomes' an-
nouncement of an election date. Subsequent develop-
ments include:
--the emergence of an economic program which
contains an immediate role for the private
sector;
--the assumption of greater powers by the
seven-man junta at the expense of the Move-
ment's more radical Coordinating Committee;
--the steady momentum of the election process
despite communist delaying tactics;
--the increasing confidence of the moderate
parties that an acceptable compromise can be
reached with the Movement on the military's
future role in government.
The embassy notes that there is now a greater
sense of equilibrium in Portugal. The political
campaign, however, combined with economic uncer-
tainty and labor and student unrest will bring
further stress to the Portuguese scene.
(continued)
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The embassy sees the most immediate dangers as
an attempted coup by the right and a rising campaign
of violence from the extreme left. The embassy
judges the latter to be the greater danger of the
two.
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ISRAEL-EGYPT-PLO
Israel seems anxious not to let the
incident of the fedayeen raid on Tel Aviv
cloud the atmosphere for negotiations with
Egypt.
The Israelis have taken pains to refute the
terrorists' cover story that the seaborne raid was
launched from Egypt and Defense Minister Peres said
that the crew of the raiders' mother ship, seized
yesterday by the Israeli navy, confessed that they
had come from Beirut.
Cairo's commentary on the raid has been re-
strained. A spokesman for President Sadat confined
himself to noting that the incident highlights "the
current explosive situation" and points up the need
for a meaningful disengagement.
The Palestine Liberation Organization has
taken responsibility for the raid, which our em-
bassy in Beirut believes must have been cleared by
the top PLO leadership. Palestinian broadcasts
have claimed that the raiders' target was the US
embassy in Tel Aviv and that the attack was designed
to thwart Secretary Kissinger's "conspiratorial ef-
forts" to disrupt Arab unity.
Aside from the efforts of both Tel Aviv and
Cairo to play down any negative impact the raid
might have on their negotiations, the significance
of the incident appears to be its testimony to the
serious strain in Egyptian-PLO relations. By dram-
atizing their frustration with Sadat, the Palestin-
ians probably hope to encourage other Arab leaders
to push him to insist more strongly that the US
cannot afford to ignore indefinitely the PLO's
claims. They successfully used a variant of this
tactic to reduce Sadat's room for maneuver at the
Arab summit in Rabat last year.
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CAMBODIA
Fairly heavy communist rocket and ar-
tillery shelling throughout the day yes-
terday failed to interrupt the US airlift
into Fochentong airfield.
Several diplomatic missions--including those
of South Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, the UK,
Australia, and West Germany--are in any case
preparing to evacuate their personnel from Phnom
Penh.
Elsewhere, about 1,000 government troops pulled
out of a key outpost guarding the Mekong River base
at Neak Luong. According to an intercepted message
the communists have surrounded another nearby out-
post and are preparing a "final" attack.
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IRAN-IRAQ
The Shah of Iran and Iraqi strongman
Saddam Husayn signed an agreement yester-
day that purportedly resolves the conflict
that has Zed to numerous armed border
clashes between their countries during
the past year. The differences between
the two leaders were substantial, and the
agreement may be chiefly a hollow response
to pressures for accommodation from im-
portant Arab leaders rather than a sub-
stantial understanding. Certainly the
language pertaining to violation of the
agreement does not augur well for its
durability.
The two sides reportedly agree to:
--define their river boundaries according to a
mid-channel principle;
--exercise strict border control and prevent
infiltration of subversives;
--demarcate their land frontiers according to
agreed procedures;
--regard violation of any part of their accord
as a violation of the entire agreement.
The mid-channel principle is a major Iraqi
concession. The border control clause implies
yielding on Iran's part since it seems to prohibit
further Iranian military aid to the Iraqi Kurds.
The Kurdish rebels are almost wholly dependent on
Iranian support. It seems unlikely that the Shah
would abandon them without securing in return a
pledge that Iraq would halt or at least delay re-
sumption of major military action against them.
The Kurdish issue--crucial to Iraq--may be the sub-
ject of a secret agreement.
If a meaningful accord has been reached, pre-
sumably it would soon be reflected in a relaxation
of military tensions along the Iran-Iraq border.
At present, Iran is bolstering Kurdish forces in
anticipation of a new Iraqi offensive. Iraq ap-
pears to be preparing for such an offensive and in
making ready for it, is receiving new Soviet mili-
tary equipment.
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THAILAND
Seni Pramot and his proposed coali-
tion cabinet--defeated in a confidence
vote in the National Assembly yesterday--
presumably will remain in a caretaker
capacity until a new government can be
formed.
Seni's policy statement, which called for the
withdrawal of all US forces within 18 months, was
not the issue that brought him down. The political
right, which enjoys considerable support from the
military elite, finds Seni unacceptable because of
his long opposition to military rule. The left,
which Seni had hoped to court with his demand for
a US withdrawal, reportedly did not trust him to
carry through on his "radical" promises and so de-
cided to vote against him.
The initiative now shifts to the conservative
bloc which, together with the political center, con-
trols the bulk of the assembly seats.
Seni's more conservative brother
Khukrit--who is more acceptable to Thailand's vested
interests--will be given the first opportunity to
form a new center-right coalition. A respected
journalist and former assembly speaker, Khukrit
enjoys the support of army commander Krit Siwara
and several other key generals.
The conservatives, nevertheless, will probably
find it difficult to put together a viable coali-
tion since they must contend with the ambitions of
many of the 22 parties elected to the assembly.
In an effort to forestall a popular outcry against
Seni's defeat, the conservatives may even try to
outdo the moderate assemblymen by demanding an ac-
celerated US withdrawal. For example, conservative
spokesman and party leader Praman has said that he
thinks US forces should be withdrawn within one
year.
Negotiations on selection of the key cabinet
portfolios may drag on for several weeks. Khukrit
would insist on placing
several of his more moderate colleagues in the cab-
inet and that he would not serve as a figurehead
in a right-wing government.
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MIDDLE EAST
Rising congestion at ill equipped
and poorly managed Middle Eastern ports
is severely hampering delivery of the
swelling volume of imports to the area.
Imports piled up at docks and storage areas
have forced ships to wait two weeks at Abu Dhabi,
three weeks at Bahrain, four weeks at Saudi Ara-
bian ports, and two months at Basra before berth-
ing or offloading into smaller craft. This conges-
tion has made a shambles out of shipping schedules.
Shipping charges have risen dramatically.
Overland transport between Europe and the
Middle East is faring no better. Hundreds of laden
freight cars are stranded between Europe and the
Middle East because the rail systems of Iran, Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon cannot handle the traffic.
Bulgaria and Greece have refused new rail traffic
since November. The USSR and Turkey are now limit-
ing transit--Western shippers are being limited to
80 freight cars a day through to the Middle East.
Trucks are also backing up at key border points.
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NOTES
OPEC chiefs of state ended their summit meet-
ing yesterday in Algiers without agreeing on a
strategy for the coming conference of consumers
and producers.
The OPEC leaders endorsed a noncommittal dec-
laration of principles, accepting only 14 of 48
propositions submitted by Algeria. They gave gen-
eral approval to a five-year stabilization of the
price of oil and endorsed the principle of index-
ing oil prices to imports by OPEC members. They
left to expert committees the task of devising how
such a scheme would work. The OPEC leaders decided
to shelve one Algerian proposal to press for reform
of the international trade and monetary system and
another to commit oil producers to specific steps
to ease the burden of oil prices on the developing
countries. The moderate oil producers apparently
want to ensure that Algeria does not emerge as the
spokesman for OPEC at coming consumer-producer
meetings.
Peru
(continued)
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*
China has postponed, and may cancel, its re-
maining contracts for US cotton.
Earlier this week, China canceled contracts
for about 233,000 bales--over 50 percent of the US
cotton currently scheduled for delivery. These
were in addition to contracts totaling about 33,000
bales that were canceled in late December or early
January. In canceling the contracts, the Chinese
agreed to pay the suppliers the difference between
the contract price and the current lower market
price. Export markets for China's finished textile
products have been depressed for some time. Con-
sequently, Peking began reducing cotton imports in
late 1974.
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Table I
Estimated Communist Military and Economic Assistance
to North Vietnam
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MILITARY
1970
1973
Million Current
US$?
1971
1972
1974'
Total Military Assistance
205
315
750
330
400
Military Equipment and Materiel
140
240
565
230
275
Air Defense Equipment
20
85
310
100
55
Ground Forces Equipment
45
80
110
40
45
Ammunition
70
60
130
85
170a
Other
5
15
15
5
5
Military Transportation Equipment
20
15
30
35
25
(Trucks, helicopters, transports)
Other Military-related Support?
45
60
155
65
100
(Delivery and packaging costs, spare parts,
POL for the military, technical assistance
and training, medical supplies)
ECONOMIC
Total Economic Assistance
735
755
465
670
1,295
Commodity Shipments a
635
645
360
540
1,145
Food
65
60
80
170
420
Fertilizer
10
15
6
5
25
Petroleum
10
10
5
15
55
Machinery, Transport Equipment,
ft Metal Products
240
175
125
165
345
Other
310
385
145
185
300
Technical Assistance
100
110
105
130
150
(Includes cost of foreign
technicians in NVN and NVN
trainees abroad)
E
Total of estimated communist 940 1,070 1,215 1,000 1,695
goods and services provided
to North Vietnam
Less ? North Vietnamese exports 50 50 30 80 125
to communist
countries f
Total estimated
communist aid to
North Vietnam 890 1,020 1,185 920 1,570 j
a Because of rounding. individual figures do not always add to the totals in this table.
The data for 1974 are preliminary.
C Although ammunition supplied to North Vietnam in 1974 constituted an estimated 40 percent of its military aid, the data regarding
probable ammunition costs per ton are admittedly "soft." Therefore, if the price estimates are off by, say, 10 percent, the total
value for ammunition alone could fluctuate by some YS $17 million.
d The lack of hard information on the items included under "Other military-related support" makes these estimates subject to a wider
margin of euvr than exists for other categories of military assistance to North Vietnam.
a For economic goods, the cost of transportation it included in the cost of the goods as shown in the table. (For military goods,
delivery and packaging costs are included under "Other military-related support. ')
f Since North Vietnamese exports in these years paid for some of North Vietnam's imports, they have been subtracted to derive the
estimates of Communist aid to North Vietnam.
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COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO NORTH VIETNAM,
1970-1974
We present the major conclusions
drawn from recent interagency analyses
of Communist military and economic aid
to North Vietnam.
Communist aid to North Vietnam from 1970 to
1974 is estimated at $5.6 billion. Total Commu-
nist military and economic aid in 1974 was higher
(in current dollars) than in any previous year, as
shown in Table I.
--The high level of military deliveries in
1972 replaced North Vietnamese combat losses
in that year.
--The cessation of US air attacks in North
Vietnam at the beginning of 1973 and the de-
cline in combat activity in the South in 1973
resulted in decreases in air defense equipment
assistance and in the amount of ammunition and
ground forces equipment provided to Hanoi.
--In 1974, the delivery of ammunition to Hanoi
markedly increased and reached a level as high
as that of 1972, although deliveries of ground
forces equipment continued at relatively low
levels.
--At the levels of military aid shown, North
Vietnam's military capabilities in the South
have increased, demonstrating that NVA capa-
bilities are not exclusively aid-driven--
particularly when the aid flows of only one
or two years are considered.
Economic aid to North Vietnam during 1970-1974
amounted to about $3.6 billion, rising from almost
$700 million in 1970 to nearly $1.2 billion in 1974.
--Economic aid was reduced to nearly $400 mil-
lion in 1972 with the closure of North Viet-
namese ports, but with their reopening rose
in 1973 and reached a record level in 1974.
The economic aid increase in 1974 was further
(continued)
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spurred by typhoons which damaged the 1973
North Vietnamese autumn rice harvest, the in-
flation of dollar values in 1974, and the in-
creased pace of North Vietnamese reconstruc-
tion in 1974.
--China became the leading supplier of economic
aid for the first time in 1973.
The estimates of military and economic aid to
North Vietnam are not equivalent to--and hence not
comparable with--US aid to South Vietnam.
--On the matter of accuracy, our information
on North Vietnam has always been incomplete,
although coverage on civilian imports is sub-
stantially better than for military aid. The
drawdown of the US presence in Southeast Asia
has further limited
so that current in-
formation on North Vietnam is less comprehen-
sive than it was formerly.
In particular, on the question of Communist
military aid, our information base is very spotty.
Hence we know we are seeing only part of the pic-
ture on military aid, and our estimates for the
part we cannot see have a wide margin of error.
--Military aid to North Vietnam is focused on
materiel required for the type of military
action undertaken by the Communist forces in
South Vietnam--i.e., selected attacks from
redoubt areas at times and places of their
choice.
US military aid to South Vietnam supports a
different military mission--i.e., defense of scat-
tered communities, large agricultural areas, and
lines of communication, plus reaction and reinforce-
ment of local forces after Communist attack. As
the total forces for the different missions differ
in size, so do their requirements for assistance.
Throughout the war, South Vietnam's forces
have been roughly twice the size of North Vietnam's
forces in the South, primarily because the missions
of South Vietnam's forces--protecting population
and holding territory--have required a much larger
and widely dispersed military structure.
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Table II
Comparisons of Major Categories of
Communist Military Aid to North Vietnam and
US Aid to South Vietnama
In Million US$
Communist Military Aid
Delivered to
North Vietnam
CV 1974
US Military Aid
So Far Appropriated to
South Vietnam
FY 1975
Total Military Aid"
400 (100%)
700 (100%)
Military Equipment and Materiel
275 (69%)
268 (38%)
Air Defense Equipment
55 (14%)
? (negl.)
Ground Forces Equipment
45 (11%)
(negl.)
Ammunition
170 (43%)
268 (38%)
Other
5 (1%)
? (negl.)
Military Transportation Equipment
25 (6%)
(negl.)
Delivery Costs
20 (5%)
74 (11%)
Other Military-Related Support
80 (20%)
358 (51%)
(including spare parts, POL for the military,
technical assistance and training, medical
supplies, and miscellaneous costs)
8 The figures on Communist aid to North Vietnam (some of which are soft estimates) are not readily comparable with US aid appropriaeons
for South Vietnam. Also, the data on Communist aid is kept on a calendar year basis while US aid appropriations are keyed to a Fiscal
Year cycle. The above table, however, gives a rough indication of the way the two aid packages break out in CY 1974 for Communist aid
and FY 1975 for US aid.
bone reason for the wide disparity is a charge against the US aid account for administrative expenses for the DAO in South Vietnam which
has no known counterpart on the Communist side. There are also other items for which no counterparts on the Communist side are
available, such as offshore maintenance servicing of military equipment, and construction.
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--The GVN has therefore also required a com-
bat air force and an ability to redeploy
forces rapidly by ground and air transport.
Thus, the types of equipment supplied to South
Vietnam by the US have been more sophisticated
and therefore more expensive than those re-
quired by Hanoi. South Vietnam also requires
considerably more logistic support.
--In addition, shipping, overhead, and other
support costs of military aid to the GVN are
substantially more than support costs of Com-
munist aid to North Vietnam because of the
greater distance involved and other factors.
(See Table II.)
--On the economic aid side, much firmer data
are available on the amount of goods delivered,
although there is a lack of information on
quality and appropriate price data, as well as
on the number of technicians and academic
trainees.
It should also be noted that, in the final
analysis, what is significant is not so much the
level of military assistance but the relative bal-
ance of forces on the battlefield in South Vietnam.
North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, supported
by record stockpiles of military supplies, are
stronger today than they have ever been.
The Communists are expected to sharply in-
crease the tempo of the fighting in the next few
months. Given the present military balance in the
South, the GVN's forces will not be decisively de-
feated during the current dry season. At currently
appropriated levels of US military assistance, how-
ever, the level of combat that we anticipate in
the next few months will place the Communists in
a position of significant advantage over the South
Vietnamese forces in subsequent fighting.
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