THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 MAY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014788
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 3, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
May 3, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption categoix5B(1)A25.(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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May 3, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: Verbal attacks between Socialists and
Communists have escalated even further, rais-
ing political tensions to a level where the
Armed Forces Movement may feel compelled to
intervene. (Page 1)
South Vietnam: The communists continue to give
priority to detaining officers of the defeated
government and to securing control over exist-
ing agencies and organizations. (Page 2)
USSR: The Soviets continue to be relatively re-
strained in their treatment of the communist
victory in South Vietnam. (Page 4)
USSR: The Soviet Ministry of Defense apparently
is planning its strategic program on the basis
of the 2,400-launcher ceiling agreed to at
Vladivostok. (Page 5)
Bahrain: Prospects for formalizing renewal of the
US navy stationing accord in the near future
now appear uncertain. (Page 6)
South Korea: President Pak is citing an increased
threat of attack from the North as justifica-
tion for cracking down harder on his domestic
political opposition. (Page 7)
Notes: PLO - USSR; Iran - Latin America (Page 9)
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PORTUGAL
Political tension has reached a
serious level in Lisbon, where the
Socialist and Communist parties have
stepped up their verbal attacks on one
another. The Armed Forces Movement
may feel compelled to intervene.
After trading charges with the Communists
throughout the day yesterday over the disruptions
at the May Day celebration, the Socialists staged
a mass protest demonstration last night. The
crowd, which military police estimated at 50-60,000
and which included some supporters of the center-
left Popular Democratic Party, marched through the
streets of Lisbon chanting "Socialism yes, dicta-
torship no."
Troops of the Portuguese internal security
force kept a close watch on the demonstrators
throughout the evening. Socialist Party leader
Soares and Justice Minister Zenha addressed the
crowd, which began to disperse around midnight
without serious incident.
Earlier in the day, Mario Soares was summoned
to meet with Prime Minister Goncalves and President
Costa Gomes, reportedly to discuss the incidents of
the day before and the increasingly virulent ex-
changes between the Socialists and Communists.
The "inner" cabinet--the Prime Minister, three
military ministers, and the chiefs of the four
coalition parties who serve as ministers without
portfolio--also met in emergency session.
The leaders of the Armed Forces Movement place
a premium on cooperation among the parties, but
might be tempted to use the current discord to re-
duce the role of the parties in the government
even further. The proposal to form a new party to
collaborate with the Armed Forces Movement--first
raised by Admiral Rosa Coutinho before the recent
election--might also surface again.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The communists in South Vietnam
continue to give first priority to
detaining officers of the defeated
government and securing control over
existing agencies and organizations.
According to an intercepted North Vietnamese
message, the communist General Staff has directed
that its units should arrest all officers of field-
grade rank and higher, dissolve the defeated units,
and send home the junior officers and enlisted men.
Press reporting indicates that at least some cap-
tured officers are being held in "re-education
camps" for indoctrination leading to communist-
style rehabilitation and eventual release for em-
ployment in new jobs.
Former government administrators are subject
to arrest as "country sellers," but the communists
apparently want to keep government agencies in-
tact, presumably in order to maintain essential
services while they establish more pervasive con-
trol over the people. Great stress is being put
on maintaining order and preventing plundering by
occupying forces.
Although labor leader Tran Quoc Buu, who has
escaped the country, is labeled a traitor, the
unions that belonged to his confederation will ap-
parently be used by the communists as mechanisms
for gaining control over organized labor in Saigon.
Existing unions are instructed to continue voca-
tional activities, but they will be supervised by
the communists' "General Federation of Free Trade
Unions.' Members of Buu's defunct confederation
have been given 24 hours to report to communist
authorities, who presumably will exploit their
knowledge of the unions to bring them rapidly under
firm control.
In its first major action toward a Southeast
Asian neighbor since gaining control over all of
Vietnam, Hanoi is leaning heavily on Thailand to
return US-supplied military hardware taken to Thai
bases by fleeing South Vietnamese. Claiming that
(continued)
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this materiel belongs to the South Vietnamese peo-
ple and therefore to the new communist administra-
tion, a Nhan Dan editorial warns: "The Vietnamese
people can postpone considering other problems
created by the Thai military dictatorial regime.
However, they will never give up consideration of
the present issue."
Nine South Korean embassy personnel and about
130 Korean civilians failed to make their escape
from Saigon when the embassy closed there. Be-
cause of South Korea's role earlier in the war,
it is feared that at least some of these people
may be apprehended and dealt with harshly. Seoul
is asking for help from third countries, including
France, Sweden, and Japan.
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USSR
The Soviets continue to be relatively
restrained in their treatment of the com-
munist victory in South Vietnam and ap-
pear to be looking for a lead from Hanoi
before taking a clear-cut position on
some of the crucial issues.
In a congratulatory message to North Vietnamese
leader Le Duan on May 1, party chief Brezhnev re-
ferred to the installation in Saigon of an "adminis-
tration," making no mention of the Provisional Re-
volutionary Government in this context. This sug-
gests that Moscow thinks that Hanoi would now just
as soon deemphasize the governmental aspects of the
PRG. A congratulatory message from the Soviet lead-
ership to the PRG leaders, also delivered on May 1,
wishes them success in implementing their "national
aspirations," but pledges Soviet support for the
"South Vietnamese patriots," rather than the PRG
- per se.
The Brezhnev message to Le Duan included a
paragraph regarding the tasks and problems now fac-
ing Hanoi. This may be one way of suggesting that
the North Vietnamese submerge whatever inclinations
they might have to become more adventuresome else-
where in the region. Cited among the "numerous dif-
ficulties" facing Hanoi were the "actions by exter-
nal forces hostile to the Vietnamese people's
national interests." In using the term "external
forces," when he might have used "imperialist
forces," Brezhnev clearly meant to put China on the
list of those Hanoi should worry about.
Concern that the Chinese may stand to benefit
from the US withdrawal may be one reason for Moscow's
decision to refrain from direct criticism of Wash-
ington. Moscow may even be trying to float the idea
that the US and the USSR have some shared interests
in Indochina and Southeast Asia that could be ex-
plored further.
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USSR
The Soviet Ministry of Defense ap-
parently is planning its strategic pro-
gram on the basis of the 2,400-launcher
ceiling agreed at Vladivostok. This
would imply a Soviet assumption that a
formal SALT agreement embodying this fig-
ure is likely.
The Ministry of Defense has been required to
justify to the Soviet State Planning Committee, or
some other higher authority, planned expenditures
for armaments and capital construction which appear
to be in dispute.
To defend his budget request for the 1976-1980
five-year plan, Defense Minister Grechko,
to draw together information on recent in-
creases in Western arms budgets, specifically those
of the US, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. He
proposed to cite the Western figures to buttress his
case that the Soviet military must receive adequate
funding if it is to "surpass" Western efforts and to
avoid falling behind technologically. In addition,
Grechko asked that selected data on the cost of So-
viet systems be presented. He may have wished to
show that newer generation Soviet systems are far
more costly than their predecessors.
Grechko particularly wanted 3 to 5 billion
rubles to be included in the budget to offset possi-
ble "failures" vis-a-vis the US. The reference to
"failures" is obscure, but Grechko mentioned such
US systems as the Trident submarine and may be con-
cerned about the Soviets' ability to match or counter
them. He may be seeking to hedge against technical
failures or, possibly, a failure at SALT to achieve
the restraints they want on US programs.
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BAHRAIN
The government of
Bahrain
is
hesi-
tant about formalizing
renewal
of
the US
navy stationing accord
because
of
stiff
parliamentary opposition, and prospects
for an early conclusion of the agreement
now appear uncertain. The Bahrainis
earlier had given repeated assurances
that the arrangement would be concluded
shortly.
The foreign minister expects within the next
month a sense-of-the-assembly motion--likely to be
adopted overwhelmingly by parliament--calling for
an end to the US naval presence. He said that the
resolution does not have the force of law and that
the government is determined to adhere to the sta-
tioning agreement. He added, however, that after
the assembly's summer recess, the opposition may try
to pass legislation terminating the accord. Such a
move would raise questions as to the assembly's
authority over foreign policy, a matter on which the
constitution is unclear.
Negotiations to renew the accord--originally
signed in 1971 and terminated by Bahrain during the
October 1973 war--were completed a month ago. Ac-
cording to the foreign minister, the cabinet is try-
ing to decide whether to adhere formally to the
stationing agreement before or after the anticipated
assembly debate. The government fears that a par-
liamentary wrangle over the stationing accord could
produce a public airing of the issue of a US naval
presence that would embarrass the ruling family.
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SOUTH KOREA
President Pak is citing an increased
threat of attack from the North as justi-
fication for cracking down harder on his
domestic political opposition.
Over the past several weeks the Pak government
has executed eight political prisoners held since
early last year; sent troops to occupy one major
university and closed down others; passed an "anti-
slander" law curbing political dissent; arrested
or otherwise intimidated a number of its more ac-
tive political opponents; and expelled from the
country an American missionary who had been criti-
cal of the reciime.
This kind of approach to domestic dissent re-
flects in part Pak's disappointment with the fruits
of the conciliatory tactics he tried during the
winter months--the staged national referendum on
his stewardship and the release of some 150 pris-
oners. These gestures did take some of the steam
out of the anti-Pak movement for a time, but oppo-
sition politicians soon began to speak out vigor-
ously once again, and university students went
ahead with their traditional spring demonstrations.
Pak's inclination to get tough was reinforced
by developments in Indochina and by the recent trip
of Kim Il-song to Peking. Pak claims that these
events will inevitably result in a greater threat
of attack from the North. He is, in general, dram-
atizing?the danger to justify suppression of crit-
icism. In a major address on April 29 aimed at in-
stilling confidence in the South Korean people,
however, Pak also emphasized that the northern
threat should not be overestimated.
Pak is aware that he will have to pay a price
for the domestic crackdown in terms of diminished
support in the US, where his policies on human
rights have been sharply criticized. Pak seems,
(continued)
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nevertheless, to have consciously reached the deci-
sion that stricter discipline--demanded by national
security--has a greater priority than the need to
satisfy the US public and Congress. He appears to
have concluded that he will never be able to fully
satisfy his critics in the US and that to attempt
it would undermine his positions.
Pak is also thinking hard about his
longer term military situation. He has
stated his firm determination to develop
a Korean missile production capability
within the next three to five years.
While recognizing the financial burden
such a program would place on his coun-
try, Pak made it clear?to our ambassador
earlier this week--that he was looking
ahead to the day when US forces would be
withdrawn from South Korea.
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Seoul is also looking to the US for assistance
to achieve self-sufficiency in missile-related tech-
nology, but Pak pointed out to the ambassador that
he would seek help from third countries if US aid
could not be obtained. Seoul reportedly is ready
to conclude an agreement with a French firm for a
propellant plant if a similar US facility cannot
be obtained.
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NOTES
PLO chief Arafat, who was orginally slated to
leave for Czechoslovakia yesterday, will now stay
in the USSR until Sunday.
His extensive discussions with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko have apparently left substantial
areas of disagreement between Moscow and the Pales-
tinians.
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One line of speculation is that recognition of Is-
rael's existence is at the heart of the discussions.
If true, this may mean that the Soviets are trying
to get some commitment from Arafat that might reduce
Israeli resistance to Palestinian representation at
Geneva.
The Shah of Iran will begin a visit,t0. vene-
zuela.and Mexico on Monday before arriving in the
US on May 15.
The Shah is seeking through personal diplomacy
and bilateral arrangements to broaden Iran's polit-
ical and economic ties to Latin America. He has
singled out Venezuela and Mexico because they are
oil producers. He and Venezuelan President Perez
are both interested in closer cooperation within
OPEC to keep prices up and to balance the Arabs in
the organization. The Shah's main interest in visit-
ing Mexico is probably to learn Mexico's plans for
developing and marketing its oil. He probably will
also try to persuade the Mexicans to join OPEC;
Mexico has rebuffed similar attempts by Venezuela
and other OPEC countries. Iran is not neglecting
other Latin countries. The establishment of diplo-
matic relations with Cuba, Jamaica, and Panama in
February and with Colombia in April brings to 14 the
number of Latin American governments having politi-
cal ties with Iran.
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