THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 OCTOBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977033
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 11, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600100001-2
The President's Daily Brief
11 October 1969
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 October 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviets are professing a renewed interest in
helping the Paris peace talks along. (Page 1)
The new travel restrictions in Czechoslovakia will
not only close off an escape hatch for harried
Czechoslovak liberals, but will also keep foreigners
from coming in--at least for the next few months.
(Page 4)
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VIETNAM
The Soviet Union seems ready to play a role in
the Vietnam talks again. Soviet Minister Tcherniakov
took the initiative with Ambassador Sullivan on 8
October. He said the USSR was interested in being
as "active as ever" in the negotiations, and he asked
if there was "any area in the field of military de-
escalation" where the Soviets could be helpful.
Tcherniakov promised to seek an answer to Sul-
livan's question about Hanoi's military intentions.
He also suggested that many obstacles in the talks
could be surmounted by working through "subordinate"
US and Soviet officials, especially in Paris. In
closing, Tcherniakov said that it was Moscow's im-
pression that Ho's death had produced a period of
"indecision" in Hanoi in which new, long-term poli-
cies were still under review. The USSR, he said,
wanted to influence the direction of future North
Vietnamese decisions.
If Moscow indeed follows through on
Tcherniakov's offers, it will be the first
significant Soviet initiative regarding
Vietnam in months.
Pham Van Dong's recent visit to Moscow
could have been the occasion for the form-
ulation of new instructions to the Soviet
mission in the US, although we have no
hard evidence to this effect.
Assuming the Soviet approach is genuine,
it is possible to speculate that Hanoi
is preparing to get down to business again
in Paris.
Tcherniakov's comment that the North Viet-
namese are undecided about how to proceed,
and his suggestion that Moscow can influ-
ence the regime's future course should
not be taken at face value. The North
Vietnamese probably have set their imme-
diate course, both in the war and the
talks, and have once again rung in the
Soviets to sound out US intentions. A
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deeper probing of North Vietnamese inten-
tions could lead to the tentative hypothesis
that they may have asked the Soviets to
bring up military de-escalation on the
assumption that this topic is of special
interest to the US.
Progress through these circuitous channels
would be slow at best, and Tcherniakov
probably would come back with only some
vague formulation of Hanoi's intentions.
Nonetheless, when the Soviets stepped into
the picture last year, it almost always
could be taken as a sign of seriousness on
the part of the Vietnamese Communists.
This was most readily apparent in June
1968; only two days after Le Duc Tho passed
through Moscow on his first trip to the
Paris talks the USSR began playing a much
more active part on the sidelines of the
negotiations.
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THAILAND
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NOTE
Czechoslovakia: The severe travel restrictions
suddenly imposed by the regime have long been pushed
by the ultraconservatil'Tes. They will close off an
escape hatch for liberals fearing retribution for
their activities last year and might lead some of
them to stop opposing the Husak regime. One little
noticed feature of the new regulations is their in-
clusion of "temporary" restrictions on foreigners
trying to enter Czechoslovakia. These will probably
last at least until next spring when the government
may take another look at them because of tourism's
importance as a source of hard currency.
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Top Secret
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