THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 JANUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993087
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 18, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-.RDP79T00936A010300150001-6
The President's Daily Brief
18 January 1972,
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THETRESIDENT S DAILY BRIEF
18 January 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Heavy fighting continues on Skyline Ridge, while
southwest of Long Tieng air strikes apparently have
forced a Communist force to withdraw. (Page 1)
Norway and the European Community have agreed on
terms for Norway's accession. (Page 3)
At Annex, we assess the loss of momentum President
Allende's government has been experiencing in its
attempt to establish a Marxist-socialist state.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LONG TIENG AREA
?
7T
Skvernent-held location
Coinmunist-held locailon
A Hi(point
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Phou Se, .\
4ruong Pot ' JAR RES.
1141st
ha Tam Bleung
4335th
1150Phou Pha Sal
L
?
?
ong Tieng'
866th \
ha Khao
Khang KFe
Muong
ha
552437 1-72 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Heavy fighting continues on Skyline Ridge over-
looking Long Tieng, and skirmishing continues through-
out the area. Irregular units yesterday recaptured
one position on the ridge after three days of fight-
ing at close quarters.
An irregular patrol has found evidence that air-
strikes have caused heavy enemy casualties and appar-
ently forced a battalion-sized Vietnamese force to
withdraw from an area southwest of Long Tieng. South
of Long Tieng, the government has moved another 400
troops into a projected fire support base. Four
105-mm. and four 155-mm. howitzers will be positioned
there within a few days.
East of the Plaine des Jarres, Communist logis-
tic elements are extremely active. Intercepts from
rear service elements in North Vietnam refer to the
delivery of more than 1,100 tons of supplies to north
Laos. Included were 715 tons of ordnance, a consid-
erable amount for this theater. No time frame for
the deliveries was specified.
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USSR-CUBA
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NOTE
Norway - European Communities: Norway will now
join with the UK, Denmark, and Ireland in signing
the EC accession treaty on 22 January. The way was
cleared when Norway and the EC agreed last weekend
on the text of a special protocol giving Norwegians
exclusive fishing rights within 12 miles of most of
their coast for a ten-year transition period and
promising consideration of their special problems
thereafter. Norway's accession, however, must still
be approved by an advisory referendum sometime this
spring and subsequently by parliament.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE: ALLENDE LOSES MOMENTUM
The defeat of government candidates in the two
legislative by-elections on Sunday was a harsh set-
back for President Allende. His political opponents
are encouraged and henceforth will be more resistant
to his efforts to divide and weaken them. Moreover,
the election setback caps a series of difficulties
that have been crowding in on Allende since late
last year.
In order to regain the political momentum that
characterized his first year in office, Allende will
have to take some decisive action. More than ten
days ago he promised to make a major policy speech
but has repeatedly postponed it. The delays may re-
flect some pulling and hauling within the adminis-
tration over important policy pronouncements and
perhaps also the need first to assess the political
impact of Sunday's by-elections.
To give his administration a new head of steam,
Allende will have to tackle myriad problems that
might overwhelm a less skilled politician. His ob-
jective, the establishment of a Marxist-socialist
state in Chile, is being frustrated by an increas-
ingly confident political opposition. But economic
problems now seem to be the most intractable and to
these there are no easy answers.
--The populist policies he adopted early in his
administration put more money in the hands of the
lowest paid Chileans and substantially increased de-
mand for food and consumer goods; by late last year
this had led to annoying shortages and rising prices
despite stringent government controls.
--Imports also shot up and by year's end had
all but exhausted the substantial foreign exchange
reserves Allende inherited.
--Mismanagement and indiscipline in the big
copper mines, taken over by the government only
last July, have resulted in lower production. This,
together with falling world copper prices, will cut
significantly into Chile's foreign exchange earnings
this year.
--The business community, which profited from
a sales boom early in 1971, is now feeling the pinch
of restrictions on supplies and prices. Some busi-
ness leaders are trying to resist government controls.
(continued)
Al
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--Agricultural production has been disrupted
by the intensified agrarian reform efforts of the
past year.
The government has moved in several ways to
deal with these problems. It put food distribution
under official control, promoted local food produc-
tion, and tightened controls on imports. The gov-
ernment averted a copper strike, strengthened man-
agement in the mines, and improved labor discipline.
On the international front, Allende sought to rene-
gotiate Chile's sizable debts and stopped payments
due for the partial nationalization of US copper in-
terests by his predecessor in 1967 and 1969. He ob-
tained some credits from abroad, notably from the
Soviet Union, which should ease the foreign exchange
crisis and help Chile meet short-term commercial
obligations.
These measures, however, have not halted the
public grumbling that was evident late last year.
The opposition has begun to make more effective use
of its legislative majority and the influence it
retains with many Chileans. Although Allende has
been adept at exploiting the ideological and per-
sonal rivalries dividing the opposition groups,
their new confidence and assertiveness have put him
on the defensive.
--The first major outbreak of public violence
in Santiago during Allende's term--a women's demon-
stration on 1 December to protest food shortages--
was larger and more determined than the government
had expected; police were unable to protect the
demonstrators from attacks by leftist agitators.
--An opposition move to bring impeachment
charges against Interior Minister Toha, blaming him
for the clashes, culminated in a vote to impeach
him in the lower house of Congress on 6 January.
Allende's prompt shift of Toha to the Defense Min?
istry is now being attacked as unconstitutional.-
? --Early this month the opposition in Congress.
dealt Allende another blow by cutting his budget.
proposalsin areas that affect certain key govern-
ment programs.-
--Throughout these troubled weeks Allende has
been conscious of growing discontent within the
armed forces.
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Allende is concerned that his efforts to assure con-
tinued military neutrality in Chilean politics may
not be enough in the long run to keep the military
in line. We think he is considering moves to give
the military a greater share of the action--perhaps
by including them in the government--as part of his
longer term hope of fully subordinating the armed
forces to political control.
--Student groups, some of them associated with
the opposition, violently resisted government efforts
late in the year to reorganize and gain control over
the National University.
--Chilean businessmen have had some success in
blocking government efforts to buy out the big, pri-
vately-owned paper company which holds a monopoly on
Chilean newsprint.
The accumulation-of pressure and problems has
led to much soul-searching by Allende and his com-
rades. The militant Socialists and more-pragmatic
Communists who vie for dominance in his disparate
coalition have reached new heights of mutual recrim-
ination and haggling Allende's position, which usu-
ally prevails, is that unity is vital to the consol-
idation-of the revolution and that ways must be found
quickly to regain lost momentum.
Reflecting on Allende's first year in office;
Defense Minister Toha observed that while the govern-
ment had served one sixth of its constitutional man-
date, it had implemented far more than one sixth of
its program. This may be. no exaggeration. But Al-
lende still must himself feel that he has not yet-
achieved his prime objective--assurance that the rev-
olution has-become irreversible.
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