THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 SEPTEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992885
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 27, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
27 September 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
27 September 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The situation in Communist China is discussed on
Pagel.,
The Chinese are trying to reassure the North Vietnam-
ese that Peking will not loose sight of Hanoi's in-
terests in talks with the US. (Page 3)
Soviets/
//(Page 4)
An analysis of Brezhnev and Tito's joint statement
is on Page 5.
Britain \USSR/
/ (Page 6)
Japanese officials are worried about growing politi-
cal violence. (Page 7)
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COMMUNIST CHINA
Press? reports state that preparations for low-
key celebrations of National Day on 1 October ?are
going forward in Peking's parks
security measures in the city
are relaxed. Despite the air of calm, behind-the-
scenes tension within the politburo apparently re-
mains high.r
There is no new information on the status of
Mao's health, ?but the absence of any official re-
action from Peking to growing press speculation
about the fate of heir-designate Lin Piao suggests
that uncertainty over Lin's physical condition, or
perhaps his political role, may be a crucial factor
in the leadership crisis.(
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the traditional National? Day banquet hosted
by Chou would be held as scheduled on 30 September.
This event may not shed any light on Mao's or Lin's
status because neither usually attends. Although
the decision to hold this affair probably is in-
tended to convey an impression of normalcy, post-
ponement of other scheduled activities suggests
that the regime anticipates no early resolution of
the crisis. A statement by Foreign Ministry offi-
cials that all foreign
businessmen have been instructed "to depart China"
may be an indication that the regime also plans to
postpone or cancel the Canton Trade Fair, scheduled
to open on 15 October.
The almost total suspension of military air-
craft flight activity is continuing into the third
week. There are indications that ground force units?
in Tibet continue to be on special alert, but there
is still no confirmation that such activity is na-
tionwide.
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NORTH VIETNAM - CHINA
? The current visit to Hanoi by a Chinese politburo
delegation is primarily designed to assuage Vietnam-
ese apprehensions that the Chinese might try to medi-
ate the war with the US. Ostensibly the visit is
that of .a routine aid mission, but it also gets the
? Chinese point of view into Hanoi more than a week
prior to the arrival of Soviet President Podgorny.
The Chinese initiative--sending politburo member Li
Hsien-nien and his aid team to Hanoi rather than
? having the Vietnamese come to Peking--suggests that
more than ?the annual aid protocol is involved. The
Vietnamese are responding in kind; they are refer-
ring to the delegation as one of "friendship," com-
paring it to Chou En-Zai-'s visit last March, and are
highlighting Chinese support for Hanoi's war aims
rather than Peking's material aid.
The tenor of Li ',s banquet speech on 24 September
was especially pleasing to Hanoi ears. He engaged
in the kind of harsh denunciation of US motives
that Hanoi is currently using, characterizing US
imperialism as the "most ferocious enemy of our
times" and criticizing Washington for making "noises
about a peaceful settlement while continuing its
war of aggression" in Indochina. Li also offered
unqualified support for Hanoi's negotiating posture
and reassured the Vietnamese that the destiny of
Indochina would indeed be decided by the "peoples
of the three Indochinese countries."
The Li visit may put to rest Vietnamese anxieties
generated by the announcement that President Nixon
had been invited to Peking. For about a month after
the announcement, Hanoi engaged in unprecedented
polemical lecturing of the Chinese, accusing them
of consorting with the enemy, abandoning friends,
and not being true revolutionaries. These attacks
stopped on 22 August as suddenZy as they had begun,
and since mid-September the Vietnamese have been
deliberately avoiding public criticism of Peking.
3
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INDIA-USSR
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USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
Brezhnev and Tito issued a joint statement
Saturday agreeing to improve relations.
They promised more cooperation between their
Communist parties, a step that could reverse
a situation in which there were few fruitful
contacts in recent years. Their statement
also called for more governmental and eco-
nomic collaboration. Both made an implied
pledge to end polemical criticism of the
other.
The Yugoslays received recognition of their
right to experiment in political and eco-
nomic reform as well as a long-sought Soviet
agreement to reciprocity in information pro-
grams conducted in the other's country. In
practice, reciprocity could mean a sharp
diminution of the USSR's propaganda effort
in Yugoslavia.
Both sides agreed to ease tensions in the
Balkans, and Brezhnev conceded that a nu-
clear-free zone in the area "could be" .a
means of stabilizing peace there. This non-
commital position falls short of the Yugo-
slav desire that the Soviets renounce the
use of force in the Balkans. The statement
contained a reference to earlier Soviet-
Yugoslav declarations of intent to end their
differences and guarantee Yugoslav sover-
eignty dating back to 19553 but this for-
mula did not satisfy Tito's desire for a
specific Soviet promise to keep hands off
his country.
Because neither Brezhnev nor Tito changed
their basic positions, it is doubtful that
either side will interpret the provisions
of their joint statement to the full satis-
faction of the other. However, when compared
to recent tensions between the two, relations
should improve for a while, at least on the
surface. Tito will accept the respite for
what it is, but his worries about Moscow's
ultimate intentions in the Balkans will re-
main.
Following the visit Brezhnev flew to Budapest
to brief Hungarian leaders on the talks. Yesterday
he arrived in Sofia to make a similar report. Hun-
gary and Bulgaria aided the USSR's effort to keep
pressure on Yugoslavia this summer.
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USSR-UK
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JAPAN
Saturday's demonstration at the imperial
palace is but the latest example of how
the use of violence is replacing more
traditional forms of ritualistic protest
among radical Japanese youth and students.
It was the first forcible intrusion by
students in modern times onto the well--
guarded grounds. Other leftist groups
are said to be preparing further demon-
strations against Emperor Hirohito's trip
abroad.
The police are expecting massive protests after
the Diet convenes in mid-October to consider the
Okinawa agreement. They are particularly worried
by evidence that guns and explosives are in the
hands of established radical youth organizations,
and no longer restricted to a tiny lunatic fringe
of the youth movement. Officials fear that the
larger organizations might use such weapons during
the coming mass demonstrations in order to trigger
widespread violence.
Any such spread of violence could readily
compound the Sato government's anticipated
difficulties with the Diet over the issues
of the Okinawa treaty and relations with
China.
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NOTE
USSR: The top leaders are continuing to add
new destinations to their itineraries for this fall.
TASS has announced that President Podgorny will
visit India and Burma on his way to Hanoi; he will
stop in Rangoon on 2 October. Premier Kosygin is
said to have added Morocco to his schedule, possi-
bly between visits to Algeria and Iran early next
month. The US Embassy in Ottawa has received a
number of hints that Kosygin may be interested in
a visit to the UN and perhaps meetings with the
"highest" US of during or after his stay in
Canada from 17 to 27 October.
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Top Secret
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